Williams v. Duffy
Citation | 513 S.E.2d 212,270 Ga. 580 |
Decision Date | 01 March 1999 |
Docket Number | No. S98A1984.,S98A1984. |
Parties | WILLIAMS v. DUFFY. |
Court | Supreme Court of Georgia |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Thurbert E. Baker, Atty. Gen., Angelica M. Woo, Asst. Atty. Gen., Paula K. Smith, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Department of Law, Atlanta, for Doug Williams, Warden.
Craig L. Cascio, Roswell, for Michael Duffy.
In 1996, Michael Duffy was charged with several offenses, including armed robbery. Retained counsel negotiated a plea bargain whereby, in exchange for Duffy's entry of a plea of guilty to that charge, the State would recommend that he receive a 15-year sentence. After conducting a hearing, the trial court accepted both Duffy's guilty plea and the State's recommended sentence. Subsequently, Duffy filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, alleging the ineffectiveness of his attorney. The habeas court found, as a matter of fact, that counsel had failed to advise Duffy that, pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-6.1(a)(2) and (c)(3), he would be ineligible for parole and, thus, would have to serve the entire 15-year sentence while incarcerated. Relying on Hutchison v. State, 230 Ga.App. 143, 495 S.E.2d 618 (1998), the habeas court further concluded, as a matter of constitutional law, that counsel's failure in this regard demonstrated his ineffectiveness. Based solely upon this finding and conclusion, the habeas court set aside Duffy's conviction and sentence for the armed robbery. The Warden appeals from the order granting this habeas corpus relief to Duffy.
1. Even a defendant who waives his right to trial and enters a guilty plea is entitled to effective legal assistance. Thompson v. Greene, 265 Ga. 782, 784(2), 462 S.E.2d 747 (1995). In order to show a constitutional violation of this Sixth Amendment right, however, the defendant must make a two-prong showing. He must demonstrate that his counsel erred and also Brantley v. State, 268 Ga. 151, 152(1), 486 S.E.2d 169 (1997). With regard to the performance prong, "the question is whether the attorney's advice falls within the range of competence of attorneys in criminal cases...." Smith v. Wilson, 268 Ga. 38, 39(2), 485 S.E.2d 197 (1997).
United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764, 768(III) (11th Cir.1985).
In Hutchison v. State, supra, the Court of Appeals held that counsel's failure to advise of parole ineligibility under OCGA § 17-10-6.1 violates the defendant's Sixth Amendment right which will authorize him to withdraw his guilty plea. However, this holding is clearly contrary to the weight of authority cited above, which provides that the failure to apprise the defendant of such a collateral consequence of the negotiated sentence does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, Hutchison is hereby overruled. We hold that Duffy is not entitled to habeas relief simply because he must comply with the literal terms of the plea bargain and serve the 15-year term of imprisonment that he accepted as punishment for the armed robbery which he freely and voluntarily acknowledged committing.
2. The habeas court also erred in predicating its grant of relief solely upon Duffy's purported satisfaction of the evidentiary burden as to the issue of his counsel's performance. As earlier pointed out, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is viable only if the defendant can prove that the performance of his attorney was deficient and that he was prejudiced thereby. For the reasons discussed in Division 1, counsel's failure to advise Duffy of his parole ineligibility fails to satisfy the requisite initial performance prong of a viable Sixth Amendment claim and, thus, any question of prejudice resulting from counsel's deficient performance never arises. Therefore, we need not remand for the habeas court to consider the unaddressed prejudice prong in this case, because, in no event, would Duffy be entitled to habeas relief.
Judgment reversed.
All the Justices concur, except BENHAM, C.J., and FLETCHER, P.J., who dissent. FLETCHER, Presiding Justice, dissenting.
Because competent counsel would inform a criminal defendant of a new sentencing statute that will require the defendant to serve more time if he accepts the state's plea offer than he will if he is tried and convicted, I dissent.
To establish ineffectiveness of counsel following a guilty plea, a defendant must show both that his counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and that, in the absence of his attorney's errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted upon facing trial.1
In 1994, the legislature proscribed more stringent punishments for the "seven violent felonies," including armed robbery. OCGA § 17-10-6.1 became effective January 1, 1995, following ratification of a constitutional amendment by Georgia voters. Under OCGA § 17-10-6.1(c)(3), a person who is convicted of one of seven "serious violent felonies," including armed robbery, and sentenced to less than life imprisonment is ineligible for parole. However, if that...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Smith v. The State
...persons or agencies other than the sentencing court constitutes a direct consequence of a guilty plea. See, e.g., Williams v. Duffy, 270 Ga. 580, 581, 513 S.E.2d 212 (1999) (holding that parole eligibility is a collateral consequence, because “ ‘eligibility or ineligibility for parole is no......
-
Kennedy v. Kohnle
...system" such that those subject to it should be given accurate information about it. Id. We explicitly overruled Williams v. Duffy, 270 Ga. 580, 513 S.E.2d 212 (1999), in which we had held that ineligibility for parole has a mere "collateral effect" on a criminal sentence and, therefore, a ......
-
Perez v. State
...received ineffective assistance of counsel because of erroneous advice about parole eligibility); see also Williams v. Duffy, 270 Ga. 580, 581-582(1), 513 S.E.2d 212 (1999) (failure to advise of parole guidelines does not render guilty plea invalid); State v. Colack, 273 Ga. 361, 541 S.E.2d......
-
Matthews v. State
...of parole. He concedes, however, that this claim is precluded by the Georgia Supreme Court's opinion in Williams v. Duffy, 270 Ga. 580, 581(1), 513 S.E.2d 212 (1999). He asserts it only to preserve the issue for any later habeas corpus claim. Based upon Williams, we find no merit in this cl......
-
Legal Ethics - Roy M. Sobelson
...at 612, 513 S.E.2d at 496. 229. Id. at 614-15, 513 S.E.2d at 498 (Sears, J., concurring specially). 230. See ga. Bar rules EC 2-20. 231. 270 Ga. 580, 513 S.E.2d 212 (1999). 232. O.C.G.A. Sec. 17-10-6.1(c)(3) (Supp. 1999). 233. 270 Ga. at 580, 513 S.E.2d at 213. 234. Id. at 581, 513 S.E.2d a......
-
Legal Ethics - Patrick Emery Longan
...Ga. App. 878, 698 S.E.2d 384 (2010). 183. Id. at 878, 698 S.E.2d at 385. 184. Id. at 881, 698 S.E.2d at 387 (quoting Williams v. Duffy, 270 Ga. 580, 581-82, 513 S.E.2d 212, 214 (1999)). 185. Id. at 881-82, 698 S.E.2d at 387 (citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010)). 186. Id......
-
Legal Ethics
...the ineffective assistance. Id. at 611-12, 761 S.E.2d at 293.170. 297 Ga. 59, 772 S.E.2d 655 (2015).171. Id. at 65, 772 S.E.2d at 660.172. 270 Ga. 580, 513 S.E.2d 212 (1999).173. Alexander, 297 Ga. at 60, 64-65, 772 S.E.2d at 657, 659-60.174. Id. at 64-65, 772 S.E.2d at 660 (quoting Padilla......
-
Criminal Law
...S.E.2d 655 (2015).111. Id. at 59, 772 S.E.2d at 656.112. Id.; see also Alexander v. State, 328 Ga. App. 300, 761 S.E.2d 844 (2014).113. 270 Ga. 580, 513 S.E.2d 212 (1999).114. Alexander, 297 Ga. at 59, 772 S.E.2d at 656; see also Alexander, 328 Ga. App. at 307, 761 S.E.2d at 849.115. Alexan......