Shapiro v. San Diego City Council

Decision Date05 March 2002
Docket NumberNo. D037323.,D037323.
Citation117 Cal.Rptr.2d 631,96 Cal.App.4th 904
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesMelvin SHAPIRO, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SAN DIEGO CITY COUNCIL, Defendant and Appellant.

Casey Gwinn, City Attorney and Leslie J. Girard, Assistant City Attorney, for Defendant and Appellant.

Charles Wolfinger, San Diego, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

HUFFMAN, J.

The defendant San Diego City Council (City Council) appeals a judgment issued under the Ralph M. Brown Act (Brown Act) (Gov.Code,1 § 54950 et seq.) to compel it to comply with certain duties under the Brown Act in closed session discussions with its real estate negotiators, concerning the posting of agenda items and the restriction of discussion within such closed sessions to the posted agenda items. (§ 54956.8; § 54954.5, subd. (b); § 54954.2, subd. (a).) This action was brought by plaintiff and respondent Melvin Shapiro, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to require fuller disclosure of the items under discussion in the context of real estate negotiations involving the overall large redevelopment project to create a baseball ballpark in the East Village section of the City of San Diego (the City), as initiated by a 1998 voter approved proposition.

On appeal, the City Council contends the trial court exceeded the scope of its authority in ordering injunctive relief, and misapplied the Brown Act statutory scheme in ruling upon the scope of the disclosures to be made in connection with closed session real estate negotiations and the scope of the discussions that could take place in such closed sessions. On de novo review of the statutory issues presented, and after reviewing the record, we conclude the trial court's decision was well within the scope of its authority and fully justified by the record. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In City of San Diego v. Dunkl (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 384, 389-390, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 269, this court set out the basic factual background of the ballpark redevelopment project giving rise to this litigation: "In November 1998, the City's voters approved Prop. C by approximately a 60-40 percentage margin, authorizing the City to enter into an MOU [Memo. of Understanding] with, in particular, the [San Diego] Padres. Prop. C and the MOU it authorizes provide for a public-private partnership between the Padres, the City and redevelopment entities to build a new major league ballpark as part of a larger redevelopment project in Centre City East in downtown San Diego.... Prop. C also authorizes the city council to amend or modify the MOU, in the best interests of the city entities, `only if any such amendment or modifications do not materially: 1) decrease the rights or increase the obligations of the City; 2) increase the financial commitments of the City; or 3) decrease revenue to the City.'"2

Subsequently, in March 1999, the City Council approved key agreements and issued resolutions implementing the MOU by making findings that the Padres had provided sufficient assurances as required by the MOU, such that approval could be granted for the costs of land acquisition, parking facilities and infrastructure, and environmental approvals. Agreements were also reached regarding the San Diego Unified Port District's investment in the project, the Padres' financial commitments, development agreements and financing, related revenue projections, and interim funding pending the issuance of bonds. Again in January 2000, additional resolutions and agreements were approved regarding land acquisition, costs for infrastructure and parking facilities, a use and occupancy agreement for the ballpark, land use restrictions for the park near the ballpark, and an extension of the Qualcomm Stadium lease.

The allegations of the complaint now before us are that the City Council, between December 1998 and October 1999, carried out a number of closed session meetings dealing with negotiations for real estate acquisitions pursuant to the redevelopment plan, and that such meetings were inadequately noticed and exceeded the scope of the notice given. The City Council posted agendas for 16 closed sessions from January through October, 1999 that contained the following single item agenda description: "In the matter of authorizing the City Manager to negotiate with designated representatives from the San Diego Padres and the San Diego Unified Port District regarding real property interests in the East Village area of downtown San Diego, and at Qualcomm Stadium in the City of San Diego." Other posted agendas for two meetings gave this description: "In the matter of giving direction to the City Manager on behalf of the City of San Diego regarding real estate interests in the Centre City East area of downtown San Diego." Plaintiff argues these were inadequate descriptions under the Brown Act, because they did not adequately designate specific parcels of property and specific transactions.

