Shannon v. Law-Yone
| Citation | 950 S.W.2d 429 |
| Decision Date | 24 July 1997 |
| Docket Number | M,No. 2-96-096-CV,LAW-YON,2-96-096-CV |
| Parties | Roy G. SHANNON, Appellant, v. ByronD. and Sanford Kiser, M.D., Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Harold D. Hammett, Fort Worth, Appellant.
J.M. Lee, Fort Worth, for Appellees.
Before LIVINGSTON, DAUPHINOT and HOLMAN, JJ.
Appellant Roy G. Shannon initially sued Appellees and several psychiatric hospitals on various claims, including fraud, false imprisonment, invasion of privacy, libel and slander, negligence, and conspiracy. After Shannon settled with some of the defendants, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the remaining defendants, Appellees Byron Law-Yone, M.D., and Sanford Kiser, M.D., ruling that all of the claims in Shannon's suit were barred by the two-year statute of limitations. 1 Shannon appeals, complaining in one point of error that the trial court erred by applying the incorrect statute of limitations to his fraud claim because the four-year, rather than two-year, statute of limitations applies to the fraud cause of action. 2 Because we find that the trial court incorrectly applied the two-year statute of limitations and erred in granting summary judgment, we reverse and remand the case for trial.
On February 22, 1989, Brookhaven Psychiatric Pavilion admitted Shannon as a voluntary inpatient for treatment relating to pain management and his addiction to pain-relieving medications. Shannon expressed a desire to end treatment and leave the facility several times during his stay by submitting letters requesting discharge within 96 hours ("96-hour" letters). After the first 96-hour letter, Dr. Law-Yone met with Shannon, his wife, and Sharon Young, a social worker and former defendant. Shannon then retracted the letter. He later submitted another 96-hour letter but retracted it the following morning. Shannon was discharged from the facility on or about April 7, 1989. This lawsuit was filed on February 19, 1993, more than two years but less than four years after the alleged cause of action accrued. 3
Shannon alleged fraud and other causes of action in his original and first amended original petitions. In a second amended petition, Shannon continued his initial claim that Appellees had defrauded and deceived him into rescinding his 96-hour letters and remaining hospitalized. He timely filed his second amended original petition about three weeks before the summary judgment hearing but after Appellees had filed their motion for summary judgment. 4
Limiting his suit to fraud and omitting all other causes previously pled, Shannon alleged more specific instances of fraudulent conduct by the two doctors, in response to their special exceptions to his original claims. The fraudulent acts Appellees allegedly committed to convince Shannon to lengthen his stay included creating false records and misrepresenting that his insurance would not cover his medical bills if he were to be discharged pursuant to a 96-hour letter and against medical advice. Appellees countered that Shannon expressed a desire to stay in Brookhaven and that his wife was adamant that he should stay there until he was free of his drug dependency problems. They also noted that Shannon's personal physician monitored his hospitalization.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees based on their two-year statute of limitations affirmative defense. The court concluded in its order that "this is a suit for personal injury damages sounding in tort...."
In his sole point of error, Shannon contends the trial court erred by interpreting his allegations as "an action that is 'essentially' a tort claim governed by the two-year statute." He asserts that his fraud allegations constitute a timely common-law fraud action subject to the four-year statute of limitations, rather than a time-barred tort claim.
Appellees argue in three counterpoints that the trial court correctly applied the two-year statute of limitations and granted summary judgment because Shannon's allegations are, in substance, a false imprisonment tort action rather than a common-law fraud action as pled. They additionally challenge Shannon's point of error on the bases that his pleadings were insufficient and his responsive summary judgment proof did not adequately establish a question of fact on damages.
In a summary judgment case, the issue on appeal is whether the movant met the summary judgment burden by establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 5 The burden of proof is on the movant. 6 All doubts about the existence of a genuine issue of a material fact are resolved against the movant. 7 Therefore, we must view the evidence and its reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. 8
In deciding whether there is a material fact issue precluding summary judgment, all conflicts in the evidence will be disregarded and the evidence favorable to the nonmovant will be accepted as true. 9 Evidence that favors the movant's position will not be considered unless it is uncontroverted. 10
A defendant is entitled to summary judgment if the summary judgment evidence establishes, as a matter of law, that at least one element of a plaintiff's cause of action cannot be established. 11 To accomplish this, the defendant-movant must present summary judgment evidence that negates an element of the plaintiff's claim. Once this evidence is presented, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to put on competent controverting evidence that proves the existence of a genuine issue of material fact with regard to the element challenged by the defendant. 12 A defendant as movant may also prevail on a summary judgment motion by pleading and conclusively establishing each essential element of an affirmative defense. 13 A summary judgment for the defendant is only proper if the plaintiff could not succeed as a matter of law upon any theories pled. 14
The claim that Shannon labels a fraud claim primarily consists of allegations that Appellees "misrepresented the nature, extent, content or financial consequences of the treatment he would or should receive from them...." Shannon alleged fraud, deceit, and intimidation by Appellees resulting in "willful and unlawful detention, illegal incarceration, unwarranted and willful intrusion into his marital and personal life at home and at work, and ... the sale of personal assets to cover fraudulent medical bills."
