Shawnee Education Association v. State of Ohio, State Employment Relations Board, and Shawnee State University
| Decision Date | 16 November 2000 |
| Docket Number | 99AP-1210 and 99AP-1211,00-LW-5229 |
| Parties | Shawnee Education Association, Appellee-Appellee [Cross-Appellant] v. State of Ohio, State Employment Relations Board, and Shawnee State University, Appellants-Appellants [Cross-Appellees] |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
APPEALS from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
Cloppert Portman, Sauter, Latanick, and Brenda J. Redmond, for appellee (cross-appellant).
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Dennis R. Morgan, for appellant (cross-appellee), State Employment Relations Board.
Schottenstein Zox & Dunn, Susan Porter and Dan Srsic, for appellant (cross-appellee), Shawnee State University.
The State Employment Relations Board ("SERB") and Shawnee State University ("University") appellants, appeal from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas reversing in part and affirming in part SERB's directive that all department chairpersons should be excluded from the bargaining unit represented by Shawnee Education Association ("SEA"), appellee. The court of common pleas held that the Allied Health chairpersons should not be included in the bargaining unit, but the chairpersons in the Arts & Sciences and the Business and Engineering Technologies departments must be included. This appeal also involves a cross-appeal by SEA questioning SERB's jurisdiction to entertain the University's unilateral petition for unit clarification. In effect, SEA asks this court to find that the court of common pleas erred in holding that SERB had jurisdiction to hear the University's unilateral petition for unit clarification. Alternatively, if this court finds that SERB had jurisdiction to hear the petition in question, SEA asks that we affirm the trial court's holding to the extent that it reversed SERB's decision that the chairpersons from the departments of Arts and Sciences, and Business and Engineering Technologies are excluded from the deemed certified collective bargaining unit.
On March 18, 1994, the University filed a petition with SERB for clarification of an existing bargaining unit as permitted under Ohio Adm.Code 4117-5-01(E). Relying on Ohio Adm.Code 4117-5-01(F), SERB granted a motion dismissing the case. The University appealed SERB's dismissal to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. On August 29, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision concluding that SERB erred in dismissing the University's petition to the extent it relied on Ohio Adm.Code 4117-5-01(F), because the Ohio Supreme Court had, in the interim, declared the rule invalid. In Ohio Council 8, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Cincinnati (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 677, 684, the Ohio Supreme Court held that "Ohio Adm.Code 4117-5-01(F) is in clear conflict with Section 4(A) of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 133 and is, therefore, invalid." However, the trial court concluded that SERB nonetheless had properly dismissed the petition because Section 4(A) of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 133 "forbids adjustments or alterations to deemed-certified collective bargaining units absent a challenge by and subsequent certification of a rival employee organization." Shawnee State Univ. v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (Aug. 29, 1995), Franklin C.P. No. 94CVF07-4709, unreported, at page 4.
The University appealed to this court. On March 21, 1996, this court reversed and remanded to SERB so that it could develop the necessary facts in order for the court to properly determine SERB's jurisdiction over the University's petition for clarification under Section 4(A). See Shawnee State Univ. v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1996), 110 Ohio App.3d 1. On June 30, 1997, SERB issued an Order and Directive, where it found that it did have jurisdiction to entertain the University's petition for clarification of the bargaining unit. SERB concluded that the position of department chairperson should be excluded from the collective bargaining unit at the University.
SEA appealed to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. On September 27, 1999, the trial court issued its decision, affirming in part and reversing in part SERB's Order and Directive. Both the University and SERB filed timely appeals. SEA filed a cross-appeal. Additionally, the University filed a motion to stay the trial court's judgment pending the appeal. Said motion was granted on November 10, 1999.
SERB appeals, assigning the following assignment of error:
THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO ACCORD DUE DEFERENCE TO THE STATE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD'S ORDER FINDING THAT THE CHAIRPERSONS IN THE ARTS AND SCIENCES (MATH/SCIENCE AND HUMANITIES) AND THE BUSINESS AND ENGINEERING TECHNOLOGIES DEPARTMENTS MUST BE EXCLUDED FROM THE BARGAINING UNIT REPRESENTED BY THE SHAWNEE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION SINCE THE ORDER WAS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ON THE RECORD AS A WHOLE AND WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.
The University also appeals, assigning the following assignments of error:
SEA appeals, asserting the following assignment of error:
PURSUANT TO OHIO LAW, THE COMMON PLEAS COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SERB HAD JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE UNIVERSITY'S PETITION FOR UNIT CLARIFI-CATION. [Or, in the alternative, that "SERB erred in holding that department chairpersons at Shawnee State University do not belong in the University's deemed certified collective bargaining unit."] [Appellee's brief, at page 6.]
The above assignments of error are interrelated and can be summarized as follows: first, we must address the jurisdictional question, namely, whether SERB has jurisdiction to entertain a unilateral petition for clarification of the composition of a collective bargaining unit. Second, we must consider whether the court of common pleas has jurisdiction to review SERB's findings as to the composition of a collective bargaining unit and the amount of deference a trial court is required to give to SERB. And finally, we will decide whether SERB or the court of common pleas erred in their respective holdings.
SEA argues that the lower court erred in holding that SERB had jurisdiction to entertain the University's unilateral petition to clarify a deemed certified collective bargaining unit. SEA argues that SERB's decision violates two recent rulings by the Ohio Supreme Court.
In Cincinnati, the Ohio Supreme Court held that Cincinnati involved a request by the city-employer that nine employees classified as waterworks guards be excluded from the bargaining unit. The city's contention was that their inclusion in the bargaining unit was prohibited by R.C. 4117.06(D)(2).
Two years later, the Ohio Supreme Court decided State ex rel. Brecksville Edn. Assn., OEA/NEA v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 665. Brecks-ville involved a joint petition for amended certification of a bargaining unit. In Brecksville, the court distinguished Cincinnati and limited its holding to unilateral employer petitions and confined its holding to those particular facts. Id. at 669. The court further noted that, while "it is reasonable to conclude *** that the General Assembly intended to protect preexisting collective bargaining relationships from unilateral attack by employers, it does not necessarily follow that the General Assembly intended to forever freeze the composition of units extant on October 6, 1983." Id. at 670. Accordingly, the court concluded "SERB has jurisdiction to consider petition jointly filed by employer and exclusive representative requesting SERB to amend composition of deemed [certified] collective bargaining unit." Id. at syllabus.
In its most recent decision, the Ohio Supreme Court revisited its holdings in the above two cases. See Ohio Council 8, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 460. The court noted that, in Cincinnati, "this court held that SERB did not have jurisdiction to adjust or alter deemed certified collective bargaining units unless exclusive representation is challenged by another employee organization." [Emphasis added.] Id. at 462. As to its holding in Brecksville, the court noted that, "[i]n Brecksville we found an exception to SERB's lack of jurisdiction regarding the composition of deemed certified bargaining units." Id. The exception was that SERB may entertain a "joint" petition to effect a change to the deemed certified collective bargaining unit. The court went on to note that "our Brecksville holding offered only one measure of how an employer and union can resolve a dispute regarding the composition of a bargaining unit." Id. at 463.
Prior to the above two cases, the Supreme Court had spoken to the questions of jurisdiction and the applicable standards of review. In Lorain City Bd. of Edn. v. State Emp Relations Bd. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 257, 260, the court noted that reviewing courts must afford due deference to SERB's interpretation of R.C. Chapter 4117. "It was clearly the intention of the General Assembly to vest SERB with broad authority to administer and enforce R.C. Chapter...
To continue reading
Request your trial