Shaughnessy v. Shaughnessy
| Decision Date | 29 December 1916 |
| Docket Number | 20,040 - (189) |
| Citation | 160 N.W. 769,135 Minn. 262 |
| Parties | ELEANOR SHAUGHNESSY AND OTHERS v. THOMAS WILLIAM SHAUGHNESSY AND OTHERS |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Dakota county to cancel certain deeds and mortgages and the record of the same in the office of the register of deeds for that county. The answer specifically denied that the deeds were procured from Mary Shaughnessey by fraud or undue influence. The case was tried before Converse, J., who at the close of the testimony denied plaintiffs' motion for a directed verdict, and a jury which returned a negative answer to the question whether Mary Shaughnessy had sufficient mental capacity to execute the deeds, and an affirmative answer to the question whether they were executed as the result of undue influence. The court made findings and ordered judgment in favor of plaintiffs. Defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the decision or for a new trial was denied. From the order denying their motion to amend the findings and order judgment notwithstanding the decision or for a new trial, defendants appealed. Reversed.
Gift -- mental capacity of donor -- verdict not sustained.
1. The evidence does not sustain the finding that the grantor was mentally incompetent to transact business when she signed and acknowledged the deed here attacked.
Gift -- undue influence.
2. The finding that the deed was procured by means of undue influence, exerted by the grantees upon the grantor, cannot be disturbed except for prejudicial error committed in the trial of such issue.
Cancelation of instrument -- charge to jury.
3. The statement in the charge that the grantor in the deeds here involved was attempting to distribute her estate among those who were to have it after her death was not improper, since the court evidently referred to a completed transaction and not to one wherein the grantor retained the control over the delivery of the deeds.
Cancelation of instrument -- undue influence -- burden of proof -- charge erroneous.
4. The burden of proof to establish undue influence is upon the party attacking the conveyance, and the charge that the burden shifted, because during the trial certain presumptions of fact might arise in aid of the other party, was erroneous.
Delivery of deed.
5. It does not appear as a matter of law that there was no delivery of the deeds involved in the transaction, and no finding was made upon that issue, therefore this court cannot base a decision upon the nondelivery of the deeds.
Kueffner & Marks, for appellants.
Thomas C. Daggett, for respondents.
Both sides plead that on October 28, 1912, Mary Shaughnessy owned a 240-acre farm in Dakota county, this state. On that date and nearly two years before her death when about 80 years old, she concluded to give it to her children. To accomplish her purpose she engaged an attorney to draw the deeds and directed him what land to include in each. The deeds were to be recorded by him after her death, unless she during her lifetime directed him to record them. The deeds were drawn, and signed and acknowledged by her. The one deed conveyed 90 acres to the four plaintiffs, and the other conveyed the balance, or 150 acres, to the two defendants. It is estimated that by this division the equity above the encumbrances that each plaintiff would receive would be about $1,100, while that of each defendant would be over $5,000. This action was brought to set aside the deed to defendants, on the ground that the grantor was incompetent mentally to transact business at the time the deed was executed, and, secondly, that it was procured through undue influence brought to bear upon the grantor by the defendants and inducing her to act. The verdict of a jury upon both issues was in favor of plaintiffs. The court embodied the verdict in the findings and ordered judgment for plaintiffs. From the order denying defendants' motion to amend the findings of fact and conclusion of law and denying a new trial, this appeal is taken.
It is impossible to escape the conclusion, after reading the record, that the finding of the court and jury to the effect that Mary Shaughnessy did not have sufficient mental capacity to execute the deeds is not sustained by the evidence. There was some testimony to the effect that advancing old age made Mrs. Shaughnessy feeble physically and mentally during the last few years of her life. The deed, however, was executed nearly two years before she died. There is no suggestion that she then, or at any time subsequent, did not know what property she owned, or who her children were, their circumstances or their claim upon her bounty -- taking the trial court's view that the deeds were to be in the nature of a division of her possessions. A person afflicted with the infirmities of age is not precluded from transacting business or conveying property because the intellect is not as keen as it once was. That in an old person there may be occasional lapses of memory as to recent events, or an easy wandering from subject to subject in ordinary, everyday conversations with friends and acquaintances, does not signify that, when a matter of business of importance is undertaken, the faculties will not readily respond so that it is done rationally according to the free choice of such person.
But upon the issue of undue influence the evidence is such that we cannot disturb the finding except for prejudicial error in its submission. The jury in determining whether undue influence was used were entitled to consider that Mary Shaughnessy's mental faculties were not as keen as formerly, and therefore more susceptible to yield to undue influence. Naeseth v. Hommedal, 109 Minn. 153 123 N.W. 287. The evidence shows that some 9 years before the transaction in question she made her will devising her property in equal shares to her children, except her daughter Bridget, who was to receive $300 more than the others, and $400, which was left to a grandson who had lived with her 5 or 6 years when he was small. She had stated to others that she intended the children to share equally in what she had. For the 5 or 6 years next prior to her death defendants had attended to all business connected with the farm. During that time Mrs. Shaughnessy lived with her daughter Mrs. Davern; but defendant Bridget also lived there, occupying a room with her mother. Bridget had access to the papers of her mother. Until the deed transaction, Bridget paid for her mother, and as a rule from the income of this farm, $15 a month board to Mrs. Davern. A month or so after the signing of the deeds payments for board ceased, and no explanation was made to Mrs. Davern. On October 28, 1912, Bridget took her mother to the home of the other defendant on the occasion of the christening of his infant child. The next day at noon Bridget went to get her mother, but they stopped down town at the office of an attorney, with whom Bridget had previously made the appointment, to have the two deeds signed and acknowledged by her mother. The business done they repaired to Mrs. Davern's home. The other defendant knew that business was to be transacted at the lawyer's and within a few days Bridget informed him fully of the transaction, but not a word was said to Mrs. Davern or any of the other plaintiffs. They never knew anything about the deeds until about 4 months after the mother's death. The deeds were not recorded until after Mrs. Shaughnessy's death. Bridget paid the taxes so they could be recorded, but she asked for no contribution from plaintiffs, nor did she inform them of the fact. Taking these and other...
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