Sharp v. Rhiel
| Decision Date | 31 January 1874 |
| Parties | BENJAMIN B. SHARP, et al., Respondents, v. HENRY RHIEL, et al., Appellants. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Henry Common Pleas.
McBeth & Pierce and F. P. Wright, for Appellants, relied upon the statute of frauds, (Wagn. Stat., 656, § 5,) and Atwood's Admr. vs. Fox, 30 Mo., 499.
LaDue & Fyke, for Respondents.
I. Respondents contend, that the real time, within the meaning of the statute, when said contract was actually made and concluded, was March 1st, 1871, when they commenced hauling, and appellants commenced receiving the coal. They acted under the original understanding, and on that day (March 1st 1871,) ratified and made binding the previous understanding between the parties.
II. The respondents were wrongfully stopped in the prosecution of their business by the appellants. We say, that this state of facts presents such a case as is recognized in the law as a contract fully performed by these respondents, and that the appellants should be made to respond in damages for the wrongful breach on their part.
The only point raised by this record is, whether the plaintiffs could recover on an executory contract not in writing, which was made on or about the first day of February, 1871, or several weeks before the first of March, whereby it was agreed between the parties, that the plaintiffs should furnish to the defendants all the coal they might need to run a steam flouring mill from the first of March, 1871, till the first of March, 1872. After making the contract, the defendants did, on the day named, commence delivering coal at the price agreed on, which was paid to them as they delivered it; and they continued to do so till the 25th of April, 1871, when the defendants refused to receive any more coal, although the-plaintiffs were ready and willing, and offered to continue, to deliver the coal for the whole time agreed on.
During the progress of the delivery the defendants acknowledged the existence of the contract in conversations, and requested plaintiffs to open another bank of better coal, so as to deliver from the new bank, which they did. But there was no proof at all to show that there was any new contract made to carry out the original contract. The statute of frauds was set up and relied upon by the defendants in their answer as a bar to the plaintiffs' recovery.
The court gave an instruction for the plaintiffs to the effect, that if the contract could be...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Reigart v. Manufacturers' Coal & Coke Co.
...doctrine of part performance, the rule has no place in an action at law, as in the present instance. 3 Pass. on Cont. (7th Ed.) 60; Sharp v. Rhiel, 55 Mo. 97. It is unnecessary to review the authorities in this state. That has been well done by Rombauer, P. J., in Johnson v. Reading, 36 Mo.......
-
Standard Fireproofing Co. v. St. Louis Expanded Metal Fireproofing Co.
...Ev., sec. 86. (d) Part performance of a contract will not take it out of the statute so as to cause a variation of the above rules. Sharp v. Rhiel, 55 Mo. 97; Atwood v. Fox, 30 Mo. 500; Nally v. Reading, 107 Mo. 350. (e) The contract in suit by its terms was to continue "during the life of ......
-
Blue Valley Creamery Co. v. Consolidated Products Co.
...mentioned in the statute runs from the date when the agreement is made, and not from the date when the performance is to begin. Sharp v. Rhiel, 55 Mo. 97; Truskett v. Rice Bros. Live Stock Commission Co. (Mo.App.) 180 S.W. 1048; Keller v. Mayer Fertilizer Co., 153 Mo. App. 120, 132 S.W. 314......
-
Brookfield v. Druru College
...completed within one year from the time that its performance was to commence, this does not take it out of the Statute of Frauds. [Sharp v. Rhiel, 55 Mo. 97; Briar v. Robertson, 19 Mo.App. 66; Cook Redman, 45 Mo.App. 397; Chase v. Hinkley (Wis.), 105 N.W. 230; see also note, 2 L.R.A. (N. S.......