Shapira v. D'arcy
| Decision Date | 07 January 1902 |
| Citation | 62 N.E. 412,180 Mass. 377 |
| Parties | SHAPIRA v. D'ARCY. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Jos C. Sharkey, for appellant.
Frank N. Nay and David Stoneman, for respondent.
This case comes before us on appeals from certain interlocutory decrees and from a final decree in equity. It presents two questions--First, whether the decree discharging an issue for a jury, after a trial, with a disagreement on this issue, and an agreement on another issue tried at the same time, was erroneous; and, second, whether there was error in the finding of the judge that the auctioneer made a sufficient memorandum of the auction sale to take the case out of the statute of frauds.
The question as to the discharge of the issue divides itself into two parts: First, whether the defendant had a constitutional right to a trial by jury on the issue; and, secondly, if not whether the discretion of the court was wrongly exercised in discharging the issue.
This is a bill for the specific performance of a contract, which belongs to a branch of equity jurisprudence that has been recognized from a time long before the adoption of our constitution. The right of trial by jury guarantied by our constitution does not include a right to such a trial in suits in equity, in which from early times it was understood that there was no such right, and in which it was the practice to proceed without a jury. Although there has been some difference of opinion expressed in the cases, the trend of judicial decision and of practice in this commonwealth has been for a long time in the direction of the proposition above stated. Ward v. Hill, 4 Gray, 593; Stockbridge Iron Co. v. Hudson Iron Co., 102 Mass 45; Ross v. Insurance Co., 120, Mass. 113; Davis v. Daivs, 123 Mass. 590; Parker v. Simpson (ante, Jan. 1902) 180 Mass. 334, 62 N.E. 401; Carlton v Rugg, 149 Mass. 550, 22 N.E. 55, L. R. A. 193, 14 Am. St. Rep. 446; Bourke v. Callanan, 160 Mass. 195, 35 N.E. 460. This is in accordance with the almost universal practice in other jurisdictions. Davis v. Dyer, 62 N.H. 231; Connecticut River Lumber Co. v. Olcott Falls Co., 65 N.H. 290, 21 A. 1090, 13 L. R. A. 826; Huntington v. Bishop, 5 Vt. 186; Plimpton v. Town of Somerset, 33 Vt. 283; Hall v. Armstrong, 65 Vt. 354, 26 A. 592, 20 L. R. A. 366; Lynch v. Railroad Co., 129 N.Y. 274, 29 N.E. 315, 15 L. R. A. 287, 26 Am. St. Rep. 523; Ward v. Farwell, 97 Ill. 593; Flaherty v. McCormick, 113 Ill. 538; Walker v. Sedgwick, 5 Cal. 192; Littleton v. Fritz, 65 Iowa, 488, 22 N.W. 641, 54 Am. Rep. 19; State v. Crawford, 28 Kan. 726, 42 Am. Rep. 182. In the exercise of the discretion of the court, issues are framed for a jury whenever from the nature of the case and from the facts in dispute it seems that such a trial will best serve the interests of justice. We are of opinion that the defendant had not a constitutional right to a trial by jury, but that the matter was within the discretion of the court.
In this case the issue in question related to only a small part of the controversy, and was narrow and simple. It was, in substance, whether the plaintiff procured persons to make fictitious bids by a secret arrangement, in fraud of the rights of other bidders. After one trial and a disagreement of the jury on his issue, and the disposition of another important part of the case by a verdict, it well might appear to the judge who heard the evidence that a second trial by a jury on this issue was inexpedient, and that the interests of justice and the rights of the parties would best be served by discharging the issue, and leaving the question to be tried before a judge. It being a matter of discretion to frame or to deny such an issue in the first place, it was equally within the discretion of the court to discharge the issue....
To continue reading
Request your trial