Shattuck v. Grider

• Decision Date: 26 January 1972
• Docket Number: No. A--17016,A--17016
• Citation: 1972 OK CR 37,493 P.2d 829
• Parties: Bruce SHATTUCK, Petitioner, v. John W. GRIDER, Warden, Oklahoma State Reformatory, Respondent.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

Page 829

493 P.2d 829

Bruce SHATTUCK, Petitioner, v. John W. GRIDER, Warden, Oklahoma State Reformatory, Respondent.

No. A--17016.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

Jan. 26, 1972.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Legislature may impose statutory limitations upon conditions of parole. (Art. 6, § 10, Oklahoma Const.)

2. Every Act of the Legislature may embrace but one subject, to be clearly expressed in the title of the Act. (Art. 5, § 57, Oklahoma Const.)

3. When meaning of portion of body of statute is uncertain, title of statute may be considered to determine Legislative intent.

4. The use of the word 'any' within a statute is equivalent and has the force of 'every' and 'all'.

5. Where statute provides that inmate on parole who is returned as a parole violator shall be deprived of Any credits up to the date of their release, he forfeits credits for blood donation as well as good time credits provided within same statute. 57 O.S.1971, § 138.

6. Credits awarded prisoner by reason of prisoner donating blood do not become contractually vested.

Bruce Shattuck, pro se.

Larry Derryberry, Atty. Gen., for respondent.

SIMMS, Judge:

This is an application for habeas corpus wherein Bruce Shattuck, hereinafter referred to as petitioner, alleges that his constitutional rights have been violated and the State of Oklahoma has broken its contract with petitioner in canceling out certain credits for blood donations made by petitioner prior to his release on parole.

Although petitioner does not state how much blood time he accrued prior to his release and before the revocation of his parole for its violation, he has substantially raised the question of whether an inmate who contributes blood prior to his release on parole is entitled to good time credits when he is returned to prison for a violation of parole. The statute relating to good time credits is 57 O,.s.1968, § 138, which provides, in pertinent part:

'Every convict who shall have no infractions of the rules and regulations of the prison or laws of the State recorded against him shall be allowed for his term a deduction to two (2) months in each of the first two (2) years; * * * And, in addition to the deduction above provided for, every convict shall be entitled to a deduction from his sentence of two (2) days for every six (6) days' work performed by him; and each convict shall also, in addition to all such deductions, be entitled to a deduction of twenty (20) days for each pint of blood he donates to the American Red Cross or to any agency or a hospital approved for such purpose by the Warden. * * * Inmates on parole who are returned to the institution as parole violators shall be deprived of Any credits earned up to the date of their release on parole. Provided, however, that no convict shall be entitled to deduction for good time as herein provided in the event he has been guilty of misconduct or violation of the prison rules and regulations unless relieved therefrom by the Warden. * * *' (Emphasis added)

Legislative authority to enact statutes such as the one in question is clearly provided for in Article 6, § 10, of the Oklahoma Constitution, which provides as follows:

'The Governor shall have the power to grant, after conviction and after favorable recommendation by a majority of the said Board, commutation, pardons and paroles for all offenses, except cases of impeachment, upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper, Subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law.' (Emphasis added)

In treating the subject of parole, as distinguished from pardon, a uniformly accepted statement of the law may be found at 67 C.J.S. Pardons § 20b, pages 604, 605:

'A parole is a mere matter of grace, favor, or privilege, and a prisoner is not entitled thereto as a matter of right. Subject to the limitations imposed by statute, (emphasis added) the question whether a prisoner shall be paroled is a matter for the discretion of the paroling authority, * * *.'

We must, therefore, conclude the language in the statute 'Inmates on parole who are returned to the institution as parole violators shall be deprived of any credits earned up to the date of their release on parole' is a limitation imposed upon a parolee by constitutionally sound legislative enactment.

Title 57, O.S.1961, § 138, provided:

'* * * Inmates on parole who are returned to the institution as parole violators Shall return the credits earned up to the date of their release on parole.' (Emphasis added)

This Court held, in construing the 1961 Act, that a parolee whose parole has been revoked does not lose his credits for good behavior, etc., earned before the parole, but is entitled to all the lawfull credits earned up to the date he was released on parole. See, In re Salisbury, Okl.Cr., 369 P.2d 476 (1962).

However, the Legislature of this State in 1968, amended the statute under consideration and provided for deprivation of Any credits earned up to the date of their release on parole.

The narrow issue before this Court is: Does the use of the word 'any' in the 1968 Act, supra, embrace credits earned by a prisoner by reason of his having donated blood.

Defendant cites no authority and this Court is unable to find any authority for the contention that blood credits become vested on the theory of contract.

Article 5, § 57, Oklahoma Constitution, provides:

'Every act of the Legislature shall embrace but one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title.'

Title 57, O.S.1968, § 138, has but one subject, to-wit: the earning of time credits by an inmate and includes both credit for blood donated and good time credits under the same statute. The 1971 Amendatory Act contains the exact language with reference to forfeiture of time credits by a returned parolee.

When meaning of portion of body of statute is uncertain, title of statute may be considered to determine Legislative intent in view of this constitutional provision. State, ex rel., Board of Education of City of Tulsa v. Morley, 168 Okl. 259, 34 P.2d 258 (1934).

The title to Senate Bill 135, Second Session of the 31st Legislature, 1968, codified as 57 O.S.1968, § 138, reads: 'Providing for Deprivation of Credits for Persons Returned to Prison as Parole Violators'. (Emphasis added) Obviously, it was the intent of the Legislature that a returned parolee be deprived of credits which could be earned under the authority of that statute, whether they be for good time or blood. This is emphasized by the insertion of the word 'any' within the body of the law.

Generally, the word 'any' is defined to mean one out of many, or an indefinite number, and is given the full force of 'every' or 'all.' Black's Law Dictionary, Revised 4th Ed., at page 120.

More specifically, the word 'any' '. . . has been defined judicially to mean 'all' or 'every' and the use of the word imports no limitation.' Shilbury v. Bd. of Supervisors, 54 Misc.2d 979, 284 N.Y.S.2d 124, at 129 (1967).

Going directly to the proposition of the construction of the word 'any' within a statute, the court in Hime v. City of Galvestion, 268 S.W.2d 543 (1967) stated:

'Further, the word 'any' has been judicially construed to mean: 'each' or 'every' or 'all'; and particularly in construing statutes, the word 'any' is equivalent to and has the force of 'every' and 'all'.'

The majority rule is that a prisoner's good time allowance may be forfeited or denied for his violation...