Sharon v. Sharon, 2D02-4272.
| Decision Date | 21 November 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 2D02-4272.,2D02-4272. |
| Citation | 862 So.2d 789 |
| Parties | Denise C. SHARON, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. C. William SHARON, Appellee/Cross-Appellant. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Marie Tomassi and Karen E. Lewis of Trenam, Kemker, Scharf, Barkin, Frye, O'Neill & Mullis, P.A., St. Petersburg, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Virginia R. Vetter of Vetter & Hunter, Tampa, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Denise C. Sharon appeals the final judgment dissolving her long-term marriage to C. William Sharon, asserting that the trial court abused its discretion in its determination of the nature and amount of alimony awarded to her and in its equitable distribution of the parties' marital property. On cross-appeal, the Husband argues that it was error for the trial court not to impute to the Wife unearned income that she would receive from her liquid investments. We affirm the judgment in part and reverse in part. On remand, the trial court shall make additional findings of fact and adjust the awards of permanent and rehabilitative alimony and the plan of equitable distribution in a manner consistent with this opinion.
The Wife argues that the trial court erred in making an alimony award that included both rehabilitative and permanent periodic alimony in lieu of an award consisting only of permanent periodic alimony because the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish that she could return to work. However, it is clearly established that the propriety of an award of rehabilitative alimony is within the scope of the trial court's broad discretion in dissolution proceedings. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197, 1202 (Fla. 1980). Although the record includes evidence that the Wife suffers from fibromyalgia and migraine headaches, the record also includes substantial, competent evidence to support the trial court's finding that the Wife can and should become partially self-supporting after a three-year rehabilitative period. Therefore, the judgment including rehabilitative alimony for three years as part of the award was not an abuse of discretion.
Nevertheless, the purpose of rehabilitative alimony is to provide the former spouse "the capacity for self-support..., either through the redevelopment of previous skills or provision of the training necessary to develop the potential supportive skills." Id. The trial court's combined award of permanent and rehabilitative alimony to the Wife was in the exact amount that the trial court determined was sufficient to meet the Wife's current needs for support. Thus the rehabilitative component of the alimony award did not include any amount to cover the cost of retraining the Wife for her anticipated return to work. The trial court's award of rehabilitative alimony should have included the costs of training based upon the evidence presented by the parties. See Welch v. Welch, 685 So.2d 895 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
. Therefore, we reverse the portion of the judgment granting rehabilitative alimony to the Wife for the trial court to revisit the matter and to adjust the award as needed, based upon a review of the existing evidence, in accordance with Ingram v. Ingram, 750 So.2d 130 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Upon review, if the record does not reveal that detailed evidence has been presented of the cost of the proposed training, an award of rehabilitative alimony for this purpose is inappropriate. Id. at 132.
The Wife additionally asserts that the trial court erred in failing to take into account the tax implications of the alimony award. Both parties agree that the trial court did not factor the tax consequences of the alimony award into its judgment. However, the Husband argues that the Wife failed to offer evidence on this issue. The record indicates that the Wife did offer evidence of potential tax impacts on awards of alimony in several different amounts, although not in the precise amount awarded by the trial court. When evidence of the tax impact of an alimony award is presented, it is error for the trial court to fail to consider these consequences. Farley v. Farley, 800 So.2d 710, 712 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Because the trial court did not consider the tax consequences in making the alimony award to the Wife, we reverse the portion of the judgment determining the Wife's need for alimony and remand for consideration of the tax consequences of the award. On remand, the trial court may receive additional evidence from both parties to determine the tax impact of the alimony award.
In the equitable distribution of the marital property, the trial court allocated the marital home to the Wife. She argues that the home should have been awarded to her as a support-based, lump...
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