Shaw v. State

• Decision Date: 29 March 2016
• Docket Number: No. 47166–3–II.,47166–3–II.
• Citation: 371 P.3d 106,193 Wash.App. 122
• Parties: Frank SHAW, Appellant, v. STATE of Washington, DEPARTMENT OF RETIREMENT SYSTEMS, Respondent.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

193 Wash.App. 122

371 P.3d 106

Frank SHAW, Appellant

v.STATE of Washington, DEPARTMENT OF RETIREMENT SYSTEMS, Respondent.

No. 47166–3–II.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2.

March 29, 2016.

Wayne L. Williams, Williams Wyckoff & Ostrander PLLC, Olympia, WA, for Appellant.

Sarah Elizabeth Blocki, Attorney at Law, Olympia, WA, for Respondent.

WORSWICK

, J.

¶ 1 Frank Shaw appeals the superior court's affirmation of a Department of Retirement Systems' (DRS) final order denying his claim for duty disability benefits pursuant to RCW 41.26.470(7)

. Shaw argues that the presiding officer erred when she wrongfully required the duty-related incident to be the “sole cause” of Shaw's disability. DRS concedes that the presiding officer applied the incorrect legal test and requests that we remand to DRS to resolve the remaining factual and legal issues. Shaw requests that we find Shaw entitled to on-duty disability benefits. We accept DRS's concession that the presiding officer applied the improper legal test and remand to DRS to properly determine Shaw's eligibility for duty disability benefits.

FACTS

¶ 2 Frank Shaw was abused as a child. As a result, Shaw experienced depression and anger management issues.

¶ 3 In September 1989, Shaw became a member of the statewide Law Enforcement Officers' and Fire Fighters' Retirement System (LEOFF) when he was first employed as a fire fighter/paramedic with the City of Ellensburg Fire Department. He remained an active, contributing member of LEOFF Plan 2 until he resigned his employment as a fire fighter/paramedic with Kittitas Valley Fire and Rescue in October 2007. Shortly thereafter, Shaw applied to DRS for LEOFF Plan 2 disability retirement on the basis that he suffered from depression and stress, which caused an inability to perform his job duties.

¶ 4 Shaw's application was initially denied, but upon additional internal review his claim for disability retirement was approved on September 6, 2008. The September 2008 approval granted Shaw non-duty disability retirement, citing a medical opinion that Shaw was incapacitated for continued employment as a fire fighter/paramedic due to depression and anger management issues.

¶ 5 Shaw petitioned for internal review of his claim, arguing he was eligible for duty-related disability benefits under RCW 41.26.470

. DRS denied his petition in August 2009, concluding he had not established that his disability was work related. On April 2, 2010, Shaw moved for reconsideration, filing additional documentation. Shaw asked DRS to consider him disabled on the basis of previously undiagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) stemming from his childhood abuse, as first diagnosed in February 2010 by his treating psychiatrist. Shaw claimed his PTSD from the abuse was aggravated by specific duty-related incidents at his job including: (1) a groundless accusation of inappropriate nonphysical contact with a teenaged girl while on duty at the fire department, (2) a false accusation of an extramarital affair while on duty, (3) a verbal altercation with medical staff at Harborview Hospital during transit of an injured patient, and (4) an additional incident while on duty at the fire station that ultimately led to him leaving his job. On January 31, 2011, DRS again denied Shaw's claim, affirming that his mental disability was not incurred in the line of duty.

¶ 6 Shaw filed a notice of appeal with DRS and requested a hearing to challenge DRS's January 31 denial. After a prehearing conference, the parties agreed to the following statement of issue for the purpose of preparing and presenting their cases:

In granting Mr. Frank Shaw non-duty disability benefits under WAC 415–104–485

, the Department determined that Mr. Shaw had

(i) incurred a mental disability ;

(ii) become totally incapacitated for continued employment in a LEOFF eligible position; and

(iii) separated from his LEOFF-eligible position due to the disability.

The only issue raised in this appeal is whether the foregoing mental disability was “incurred in the line of duty,”

such that Mr. Shaw is eligible for duty disability benefits under RCW 41.26.470

and WAC 415–104–480.

Administrative Record (AR) at 5

–6.

¶ 7 Shaw argued that he was entitled to duty disability benefits because specific duty-related incidents aggravated his preexisting condition of PTSD. Shaw and DRS offered different interpretations of what is meant by the “line of duty” requirement for duty disability benefits pursuant to RCW 41.26.470

.

¶ 8 Ultimately, the presiding officer issued a final order rejecting Shaw's claim. The analysis of the final order begins, “[T]he claim as presented is not sufficiently supported by law that can be applied in this forum. For the following dispositive analysis it is not necessary to address or determine how his disabling condition(s) came about, or what his disabling condition(s) may have been.” AR at 6

. The final order made no findings or conclusions as to Shaw's mental disability, his employment, or any causal connection between the two.