The complaint further alleges that the closed session meetings included substantive discussions that greatly exceeded the scope of the agenda items noticed, because they were not directly related to a purchase, sale, lease, or exchange of specific real property by or for the City. These were alleged to include financing issues dealing with the transient occupancy tax, real estate issues belonging to parties other than the City, and other issues concerning the MOU. Declaratory and injunctive relief was sought on the basis that the public had a right to know what was going on in closed session and that the City Council was not complying with its obligations under the Brown Act.

The matter went to trial and the trial court conducted an in camera examination of confidential minutes prepared by the City Council of the challenged closed sessions, to determine whether the business that was conducted at the closed sessions had been properly noticed and was within the scope of the disclosed agenda items.3 Subsequently, the trial court issued a statement of decision stating that it had reviewed the published agendas and the confidential minutes for the closed sessions and concluded that the City Council had violated both the letter and the spirit of the Brown Act. The trial court observed that the Brown Act was enacted to ensure that in doing the people's business, government should deliberate in public. Judgment was entered accordingly, including declaratory relief on both of the above issues as follows:

"1. The defendant City Council of the City of San Diego's (defendant City Council's) practice of posting agendas for closed sessions on the ballpark project, which contain a single item agenda description (`In the matter of authorizing the City Manager to negotiate with a designated representative from the San Diego Padres regarding real property interests in the East Village area of downtown San Diego, and at Qualcomm Stadium in the City of San Diego') and which do not identify the separate items of business to be discussed in the closed session, and its continuing contention that such practice complies with the Brown Act, violate its duty under section 54954.2, subdivision (a) to post an agenda containing a `brief general description of each separate item of business to be transacted or discussed at the meeting.'

"2. The defendant City Council's practice of posting agendas for closed sessions pursuant to the safe harbor provision in section 54954.5, subdivision (b), which do not contain the names of the negotiators for the City to be attending the closed session and its continuing contention that such practice complies with the Brown Act, violate its duty under section 54954.5, subdivision (b) to specifically name the negotiators for the City of San Diego attending the closed session.

"3. The defendant City Council's practice of failing to identify in an open and public session before each session closed pursuant to section 54956.8, its negotiators, the real property under negotiation and the persons with whom its negotiators may negotiate for each item of business, and its continuing contention that such practice complies with the Brown Act, violate its duties under section 54956.8 [¶ 2] and section 54957.7, subdivision (a) to identify its negotiators, the real property under negotiation and the persons with whom its negotiators may negotiate for each item of business in an open and public session before each session closed pursuant to section 54956.8.

"4. The defendant City Council's practice of discussing the topics in sessions closed pursuant to section 54956.8 that are not instructions to its negotiators regarding price and terms of payment for the purchase, sale, exchange or lease of specific real property by or for the City of San Diego and its continuing contention that such practice complies with the Brown Act, violate its duty to limit discussions at such a closed session to instructions to its negotiators regarding price and terms of payment for the purchase, sale, exchange or lease of specific real property by or for the City of San Diego under section 54956.8.

"5. The defendant City Council's discussion of the following topics in closed sessions on the dates specified, is outside the scope of and so violates its duty under section 54956.8 to limit topics to instructions to its negotiators regarding the price and terms of payment for the purchase, sale, exchange or lease of specific real property by or for the City of San Diego:

                "Closed session      Improper topics
                "Dec. 1, 1998 -      briefing on land acquisition
                                     matters, design work of architect
                                     engineers, and infrastructure
                                     and parking developments
                "Dec. 8, 1998 -      general MOU discussion
                "Jan. 11, 1999 -     authority to hire ballpark
                                     manager
                "Jan. 19, 1999 -     need to hire a project director
                                     for the ballpark
                                     project
                "Feb. 16, 1999 -
...

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