Shaw v. Eaves, 90
| Decision Date | 04 November 1964 |
| Docket Number | No. 90,90 |
| Citation | 138 S.E.2d 520,262 N.C. 656 |
| Parties | Edgar Otto SHAW, Jr. v. Wellmon EAVES, Mable Whittenburg, Louis Carson and Willie Carson. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Lawrence C. Stoker, Landon Roberts, Meekins, Packer & Roberts, Asheville, for plaintiff appellant.
Williams, Williams, & Morris, Asheville, for defendants Louis Carson and Southern Gen. Ins. Co., appellees.
George H. Ward, Loftin & Loftin, Asheville, for defendant Willie Carson, appellee.
All parties agree that the judgment of the general county court in the action instituted by Willie Carson is a valid, binding, final judgment. We are concerned here with its effect on the rights of the parties in the action instituted by Shaw in the superior court.
(1) The superior court judge granted Willie Carson's motion for judgment on the pleadings and entered judgment in the superior court case that Willie Carson recover of plaintiff Shaw $35,000 on his counterclaim, and that Louis Carson recover of plaintiff Shaw such sums, on his counterclaim, for damage to his automobile, 'as a jury may hereafter determine.' In effect, the superior court judge entered judgment in Shaw's superior court case in favor of the Carsons upon the verdict of the jury in general county court in the Willie Carson action.
The general county court could not have entered judgment in favor of Willie Carson against Shaw upon the verdict in that court. In general county court Willie Carson sued Eaves and Eaves joined Shaw for contribution (G.S. § 1-240); the verdict was such as to permit judgment in favor of Willie Carson against Eaves, and in favor of Eaves against Shaw for contribution. Willie Carson sought no affirmative relief against Shaw in that action. We held in Pascal v. Transit Co., 229 N.C. 435, 50 S.E.2d 534, that where plaintiff seeks no affirmative relief against an additional defendant joined by the original defendant for the purpose of enforcing contribution against the additional defendant as a joint tort-feasor, it is error for the court to enter joint and several judgments in favor of plaintiff against both defendants upon the jury's finding that both the original defendant and the additional defendant were guilty of actionable negligence, since the liability of the additional defendant is solely to the original defendant on the latter's claim for contribution.
Since the general county court could not enter an affirmative judgment in favor of Willie Carson against Shaw upon the verdict in that court, neither can the superior court in an entirely different action on motion for judgment on the pleadings. A fortiori, the superior court could not enter judgment against Shaw in favor of Louis Carson, who was not a party to the action in the general county court.
A motion for judgment on the pleadings is similar to a demurrer. In determining such motion the court's decision must be based upon the facts alleged on the one hand and admitted on the other. The court should not hear extrinsic evidence or make findings of fact. The motion raises a question of law, whether the matters set up in the pleadings of an opposing party are sufficient in law to constitute a cause of action or a defense. When a party moves for judgment on the pleadings, he admits for the purposes of the motion (1) the truth of all well pleaded facts in the pleadings of his adversary, together with all fair inferences to be drawn from such facts, and (2) the untruth of his own allegations insofar as they are controverted by the pleadings of his adversary. The law does not authorize the entry of a judgment on the pleadings in any case where the pleadings raise an issue of fact on any single material proposition. Erickson v. Starling, 235 N.C. 643, 71 S.E.2d 384; 41 Am.Jur., Pleadings, §§ 335-339; pp. 520-523.
Shaw's complaint and the answers of defendants, including the counterclaims of defendants Carson, raise issues as to negligence, contributory negligence and damages. The defendants Carson amended their answers and set up the judgment roll in the general county court case and pleaded the same in bar of Shaw's action in superior court. In reply Shaw admitted the correctness of the judgment roll in general county court, denied that it bars his action, and asserted that if it does bar his action the estoppel is mutual and it also bars Carsons' counterclaims. Certainly the judgment of the general county court cannot be the basis for an affirmative judgment on the pleadings, including an award of damages, in favor of the Carsons, unless it is a complete bar to plaintiff Shaw's action and also estops him to deny the truth of the counterclaims.
(2) We now come to a consideration of the pleas of res judicata as between plaintiff Shaw and defendants Carson in the superior court case.
'The doctrine of res judicata as stated in many cases is that an existing final judgment rendered upon the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of rights, questions, and facts in issue, as to parties and their privies, in all other actions in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction.' 30A Am.Jur., Judgments, § 324, p. 371. In order for a judgment to constitute res judicata in a subsequent action there must be identity of parties, subject matter, issues and relief demanded, and it is required further that the estoppel be mutual. Carolina Power & Light Co. V. Merrimack Mut. Fire Insurance Co., 238 N.C. 679, 79 S.E.2d 167; Stansel v. McIntyre, 237 N.C. 148, 74 S.E.2d 345; Cameron v. Cameron, 235 N.C. 82, 68 S.E.2d 796, 31 A.L.R.2d 436; Leary v. Virginia-Carolina Joint Stock Land Bank, 215 N.C. 501, 2 S.E.2d 570. In order for a party to be barred by the doctrine of res judicata, it is necessary not only that he should have had an opportunity for a hearing but also that the identical question must have been considered and determined adversely to him. Crosland-Cullen Co. v. Crosland, 249 N.C. 167, 105 S.E.2d 655. Recent cases involving the doctrine of res judicata seem to indicate that a prior judgment will work an estoppel only if the rights and liabilities of the parties were put in issue so that they were actually adverse parties in the prior case. See Hill v. Edwards, 255 N.C. 615, 122 S.E.2d 383.
The judgment of the general county court is res judicata as to Willie Carson's cause of action against Eaves and Whittenburg, and as to the defenses and counterclaims which were or could have been asserted by Eaves and Whittenburg against Willie Carson. But it does not necessarily follow that that judgment is res judicata as to the ...
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