Shanks v. State, 93-KP-00852-SCT
| Decision Date | 11 April 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-KP-00852-SCT,93-KP-00852-SCT |
| Citation | 672 So.2d 1207 |
| Parties | Eddie James SHANKS v. STATE of Mississippi. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Eddie Shanks, pro se, Pearl.
Michael C. Moore, Attorney General, Scott Stuart, Sp. Asst. Attorney General, Jackson, for Appellee.
En Banc.
SMITH, Justice, for the Court:
Eddie James Shanks filed a motion for post-conviction relief in the Circuit Court of Wayne County alleging that his guilty plea to armed robbery was involuntary and unintelligently made. The trial judge entered an order denying the motion for post-conviction relief. Shanks filed an appeal to this Court claiming that the trial judge's comments regarding parole were misleading. We disagree. The trial judge was not required to inform Shanks of his ineligibility for parole. Ware v. State, 379 So.2d 904, 907 (Miss.1980).
FACTS
On April 2, 1990, Shanks pled guilty to armed robbery and robbery. Shanks received a twenty-five year sentence for armed robbery and a fifteen year concurrent sentence for robbery.
On February 18, 1993, Shanks filed a motion for post-conviction relief in the Circuit Court of Wayne County requesting that his guilty plea to armed robbery be vacated because the trial judge and his attorney failed to inform him that the first ten years of his armed robbery sentence would have to be served without possibility of parole pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 47-7-3(1)(d) (Supp.1990). On March 25, 1993, the trial judge entered an order denying the motion for post-conviction relief. In denying the post-conviction relief, the trial judge found that:
Mr. Shanks understood each paragraph [of his guilty plea petition] including Paragraph 16.... He stated that he understood whether he made parole or did not make parole would be up to the authorities at the Parole Board. Paragraph 16 of said petition, which Mr. Shanks signed under oath and which he told the Court he understood states that any estimate of the time required to serve before becoming eligible for parole or release made by his attorney was an estimate only and that the Parole Board was not bound by that estimate.
Shanks filed an appeal alleging that the trial judge failed to inform him that the first ten years of his sentence would be mandatory; thus, his plea was involuntary and unintelligently made.
DISCUSSION OF LAW
WHETHER THE TRIAL JUDGE'S FAILURE TO INFORM SHANKS OF THE MANDATORY PORTION OF HIS SENTENCE RENDERED THE PLEA INVOLUNTARY?
Shanks was informed of the minimum and maximum sentence he could receive for armed robbery in compliance with Rule 3.03(3)(B) of the Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice. The transcript of the guilty plea hearing indicates that Shanks was not informed that the first ten years of his sentence for armed robbery would have to be served without possibility of parole. See Miss.Code Ann. § 47-7-3(1)(d) (Supp.1990). Shanks claims that this fact renders his guilty plea involuntary. The State contends that there is no requirement that defendants be advised of parole eligibility information prior to entering a guilty plea, citing Womble v. State, 466 So.2d 910 (Miss.1985) and Ware v. State, 379 So.2d 904 (Miss.1980).
In Ware, the defendant was not advised until the sentencing hearing that the sentence for attempted armed robbery was without parole. Likewise, Shanks claims that he did not learn about the non-parolable portion of his sentence until after he had entered his guilty plea. This Court held that Ware "was not, as a constitutional right, entitled to full parole information at or before his guilty plea." Ware, 379 So.2d at 907. This language was later cited as authority in Womble, 466 So.2d at 912. See also Alexander v. State, 605 So.2d 1170, 1173-74 (Miss.1992).
Shanks is clearly not entitled to an evidentiary hearing under these circumstances because the trial judge's comments found objectionable were accurate statements of the law. The trial judge merely made the statement that he did not have jurisdiction to determine parole eligibility. The parole board, not the trial court, has jurisdiction over parole matters.
Through the colloquy between the court and Shanks, the guilty plea was properly entered. Shanks was properly informed of the maximum and minimum sentence as required by Rule 3.03(3)(B) of the Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice. Shanks indicated that he understood the impact of entering a plea of guilty to the charge of armed robbery, and the trial court found that he knowingly and intelligently entered his petition. Jurisdiction over the parole decision is vested in the parole board once the trial court has properly accepted a plea of guilty. Although the parole board may be bound by laws, such as Miss.Code Ann. § 47-7-3 (Cum.Supp.1995), in granting parole to a particular individual, there was no misrepresentation in the case at hand since the trial judge merely commented on the proper jurisdiction for parole decisions.
This Court, in Ware, specifically held that a trial judge was not required to inform a defendant of his ineligibility for parole. 379 So.2d at 907. Trial courts are not required to provide parole information because eligibility or ineligibility for parole is not a "consequence" of a plea of guilty, but a "matter of legislative grace" or a "consequence of the withholding of legislative grace." Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 436, 441 (D.C.Cir.1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 957, 84 S.Ct. 978, 11 L.Ed.2d 975 (1964); see also Fernandez v. United States, 492 F.2d 771 (5th Cir.1974) (). There is no merit to this issue and we must affirm the trial court.
DENIAL OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF AFFIRMED.
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