Shannondale, Inc. v. Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Com'n

• Decision Date: 11 April 1997
• Docket Number: No. 23453,23453
• Citation: 199 W.Va. 494,485 S.E.2d 438
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: SHANNONDALE, INC., Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. JEFFERSON COUNTY PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION; Ernest R. Benner; Scott Coyle, Samuel J. Donley, Jr., H. Richard Flaherty, Paul W. Griger, A.G. Hooper, Jr., Rosella Kern, R. Gregory Lance, Betty Roper, Lyle Campbell Tabb, III, and Gilbert Page Wright, Jr., Members of the Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Commission, Defendants Below, Appellees.

Page 438

485 S.E.2d 438

199 W.Va. 494

SHANNONDALE, INC., Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. JEFFERSON COUNTY PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION; Ernest R Benner; Scott Coyle, Samuel J. Donley, Jr., H. Richard Flaherty, Paul W. Griger, A.G. Hooper, Jr., Rosella Kern, R Gregory Lance, Betty Roper, Lyle Campbell Tabb, III, and Gilbert Page Wright, Jr., Members of the Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Commission, Defendants Below, Appellees.

No. 23453.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted Feb. 4, 1997.

Decided April 11, 1997.

Syllabus by the Court

1. "A circuit court's entry of a declaratory judgment is reviewed de novo." Syllabus Point 3, Cox v. Amick, 195 W.Va. 608, 466 S.E.2d 459 (1995).

2. " 'Statutes which relate to the same persons or things, or to the same class of persons or things, or statutes which have a common purpose will be regarded in pari materia to assure recognition and implementation of the legislative intent. Accordingly, a court should not limit its consideration to any single part, provision, section, sentence, phrase or word, but rather review the act or statute in its entirety to ascertain legislative intent properly.' Syl. pt. 5, Fruehauf Corp. v. Huntington Moving & Storage Co., 159 W.Va. 14, 217 S.E.2d 907 (1975). Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. Lambert v. County Commission of Boone County, 192 W.Va. 448, 452 S.E.2d 906 (1994)." Syllabus Point 12, Cox v. Amick, 195 W.Va. 608, 466 S.E.2d 459 (1995).

3. " 'While on appeal there is a presumption that a board of zoning appeals acted correctly, a reviewing court should reverse the administrative decision where the board has applied an erroneous principle of law, was plainly wrong in its factual findings, or has acted beyond its jurisdiction.' Syllabus point 5.,[sic] Wolfe v. Forbes, W.Va. , 217 S.E.2d 899 (1975)." Syllabus Point 3, Harding v. Board of Zoning Appeals of City of Morgantown, 159 W.Va. 73, 219 S.E.2d 324 (1975).

4. "Where the power to pass upon special exceptions or conditional uses allowable by a zoning ordinance has been delegated to an administrative body, the body must set forth the factual basis of its determination so that a reviewing court may ascertain whether the administrative decision conforms to the standards in the ordinance for the particular action taken." Syllabus Point 4, Harding v. Board of Zoning Appeals of City of Morgantown, 159 W.Va. 73, 219 S.E.2d 324 (1975).

5. "When a reviewing court has determined that there was reversible error in an administrative decision and the cause is remanded without restrictions to the administrative body, that tribunal is vested with discretion to decide whether to conduct a reconsideration merely or a full rehearing." Syllabus Point 5, Harding v. Board of Zoning Appeals of City of Morgantown, 159 W.Va. 73, 219 S.E.2d 324 (1975).

Douglas S. Rockwell, Steptoe & Johnson, Charles Town, for Appellant.

J. Michael Cassell, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Charles Town, for Appellees.

PER CURIAM:

Shannondale, Inc. ("Shannondale") appeals a decision of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County which affirmed a decision of the Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Commission ("Commission") interpreting an ordinance and denying Shannondale a zoning variance. On appeal, Shannondale maintains that there are errors concerning the meaning of the subdivision ordinance, the recusal of a Commission member and the denial of a variance. Although we find no error in the interpretation of the subdivision ordinance, we find error in the Commission's failure to set forth the factual basis for its denial of a variance. We, therefore, affirm, in part, reverse, in part, and remand the case for the Commission to conduct, at its discretion, either a reconsideration or a full hearing. In either case, the Commission is directed to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law.

I. Facts and Background

Shannondale seeks to develop several parcels of real estate that it owns in Jefferson County. The parcels constitute a 19-acre tract located east of the Shenandoah River and Mission Road bordering on the existing Shannondale subdivision. The development plan calls for 15 single family residences to be developed on the 19-acre tract. The tract is to be accessed via Grey Fox Road, which would connect the development to a public highway. Grey Fox Road, which is not part of the proposed development, has existed for over 30 years, has about 10 families living along it and appears to be a steep, narrow, winding road.

