Shamlian v. Equitable Acc. Co.

• Decision Date: 10 February 1917
• Citation: 115 N.E. 46,226 Mass. 67
• Parties: SHAMLIAN v. EQUITABLE ACC. CO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

226 Mass. 67

115 N.E. 46

SHAMLIAN

v.EQUITABLE ACC. CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Feb. 10, 1917.

Appeal from Municipal Court of Boston, Appellate Division.

Action by Alice Shamlian against the Equitable Accident Company. On report of a judge of the municipal court of the city of Boston to the appellate division of that court, which ordered dismissal of the report, defendant appeals. Order affirmed.

D. T. Montague, of Boston, for appellant.

Gaston, Snow & Saltonstall, of Boston (Wm. E. Russell, of Boston, of counsel), for appellee.

CROSBY, J.

The plaintiff is the beneficiary named in an accident insurance policy duly issued by the defendant to one John K. Shamlian, husband of the plaintiff, for $1,000, by the terms of which she is entitled to receive that amount in the event of the death of the insured ‘by external, violent and accidental means.’

The case is before us upon a report of a judge of the municipal court of the city of Boston. The report recites that:

‘It appeared in evidence that on the morning of February 9, 1914, the assured, John K. Shamlian, who was a jeweler with a place of business on Washington street near Dover street in Boston, left his home for the purpose of going to Lawrence in the pursuit of his business; that he did not return to his home that night and that on Tuesday night, February 10, his brother went to Lawrence and traced his whereabouts as late as nine o'clock on Monday night, February 9, 1914, and that nothing further was known of his whereabouts until March 11, 1914, when the dismembered body of said John K. Shamlian was found buried in a shallow grave in the town of Andover, Mass.’

The medical examiner of the district in which the body was found testified that he viewed the body on March 11, 1914, and the next morning performed an autopsy; that he found the body dismembered; that in his opinion death was caused by external violence; and that he signed a death certificate. He further testified that in his opinion the death occurred ‘anywhere from three to five weeks before the autopsy.’ He also testified at length concerning the appearance of the body. The only evidence offered of the date and cause of death was the testimony of the medical examiner and the death certificate filed by him in the office of the city clerk of the city of Lawrence. In the certificate the following appears:

‘Disease or cause of death, blows upon the head causing fracture of the skull and bruising and laceration of brain (murder).’

The defendant duly objected to the introduction of the record of the death certificate filed in the office of the city clerk as evidence of the time, place, and cause of death, and contended that there was not sufficient evidence to warrant a finding that the deceased met his death by ‘external, violent, accidental means' within the terms of the policy. We are of opinion that the record was properly admitted under R. L. c. 29, § 20. It is not contended that the death certificate embodied in the record contains any statement which the medical examiner was not required by law to recite therein. R. L. c. 24, § 8.

R. L. c. 29, § 20, provides that such a record shall be ‘prima facie evidence of the facts recorded.’ For many years before the enactment of the Revised Laws which went into effect on January 1, 1902, this section of the statute provided that such a record ‘shall be prima facie evidence in legal proceedings of the facts recorded.’ Pub. St. c. 32, § 11; St. 1897, c. 444, § 21. Upon the enactment of the Revised Laws, the words ‘in legal proceedings' were omitted. An examination of the report of the commissioners who were appointed to consolidate and arrange the revision of the statutes fails to disclose any reason for the omission. It is, therefore, a reasonable inference that such omission was not intended to change the law as it had previously existed. The language of the statute is not limited in terms to cases where questions concerning public rights are involved, and cannot be so construed. Its landguage is clear and free from ambiguity and in our opinion the Legislature did not intend to except from its provisions proceedings between private parties growing out of contract or otherwise. No such limitation...