Shaw v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.

• Decision Date: 15 January 2013
• Docket Number: No. COA12–338.,COA12–338.
• Citation: 737 S.E.2d 168
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: Lashanda SHAW, Plaintiff, v. The GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO., Defendants.

737 S.E.2d 168

Lashanda SHAW, Plaintiff,

v.The GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO., Defendants.

No. COA12–338.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Jan. 15, 2013.

Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 8 April 2011 by Judge Mary Ann Tally in Superior Court, Cumberland County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 November 2012.

Kennedy, Kennedy, Kennedy and Kennedy, LLP, Winston–Salem, by Harold L. Kennedy, III and Harvey L. Kennedy, for plaintiff-appellee.

Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard, L.L.P., Raleigh, by Julia C. Ambrose, John W. Ormand, III and Patricia W. Goodson, for defendant-appellant.

Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, LLP, Raleigh, by Burley B. Mitchell, Jr., for Amicus Curiae North Carolina Chamber.

STROUD, Judge.

This case presents in a unique procedural posture, with defendant's appeal from a $450,000.00 jury award to plaintiff for her claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. For the following reasons, we agree and vacate the judgment of the trial court.

I. Background

This case is in an unusual procedural posture because it comes to us with facts that have already been determined by a jury. Because the only issue addressed by this Court is subject matter jurisdiction, we recite just the background we deem pertinent for an understanding of the jurisdictional issue before us. In 2007, defendant hired plaintiff “as an Area Manager.” During the course of plaintiff's employment, she complained that she was being harassed by her male supervisor.Plaintiff's supervisor's behavior toward plaintiff was obnoxious and rude; the harassment was verbal and involved some forms of intimidation but did not involve anything of a sexual nature nor did it involve any physical contact with plaintiff. Despite plaintiff's complaints to the appropriate personnel, plaintiff's supervisor remained in his position, where he continued to harass her, and eventually, defendant terminated plaintiff's employment. On 13 January 2010, plaintiff filed a verified amended complaint claiming (1) wrongful discharge, (2) violation of Retaliatory Employment Discrimination Act (“REDA”), (3) tortious interference with contractual rights, (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (5) negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”).¹

On or about 27 August 2010, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her second claim, the REDA claim. On 8 November 2010, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. On 21 December 2010, the trial court filed an order regarding defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed plaintiff's third and fourth claims for tortious interference with contractual rights and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, only plaintiff's first and fifth claims for wrongful discharge and NIED remained at the time of trial. The allegations central to both plaintiff's wrongful discharge and NIED claims were that plaintiff complained to defendant about the harassment by her supervisor; defendant negligently handled plaintiff's complaint about the harassment; and defendant's negligence caused plaintiff's emotional distress and eventually led to her wrongful discharge.

Several specific issues were submitted to the jury, and on appeal neither party challenges these issues as submitted to the jury. After a lengthy trial, the jury entered the following verdict:

ISSUE ONE:

Did the defendant intentionally discriminate against the plaintiff because of her race or sex or both when the defendant fired the plaintiff?

[The jury answered “No[.]”]

ISSUE TWO:

Did the defendant retaliate against the plaintiff by firing her for her making a complaint of discrimination based upon her race or sex or both?

[The jury answered “Yes[.]”]

ISSUE THREE:

Would the defendant have terminated the plaintiff in the absence of race or sex discrimination and/or retaliation for her complaints of discrimination?

YOU WILL ANSWER THIS ISSUE ONLY IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED ISSUES 1 OR 2 “YES [”] IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF.

[The jury answered “Yes[.]”]

ISSUE FOUR:

Did the plaintiff suffer severe emotional distress as a proximate result of the negligence of the defendant?

[The jury answered “Yes[.]”]

ISSUE FIVE:

What amount of damages is the plaintiff entitled to recover?

YOU ARE TO ANSWER THIS ISSUE ONLY IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED ISSUES 1 OR 2 “YES” IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF AND ANSWERED ISSUE 3 “NO” OR IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED ISSUE 4 IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF.

[The jury answered “$450,000.00[.]”]

