Sharpe v. Sharpe, 97-395
| Decision Date | 27 June 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-395,97-395 |
| Citation | 695 So.2d 1302 |
| Parties | 22 Fla. L. Weekly D1541 Douglas Michael SHARPE, Appellant, v. Michelle D. SHARPE, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Charles E. Heim, Jr., of Charles E. Heim, Jr., P.A., Indian Harbor Beach, for Appellant.
Michelle D. Sharpe, Melbourne, pro se.
Michelle D. Sharpe, the widow of Appellant's brother, sought and received a "domestic violence" injunction against Douglas Michael Sharpe. He appeals; we reverse.
A domestic violence injunction is authorized under section 741.30, Florida Statutes (1995). But the statute limits the cause of action to "family or household member[s]" who have been or reasonably believe that they may become victims of domestic violence. It is therefore critical to our analysis first to determine what domestic violence is. The legislature has defined domestic violence as "any assault ... of one family or household member by another who is or was residing in the same single dwelling unit."
It is true that the term "family or household member" is more broadly defined in section 741.28(2) as:
"[S]pouses, former spouses, persons related by blood or marriage, persons who are presently residing together as if a family or who have resided together in the past as if a family, and persons who have a child in common regardless of whether they have been married or have resided together at any time."
Even though this definition does not appear to require that one related by blood or marriage needs to reside with or to have resided with the alleged offender in order to come within subparagraph (e) of section 741.30, still the statute authorizes a cause of action only if such family or household member is or may have become the victim of domestic violence. 1 Mr. Sharpe could not and cannot inflict statutory domestic violence on a sister-in-law with whom he has not shared a living accommodation.
A similar issue was before the court in Evans v. Evans, 599 So.2d 205 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). In that case, the court was concerned with section 741.30(1)(e), which then provided that the cause of action for domestic violence was limited to persons related by blood or marriage who are or were residing within a single dwelling unit. Because the adult estranged son of her husband had never lived in the same household with the stepmother, the court reversed the injunction against domestic violence entered in the stepmother's favor. Because the stepmother failed to qualify as one protected by the act then in effect, there was no authority to grant her an injunction under the domestic violence statute. 2
Although the legislature thereafter amended subsection (e) to eliminate the requirement that one related to the offender by blood or marriage must have resided with such offender in the same household, it failed to amend the very definition of domestic violence. Even though we might assume that by amending subsection (e), the legislature intended to also amend the definition of "domestic violence," it is not our place to amend clear and unambiguous statutory language. 3
It appears, therefore, that in order for Ms. Sharpe to qualify for a domestic violence injunction, she must be a relative by marriage of appellant and must have...
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...brother-in-law was related to the named insured by marriage for purposes of automobile insurance policy); Sharpe v. Sharpe, 695 So. 2d 1302, 1304 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (finding that widow was related by marriage to her deceased husband's brother, which would make her a relative by marriage un......
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Kokoris v. Zipnick, 98-2454.
...On appeal, the aunt contends that the trial court erred by denying her motion to dissolve the injunction. In Sharpe v. Sharpe, 695 So.2d 1302 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), the Fifth District stated a two prong test regarding the relationship between the parties before the court can properly issue a ......
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