¶ 9 The final order noted Shaw's exclusive reliance on workers' compensation case law to support his claim, particularly what the final order referred to as the “aggravation rule.” AR at 10. The presiding officer concluded DRS had no authority to incorporate workers' compensation law in general, or the aggravation rule in particular, to LEOFF disability retirement determinations.

¶ 10 Finally, the final order stated:

LEOFF retirement for mental disability

in the line of duty [may] be granted only upon a persuasive showing that a member's disabling condition arose naturally and proximately from performance of duties particular to LEOFF employment, that is, that performance of those required or particularly authorized duties was the sole cause of a particular disabling condition.

AR at 11.

¶ 11 Shaw petitioned the superior court to review the final order, arguing that the order misinterpreted RCW 41.26.470

. The superior court affirmed the final order. Shaw appeals.

ANALYSIS

I. Standard of Review

¶ 12 We review a final agency order under RCW 34.05.570(3)

. In reviewing an administrative action, we sit in the same position as the trial court and apply the Administrative Procedure Act¹ standards directly to the agency's administrative record. Superior Asphalt & Concrete Co. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 112 Wash.App. 291, 296, 49 P.3d 135 (2002). The party challenging an agency's action must prove the decision's invalidity; our review is limited to the record before the agency. RCW 34.05.570(1)(a) ; Tucker v. Dep't of Ret. Sys. 127 Wash.App. 700, 705, 113 P.3d 4 (2005).

¶ 13 We may grant relief based on an agency's erroneous interpretation or application of the law. RCW 34.05.570(3)(d)

. We review a challenge to an agency's statutory interpretation and legal conclusions de novo, giving substantial weight to an agency's interpretation of the law it administers. Tucker, 127 Wash.App. at 705, 113 P.3d 4. To determine legislative intent we evaluate a statute's plain language, and we interpret the statute to avoid absurd results. 127 Wash.App. at 705–06, 113 P.3d 4.

II. Chapter 41.26 RCW

¶ 14 Chapter 41.26 RCW provides an actuarial reserve system for the payment of death, disability, and retirement benefits to law enforcement officers and firefighters and their beneficiaries. RCW 41.26.020

. Benefits for persons who became members of the system prior to October 1, 1977 are governed by LEOFF Plan 1, and LEOFF Plan 2 governs benefits for members of the system on and after that date. RCW 41.26.030(21)

; RCW 41.26.030(22). When the legislature enacted LEOFF Plan 2 it provided a general earned disability retirement for all members “who become[ ] totally incapacitated for continued employment by an employer....” RCW 41.26.470(1).

¶ 15 In 2004, the legislature enacted a new benefit specifically for LEOFF 2 members who “become disabled in the line of duty.” RCW 41.26.470(7)

. This benefit was intended to provide more favorable federal tax status to members who leave service as a result of a line of duty disability. LEOFF Plan 1 members could obtain a similar benefit for any disability “incurred in the line of duty.” RCW 41.26.120.

¶ 16 As part of DRS's implementation of chapter 41.26 RCW, DRS adopted administrative rules governing the unique aspects of administrating the LEOFF system. See WAC 415–104–015

. One such regulation, WAC 415–104–480, governs duty disability benefits for LEOFF Plan 2 members and incorporates the same “incurred in the line of duty” language as used in LEOFF Plan 1. WAC 415–104–480 reads:

(1) Who is entitled to duty disability benefits? Any member of LEOFF Plan 2 who the department determines has:

(a) Incurred a physical or mental disability

in the line of duty;

(b) Become totally incapacitated for continued employment in a LEOFF eligible position; and

(c) Separated from a LEOFF eligible position due to the disability.

(2) How is ‘line of duty’ defined? Line of duty means any action or activity occurring in conjunction with your employment or your status as a law enforcement officer or firefighter and required or authorized by law, rule, regulations, or condition of employment or services.

WAC 415–104–480

(emphasis added).

¶ 17 No Washington court has interpreted the “line of duty” requirement for duty disability benefits under LEOFF Plan 2. However, Washington courts have interpreted the phrase for purposes of LEOFF Plan 1 duty disability, which we discuss more fully in the following section. See Dillon v. Seattle Police Pension Bd., 82 Wash.App. 168, 916 P.2d 956 (1996)

, and Woldrich v. Vancouver Police Pension Bd., 84 Wash.App. 387, 928 P.2d 423 (1996). Because the provisions governing LEOFF Plans 1 and 2 are statutorily separate, the interpretation of the language of one would not generally be applied to the other. But because WAC 415–104–480 incorporates the crucial “incurred in the line of duty” language used for duty disability in Plan 1, and the rule became effective eight...