Sharif v. The Regents of Univ. of Cal.
| Docket Number | B308941 |
| Decision Date | 06 December 2021 |
| Parties | RANA SHARIF, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, Defendant and Respondent. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. 19STCV32356 Barbara Ann Meiers, Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part with directions.
The Cook Law Firm, Philip E. Cook, Brian J. Wright; Public Counsel, Jill Thompson and Mallory Sepler-King for Plaintiff and Appellant.
McCune & Harber, Stephen M. Harber and AmyArseneaux Evenstad for Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff Rana Sharif was a doctoral candidate at University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). After she was disqualified from her doctoral program for failing to make progress toward her Ph.D. and for an unsatisfactory dissertation, she sued defendant Regents of the University of California (the Regents) for discrimination, breach of an imp lied-in-fact contract, promissory estoppel, and violation of her due process rights. The Regents demurred to Sharif s complaint on the grounds that she had failed to exhaust her administrative and judicial remedies and otherwise failed to state any cause of action. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, and this appeal followed. Although we agree that the trial court properly sustained the demurrer as to Sharif s discrimination and contract-based causes of action Sharif may proceed on her due process and declaratory relief causes of action.
According to the allegations of the operative pleading, Sharif is a woman of color, a mother of young children, the caretaker of a disabled parent, and a primary source of income for her family. In 2006, Sharif began pursuing her Ph.D. in gender studies at UCLA, advancing to a doctoral candidacy in 2012. She gave birth in 2009 and again in 2014, and her oldest child has a congenital condition that required three surgeries and ongoing care.
UCLA requires its departments to set a normative time to degree, meaning the number of quarters in which students should complete the requirements for a doctorate. The Department of Gender Studies anticipates it will take six years to achieve a Ph.D., although leaves of absence are permitted. Despite this normative-time-to-degree policy, Sharif alleged that the department has never enforced it against anyone except her, although former and current graduate students have taken more than six years to complete their degrees.
In September 2016, Sharif s supervisory doctoral committee set September 15, 2017 as the deadline for Sharif to complete her dissertation. Sharif alleged that the committee did not tell her that failure to meet the deadline would result in her disqualification as a doctoral candidate or other consequence. In August 2017, Sharif submitted a "completed draft" of her dissertation.
On September 11, 2017, the department recommended terminating Sharif s status as a doctoral student for two reasons. First, she had exceeded by five years the normative six years to complete a Ph.D. Second, Sharif s dissertation was "not [of] a sufficient academic quality to pass." A week later, the graduate division informed Sharif that it agreed with the department's recommendation. At that time, Sharif was given a document, "Excerpt from Standards and Procedures for Graduate Study at UCLA."[1] It stated that disqualification of graduate students was at the discretion of the dean of the concerned graduate division, meaning that the dean had "final authority over this decision" and an "appeal can go no higher."
Sharif appealed her disqualification to the Interim Chair of the Department of Gender Studies, arguing that the decision should be reversed for (1) procedural error and (2) substantial mitigating circumstances.
First, as to procedural error, Sharif argued: she lacked notice of the possibility of her disqualification; she had no opportunity to be heard before the recommendation to disqualify her was made; and the department's procedural process was unclear at best.
Second, as to mitigating circumstances, she identified personal circumstances that contributed to her prolonged time to degree: her marital status, in that her 2006 marriage to a Jordanian citizen involved a longer than anticipated immigration process; her husband's underemployment required Sharif to take additional teaching jobs; her two pregnancies, during which UCLA did not tell her about benefits to which she was entitled; caring for her children, one of whom was disabled; caring for her mother who was on disability; having to adjust her project apparently because conflict in the Israeli/Palestinian region affected her ability to do fieldwork for her dissertation; and her personal disability for which she was treated in fall and summer 2017.
On November 3, 2017, the Interim Chair of the department informed Sharif that the doctoral committee had discussed her appeal and found no cause to reverse the decision to disqualify her. The Interim Chair further informed Sharif that the recommendation would be forwarded to the graduate division for a final decision. A week later, the graduate division found no reason to reverse the recommendation, and therefore the disqualification decision was final, with no additional avenue for an appeal.
Sharif then sued the Regents. Her operative first amended complaint alleged causes of action for: (1) discrimination in violation of Education Code sections 220 and 66270;[2] (2) discrimination in violation of Government Code section 11135;[3] (3) discrimination in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Civil Code section 51 et seq.;[4] (4) breach of an implied-in-fact contract; (5) promissory estoppel; (6) violation of due process; and (7) declaratory relief.
As to her discrimination causes of action, Sharif alleged the Regents discriminated against her on the basis of sex, sexual stereotypes, marital status, pregnancy and associated disability.
As to her implied-in-fact contract cause of action, Sharif alleged that such a contract was created by, for example, her matriculation, payment of tuition and fees, completion of her coursework, teaching, publishing, and progression to complete her dissertation.
In her promissory estoppel cause of action, Sharif alleged that by offering a Ph.D. program at UCLA, the Regents promised to, with adequate notice of all requirements and for no unlawful purpose, fairly permit her to complete her program. Sharif further alleged that two weeks before she submitted her draft dissertation, Dr. Sondra Hale told Sharif that she was eligible for the fall filing fee, "which 'is intended for students who are in good academic standing and who have completed all degree requirements except for filing their dissertation.'"
Her due process violation cause of action alleged she acquired a property or liberty interest in the opportunity to complete her Ph.D. program.
Sharif also alleged that she exhausted all administrative remedies by following UCLA's Standards and Procedures for Graduate Study at UCLA (Standards and Procedures).
The Regents demurred to the first amended complaint. The Regents asserted that Sharif failed to exhaust her administrative remedies pursuant to UCLA Procedure 230.2; Sharif failed to exhaust her judicial remedies, because administrative mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure[5] section 1094.5 was the exclusive remedy for relief; immunity; uncertainty; and failure to state facts sufficient to constitute any causes of action.[6] In support of the demurrer, the Regents asked the trial court to take judicial notice of UCLA Procedure 230.2, regarding the grievance process.
Sharif opposed the demurrer and the request for judicial notice. She argued that she exhausted her administrative remedies by following the grievance procedure in the Standards and Procedures, and she did not have to follow UCLA Procedure 230.2. Alternatively, Sharif urged that the Regents be estopped from asserting that Sharif had to comply with UCLA Procedure 230.2, and she was not required to seek judicial review by administrative mandate because no hearing had taken place in connection with the grievance procedure.
The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, finding that Sharif had not pleaded sufficient facts showing she alleged discrimination or disability during her appeals process, and her recourse was to seek a writ of mandate as to all causes of action.
The trial court entered a judgment of dismissal, and this appeal followed.
When a trial court sustains a demurrer, we review the complaint de novo to determine whether, as a matter of law, it states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126.) Reading the complaint as a whole and giving it a reasonable interpretation, we treat all material facts properly pleaded as true. (Ibid.) The plaintiff has the burden of showing that the facts pleaded are sufficient to establish every element of the cause of action and overcome all legal grounds on which the trial court sustained the demurrer, and if the defendant negates any essential element, we will affirm the order sustaining the demurrer as to the cause of action. (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 879-880.) We will affirm if there is any ground on which the demurrer can properly be sustained, whether the trial court relied on proper grounds or the defendant asserted a proper ground in the trial court proceedings. (Id. at p. 880, fn. 10.)
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