Shapiro v. Lipman, 46266
| Decision Date | 15 March 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 46266,46266 |
| Citation | 259 Ga. 85,377 S.E.2d 673 |
| Parties | SHAPIRO v. LIPMAN. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Kathy L. Portnoy, Alembik, Fine & Callner, Atlanta, for Martin M. shapiro.
George S. Stern, Atlanta, for Marlene S. Lipman, f/k/a Shapiro.
The question for determination in this appeal is which party is "prevailing," for the purposes of an attorney fee award under OCGA § 19-6-19(d). The husband filed a petition for modification of alimony, contending the wife's receipt of a substantial inheritance constituted a material change in her financial circumstances, and requesting that his obligation to pay alimony be terminated in its entirety or modified downward. The wife denied any change in her financial circumstances and denied the husband was entitled to any modification of his obligation. Following a trial, the jury rendered a verdict reducing the husband's monthly alimony obligation by $250 per month, from $1,650 to $1,400. We granted the husband's application to appeal from the trial court's subsequent award of attorney fees to the wife.
The trial court awarded attorney fees to the wife under OCGA § 19-6-19(d), which provides:
In proceedings for the modification of alimony for the support of a spouse or child pursuant to the provisions of this Code section, the court may award attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses of litigation to the prevailing party as the interests of justice may require.
The trial court concluded the wife was the prevailing party because she successfully defended her entitlement to a substantial support obligation. The trial court noted that, although the husband had asked the jury to terminate his obligation in its entirety, the jury authorized only a minor reduction.
Although OCGA § 19-6-19(d) gives the court discretion whether to award attorney fees to a prevailing party, it does not authorize the court to designate who is the prevailing party. That determination is made by the trier of fact, in this case, the jury. Since the only issue in the case was whether the husband's alimony obligation should be reduced, and since the husband was successful on that claim, albeit not to the extent he might have hoped, he was the prevailing party. Accordingly, the trial court was not authorized to award the wife attorney fees under OCGA § 19-6-19(d). Nonetheless, this holding does not require reversal of the trial court's award of attorney fees to the wife because the trial court would have been authorized, in his discretion, to award her fees under OCGA § 19-6-22 which provides:
Where a [petition to modify alimony] is filed by a party obligated to pay alimony, the court may require the party to pay the reasonable...
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McCombs v. Southern Regional Med. Center, A98A0211.
...Act. We will not reverse the correct judgment of a trial court regardless of the reason given therefor. Shapiro v. Lipman, 259 Ga. 85, 86, 377 S.E.2d 673 (1989). (a) Magnuson-Moss Act. As appellant has failed to cite authority or to argue in her brief that the trial court erred in dismissin......
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Moore v. Moore-McKinney, A09A0262.
...fee] award," we cannot say it is apparent that the trial court "would have done so under [OCGA § 19-9-3(g)]." Shapiro v. Lipman, 259 Ga. 85, 86, 377 S.E.2d 673 (1989). Unlike OCGA § 9-15-14(b), a fee award under OCGA § 19-9-3(g) would not necessarily be focused on Moore's conduct. Thus, it ......
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Bailey v. Hall
...S.E.2d 138; Smith v. Griggs, supra 164 Ga.App. at 18, 296 S.E.2d 87. A judgment right for any reason must be affirmed. Shapiro v. Lipman, 259 Ga. 85, 86, 377 S.E.2d 673. Granted, "[t]he trial court did not explicitly base its decision upon the failure of plaintiff to act in a reasonable and......
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Mauldin v. Weinstock
...at 351(2), 364 S.E.2d 87. The trial court's judgment was correct, and a judgment right for any reason must be affirmed. Shapiro v. Lipman, 259 Ga. 85, 86, 377 S.E.2d 673. Moreover in this case, although the motive for the action may be contested, it is uncontroverted that appellee did not a......