Slater v. National Medical Enterprises, Inc.

• Decision Date: 29 January 1998
• Parties: Kayla SLATER, Appellant, v. NATIONAL MEDICAL ENTERPRISES, INC.; NME Specialty Hospitals, Inc.; PIA of Fort Worth d/b/a Psychiatric Institute of Fort Worth; Psychiatric Institutes of America, Inc.; Community Psychiatric Centers of Texas, Inc.d/b/a CPC Oak Bend Hospital; Fort Worth Medical Plaza, Inc. d/b/a HCA Medical Plaza Center; Annette Shelton, M.D.; and Robert Lamm Deas Appellees. NO. 2-96-342-CV.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 228

962 S.W.2d 228

Kayla SLATER, Appellant, v. NATIONAL MEDICAL ENTERPRISES, INC.; NME Specialty Hospitals, Inc.; PIA of Fort Worth d/b/a Psychiatric Institute of Fort Worth; Psychiatric Institutes of America Inc.; Community Psychiatric Centers of Texas, Inc.d/b/a CPC Oak Bend Hospital; Fort Worth Medical Plaza, Inc. d/b/a HCA Medical Plaza Center; Annette Shelton, M.D.; and Robert Lamm Deas Appellees.

NO. 2-96-342-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas Fort Worth.

Jan. 29, 1998.

Rehearing Overruled Feb. 26, 1998.

Noteboom and Gray, Chris Cessac, Hurst, for Appellant.

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, L.L.P., Robert B. Krakow, Dallas, for Appellee National Medical Enterprises, Inc.

Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., G. Dennis Sheehan, Fort Worth, for Appellee Psychiatric Institutes of America and NME Speciality Hospitals, Inc.

Davis & Wilkerson, P.C., Robert L. Hargett, Austin, for Appellee Community Psychiatric Centers of Texas, Inc.

Gwinn & Roby, Lea F. Courington, Dallas, for Appellee Fort Worth Medical Plaza, Inc.

McLean & Sanders, P.C., Tom Renfro, for Appellee Annette Shelton, M.D.

Before CAYCE, C.J., and LIVINGSTON and BRIGHAM, JJ.

OPINION

BRIGHAM, Justice.

This is a medical malpractice case that requires us to determine whether Appellant Kayla Slater's claims are time-barred and whether duress of a third party or fraudulent concealment act to toll the statute of limitations for her claims. The trial court granted summary judgment for Appellees ¹ on all of Appellant's claims on the basis of limitations. We affirm.

I. Background

In January 1987, Appellant, sixteen years old, suffered from depression related to the then-recent divorce of her parents. She sought help from Dr. Annette Shelton, who admitted her to inpatient treatment at Plaza Medical Plaza in Fort Worth. Appellant alleged that while there, she was placed on an all-adult psychiatric floor and was overmedicated. She claimed that she did not receive the appropriate therapy that she had been told of and remained depressed after her release.

Shortly thereafter, Dr. Shelton admitted Appellant to the Psychiatric Institute of Fort Worth, based on a diagnosis of chemical dependency. Appellant alleged mistreatment and overmedication there, and that she was released once her insurance benefits lapsed. She alleged that she remained depressed after her release. Appellant alleged the same series of events occurred thereafter at Willow Creek Hospital and then CPC Oak Bend Hospital. She further alleged that while she was in CPC Oak Bend Hospital, her alcohol and drug abuse counselor, Robert Lamm Deas, subjected her to mental and emotional abuse and sexual advances. Appellant was then seventeen, and Deas was forty-two years old.

Appellant was released from CPC Oak Bend Hospital on January 15, 1988, and was not admitted to any other hospitals by Dr. Shelton. Deas left Oak Bend's employment about eight weeks later. Appellant's last treatment by Dr. Shelton was on August 26, 1989.

Appellant was later married to Deas from March 16, 1990 to April 13, 1992. Appellant filed an affidavit in the summary judgment proceeding detailing her allegedly abusive relationship with Deas. Appellant alleged that Deas threatened throughout their marriage to "make her life miserable" if she ever sued him. She claimed that Deas was also physically abusive on many occasions, including throwing her into the fireplace, bruising her arms, slapping her, and "busting her lips." Appellant also alleged that Deas was usually drunk, would not let her manage even her own income, and often locked her outside on the balcony. After Appellant ended the marriage, she alleged that Deas continued to stalk and harass her and her family, and continued to threaten her for several years.