A claim for misrepresentation that can be read as a common-law fraud action is governed by the four-year statute of limitations. 15 The elements of common-law fraud or misrepresentation are: 1) a material misrepresentation was made; 2) the misrepresentation was false; 3) it was false at the time it was made; 4) the speaker knew it was false or made the misrepresentation recklessly without any knowledge of its truth or falsity; 5) the misrepresentation was made with the intention that it be acted upon by the recipient; 6) the recipient did act in reliance; and 7) the recipient was injured as a result of that reliance (i.e. damages). 16 Shannon tracked these elements in his fraud allegations in his second amended original petition.
Pleadings shall be construed so as to do substantial justice, and the general rule that pleadings are construed in favor of the pleader is particularly applicable in a summary judgment proceeding. 17 Shannon's live pleading at the time of the summary judgment hearing was his second amended original petition. In addition to tracking the elements of fraud, this pleading contained specific allegations that Appellees fraudulently and coercively obtained the 96-hour letter retractions.
Shannon claimed that false statements and misrepresentations made by Appellees and their agents were a common fraud used to convince patients to rescind 96-hour letters and that they were made with the intent of inducing Shannon to withdraw his 96-hour letters and remain hospitalized to his detriment. Shannon described the circumstances surrounding these retractions in his second amended original petition:
During his incarceration at Brookhaven [Shannon] signed a number of 96-hour letters. Each time [Shannon] signed a 96-hour letter either or both Law-Yone and Kiser would do anything and everything within their power to coerce, pressure, trick and defraud [Shannon] to rescind his 96-hour letters, including enlisting the aid of [Shannon's] family members through fraudulent information, trickery and deceit. These coercions, pressures and persuasions included having mental health workers strap him down and telling him that they would have him transferred to Terrell State Mental Hospital to be committed for six months or longer. [Shannon] was threatened by Law-Yone and Kiser with being involuntarily committed and transferred to Terrell State Mental Hospital if he did not rescind a given 96-hour letter on at least three occasions.
Shannon also specifically alleged that Appellees created false records as a basis for lengthening patients' stays to increase census and revenue, and that they misrepresented verbally to Shannon, his friends, and his family and in medical notes that he was suicidal, dangerous to his family, or a present danger to himself or others. He accused Appellees of fraudulently representing that his insurance company would not pay his medical bills and that he would be personally liable for them if he was discharged against medical advice (pursuant to a 96-hour letter). He further described their tactics of "falsely stating to a patient or to the spouse of a patient that the other wanted to terminate the relationship," "maliciously recommending that the relationship should be terminated," and "claiming the patient was dangerous to be around friends or family members."
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Other Workplace Torts
...denied , 514 U.S. 1004 (1995) (holding that to sustain a claim for fraud, plaintiff must prove pecuniary loss). In Shannon v. Law-Yone, 950 S.W.2d 429, 436 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, review denied), on the other hand, the court held that the damage caused need not be pecuniary, but must re......
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Other Workplace Torts
...denied , 514 U.S. 1004 (1995) (holding that to sustain a claim for fraud, plaintiff must prove pecuniary loss). In Shannon v. Law-Yone, 950 S.W.2d 429, 436 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, review denied), on the other hand, the court held that the damage caused need not be pecuniary, but must re......
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Other workplace torts
...denied , 514 U.S. 1004 (1995) (holding that to sustain a claim for fraud, plaintiff must prove pecuniary loss). In Shannon v. Law-Yone, 950 S.W.2d 429, 436 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, review denied), on the other hand, the court held that the damage caused need not be pecuniary, but must re......
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Other Workplace Torts
...denied , 514 U.S. 1004 (1995) (holding that to sustain a claim for fraud, plaintiff must prove pecuniary loss). In Shannon v. Law-Yone, 950 S.W.2d 429, 436 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, review denied), on the other hand, the court held that the damage caused need not be pecuniary, but must re......