The jury verdict sheet required that the jury answer Issue Five only in either of two scenarios: (1) “IF [IT HAD] ANSWERED ISSUES 1 OR 2 ‘YES' IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF AND ANSWERED ISSUE 3 ‘NO’ ” or (2) “IF [IT HAD] ANSWERED ISSUE 4 IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF.” The jury answered Issue Two “Yes[,]” but answered Issue Three “No[.]” Accordingly, the jury could not award plaintiffa verdict based upon the first two issues.² The jury answered Issue Four “Yes[,]” and thus the award of $450,000.00 was based solely upon Issue Four regarding plaintiff's “severe emotional distress as a proximate result of the negligence of defendant.” In summary, the jury did not award plaintiff any damages for her wrongful discharge claim but only for her NIED claim.

The jury then considered the issue of punitive damages.

The jury entered the following verdict as to punitive damages:

ISSUE ONE:

IS THE DFENDANT LIABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF SEVERE EMOTIONAL DISTRESS?

[The jury answered “Yes[.]”]

ISSUE TWO:

WHAT AMOUNT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES, IF ANY, DOES THE JURY IN ITS DISCRETION AWARD TO THE PLAINTIFF?

(YOU ARE TO ANSWER THIS ISSUE ONLY IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED THE FIRST “YES” IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF)

[The jury answered “None[.]”]

On 8 April 2011, the trial court entered judgment consistent with the jury's verdict sheets and awarded plaintiff compensatory damages of $450,000.00. Defendant appeals.

II. Jurisdiction

Defendant argues that “the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's NIED claim, which is barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act.” (Original in all caps.) “Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law, reviewed de novo on appeal.” McKoy v. McKoy, 202 N.C.App. 509, 511, 689 S.E.2d 590, 592 (2010). It is important to note that the only issue on appeal is the trial court's jurisdiction as to plaintiff's NIED claim, and thus we need not consider any of plaintiff's other claims. Furthermore, the relevant facts have already been determined by the jury, so our analysis is based upon the jury's verdict and not the allegations or evidence of either party.

Here, the jury determined that “plaintiff suffer[ed] severe emotional distress as a proximate result of the negligence of the defendant” and awarded plaintiff $450,000.00 as compensation for that claim and that claim only. The jury further determined that defendant is “liable to the plaintiff for punitive damages for negligent infliction of severe emotional distress” but awarded no damages. (Original in all caps.) However, a finding of liability for punitive damages requires that the plaintiff prove “that the defendant is liable for compensatory damages and that one of the following aggravating factors was present and was related to the injury for which compensatory damages were awarded: (1) Fraud. (2) Malice. (3) Willful or wanton conduct.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1D–15(a) (2007). The jury was properly instructed on the requirements for a finding of liability for punitive damages as to willful or wanton conduct. Plaintiff proved “that the defendant [was] liable for compensatory damages” as is shown by the jury's compensatory damages award of $450,000.00. Accordingly, the issue before us is whether the trial court had jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim for NEID caused by defendant's willful or wanton negligence.³

A. Willful and/or Wanton Negligence Defined

Here, the jury has already made the determination that defendant's negligencewas “willful or wanton.” “Willful negligence arises from the tortfeasor's deliberate breach of a legal duty owed to another, while wanton negligence is done of a wicked purpose or done needlessly, manifesting a reckless indifference to the rights of others.” Sloan v. Miller Building Corp., 128 N.C.App. 37, 43, 493 S.E.2d 460, 464 (1997) (citation, quotation marks, and ellipses omitted). “Wil[l]ful and wanton negligence is conduct which shows either a deliberate intention to harm, or an utter indifference to, or conscious disregard for, the rights or safety of others. Carelessness and recklessness, though more than ordinary negligence, is less than willful[l]ness or wantonness.” Siders v. Gibbs, 31 N.C.App. 481, 485, 229 S.E.2d 811, 814 (1976) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, defendant argues that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over plaintiff's NIED claim caused by defendant's willful and wanton negligence because the Industrial Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over this type of claim.

B. The Exclusivity Provisions

N.C. Gen.Stat. § 97–9 provides,

Every employer subject to the compensation provisions of this Article shall secure the payment of compensation to his employees in the manner hereinafter provided; and while such security remains in force, he or those conducting his business shall only be liable to any employee for personal injury or death by accident to the extent and in the manner herein specified.

N.C. Gen.Stat. § 97–9 (2007).

N.C. Gen.Stat. § 97–10.1, provides,

If the employee and the employer are subject to and have complied with the provisions of this Article, then the rights and remedies herein granted to the employee, his dependents, next of kin, or personal representative shall exclude all other rights and remedies of the employee, his dependents, next of kin, or representative as against the employer at common law or otherwise on account of such injury...