Appellant filed suit on August 31, 1995. Her third amended original petition contained the following allegations:

Plaintiff alleges Corporate Defendants have been engaged in a pattern of fraud in the psychiatric or mental health care industry for several years. Plaintiff further alleges that, in pursuit of fraudulent and illegal profits from the psychiatric or mental health care industry, Corporate Defendants developed a broad network of fraudulent relationships with mental health care providers, including physicians, nurses, and other mental health care professionals who subordinated their independent medical judgment to the profit motive of Corporate Defendants. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Shelton was among the mental health care professionals enticed by the Corporate Defendants into a network of conspiracies designed to defraud Plaintiff and others.

Plaintiff alleges that this network was especially concerned with admitting persons as patients to psychiatric facilities owned or operated by Corporate Defendants and extending the length of stay such persons had in these facilities. Plaintiff further alleges that Corporate Defendants and Dr. Shelton, in furtherance of this common plan, admitted Plaintiff Kayla Slater to the above-named psychiatric hospitals without proper medical justification.

....

Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants have engaged in a pattern of fraud in the psychiatric and mental health industry for several years. This pattern of fraud has two main levels. The first level is designed to generate inpatient admissions of patients into the psychiatric hospitals. The second level of fraud involves employees of the Defendants going to great lengths to insure that an insurance company will pay for the inpatient hospitalization once it is secured.

All Defendants entered into a scheme, joint action, or conspiracy not directed at Plaintiff particularly, but at all persons who sought help from psychiatric facilities owned or operated by Corporate Defendants and at patients of Dr. Shelton. In doing these acts, Defendants were joint actors and conspirators, engaged in a scheme to exact payment from insurance companies without regard to the patient's rights to liberty and freedom from unwarranted medical treatment.

Appellant also alleged various acts of negligence attributable to each of the hospitals and to Dr. Shelton and Deas individually.

The trial court granted summary judgment for each hospital and Dr. Shelton against Appellant on all claims, holding that each claim was time-barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. The summary judgment order does not specifically dispose of Robert Deas, but does order that "all other relief not herein granted is hereby denied."

We note that there is no evidence in the record that Deas was ever served with citation or appeared in the suit. Therefore, "the case stands as if there had been a discontinuance as to [Deas], and the judgment is to be regarded as final for the purposes of appeal." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Penn, 363 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex.1962); see Ballard v. Portnoy, 886 S.W.2d 445, 446 (Tex.App.--Houston [1 st Dist.] 1994, no writ) (op. on reh'g).

II. Points on Appeal

Appellant asserts eight points in this appeal. In her first point, Appellant contends that summary judgment was improper because her fraud claims were brought within four years of her discovery of Appellees' fraud. All Appellees respond that she stated only health care liability claims governed by the strict two-year statute of limitations of article 4590i, ² and alternatively, that even the four-year statute of limitations has run, so that her claims are time-barred regardless of their labels.

Appellant's second, third, and forth points assert that summary judgment was erroneous on both her fraud and health care liability claims because the limitations periods were tolled due to the duress she suffered at Deas's hands. Appellees respond that because Deas did not work for them at the time of the alleged duress, any duress was imposed by a third party. They assert that duress has never been recognized as tolling limitations for the health care liability statute, and that even if it was, or if we hold her claims to be common law fraud claims, which are subject to the duress defense, duress of a third party cannot toll limitations.

Appellant's fifth, sixth, and seventh points are partially repetitious of point one, but they also contend that the limitations period provided by article 4590i is unconstitutional as applied to her fraud and health care liability claims. Primarily, she argues that article 4590i violates the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution. ³ Appellees contend that article 4590i is not unconstitutional as applied to Appellant.

By her final point, Appellant contends that summary judgment was erroneous because Appellees engaged in fraudulent concealment, which tolled limitations. The Appellees present varying arguments denying that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment tolls limitations as to each of them.

III. Applicable Law

A. Summary Judgment

The standards for reviewing a motion for summary judgment are well established. The movant has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex.1985). When a defendant moves for summary judgment based on an affirmative defense, such as the statute of limitations, the defendant, as movant, bears the burden of proving each essential element of that defense. See City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex.1979); Swilley v. Hughes, 488 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Tex.1972). Once a defendant has established its statute of limitations defense as a matter of law, a nonmovant asserting fraudulent concealment must "come forward with proof raising an issue of fact with respect to" that claim to defeat summary judgment. American Petrofina, Inc. v. Allen, 887 S.W.2d 829, 830 (Tex.1994) (citing Nichols v. Smith, 507 S.W.2d 518, 521 (Tex.1974)). Furthermore, a plaintiff must plead and prove application of the discovery rule as an affirmative defense to circumvent...