The development of subdivisions in Jefferson County is governed by the Jefferson County Subdivision Ordinance ("Ordinance"). The Ordinance has two sections pertaining to road specifications, which are important for this case. Section 4.8.a of the Ordinance provides that a road accessing a subdivision "meet the standards required for rights-of-way and roads within the proposed subdivision." ¹ Section 8.2.a.16 of the Ordinance requires a developer who uses an existing access road "must upgrade such road ... to the asphalt standards of this Ordinance...." ² Shannondale maintains that only the asphalt upgrade requirement of Section 8.2.a.16 applies to Grey Fox Road and not the subdivision standards of Section 4.8.a. After the Commission found that under the Ordinance, the subdivision standards of Section 4.8.a were applicable to Grey Fox Road, Shannondale sought a variance, whereby it offered to upgrade Grey Fox Road but not to the subdivision standards.

After the Commission denied Shannondale a variance, Shannondale filed a petition for a Writ of Certiorari and an Action for Declaratory Relief in the circuit court. The circuit court found that the Ordinance, when read in pari materia, required Grey Fox Road be upgraded to subdivision standards and that the decision to deny the variance was supported by the evidence. This appeal follows the circuit court's affirmation of the Commission's decision.

On appeal, Shannondale argues: (1) the circuit court erred in applying the higher subdivision standards of Section 4.8.a to Grey Fox Road; (2) the variance sections of the Ordinance are void for vagueness; (3) the circuit court erred in failing to find the Commission's order tainted because of the participation of a commissioner with a personal animosity toward Shannondale; and (4) the circuit court erred in refusing to overturn the Commission's denial of a variance without any written findings of fact.

II. Discussion

A. Access Road Standards

Shannondale maintains that the Ordinance requires the upgrading of the asphalt on the access road, but does not require the access road to meet the subdivision road standards. Specifically Shannondale argues that section 4.8.a (subdivision road standards requirement) is a general provision and its requirements are superseded by the specific provision dealing with existing access roads, namely section 8.2.a.16 (asphalt up-grade). See supra notes 1 and 2 for the text of 4.8.a and 8.2.a.16, respectively. The Commission maintains that the provisions are not exclusive and must be read together to insure safe and well-constructed roads, one of the purposes of the Ordinance.

We review de novo the circuit court's determination of the meaning of the Ordinance. The interpretation question was presented in an action for a declaratory judgment. Syllabus Point 3 of Cox v. Amick, 195 W.Va. 608, 466 S.E.2d 459 (1995) states: "A circuit court's entry of a declaratory judgment is reviewed de novo." In Cox, we further explained that "because the purpose of a declaratory judgment action is to resolve legal questions, a circuit court's ultimate resolution in a declaratory judgment action is reviewed de novo." Cox, 195 W.Va. at 612, 466 S.E.2d at 463. Factual determinations used by the circuit court to reach the ultimate legal resolution are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.

Our general rules of statutory construction are applicable in this case. See Syllabus Points 10 (ambiguous statutes must be construed before applied) and 11 (effect should be given to the legislature's intent) of Cox, supra. Because two provisions of the Ordinance deal with access road requirements, we also apply our statutory construction rules relating to two or more provisions. The Commission emphasized the consideration of all the Ordinance's provisions, and Shannondale emphasized the preference given to a specific provision over a general provision. Syllabus point 12 of Cox states:

" 'Statutes which relate to the same persons or things, or to the same class of persons or things, or statutes which have a common purpose will be regarded in pari materia to assure recognition and implementation of the legislative intent. Accordingly, a court should not limit its consideration to any single part, provision, section, sentence, phrase or word, but rather review the act or statute in its entirety to ascertain legislative intent properly.' Syl. pt. 5, Fruehauf Corp. v. Huntington Moving & Storage Co., 159 W.Va. 14, 217 S.E.2d 907 (1975)." Syl. pt. 1,State ex rel. Lambert v. County Commission of Boone County, 192 W.Va. 448, 452 S.E.2d 906 (1994).

Syllabus Point 1 of Whitlow v. Bd. of Educ. of Kanawha County, 190 W.Va. 223, 438 S.E.2d 15 (1993) states:

"The general rule of statutory construction requires that a specific statute be given precedence over a general statute relating to the same subject matter where the two cannot be reconciled." Syllabus Point 1, UMWA by Trumka v. Kingdon, 174 W.Va. 330, 325 S.E.2d 120 (1984).

See Vance v. Ritchie, 178 W.Va. 155, 157, 358 S.E.2d 239, 241 (1987) (general venue provision "must yield to the more specific").

When the Ordinance is considered in light of both these rules of statutory construction, the conclusion is that access roads must meet the same standards as the subdivision roads except that if gravel roads are used in the subdivision, then the access road must be asphalted. Section 8.2.a.16 of the Ordinance specifically deals...