Shea v. Cameron

• Decision Date: 09 February 2018
• Docket Number: No. 16–P–1479,16–P–1479
• Citation: 93 N.E.3d 870,92 Mass.App.Ct. 731
• Parties: Susan SHEA v. Michael CAMERON.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

92 Mass.App.Ct. 731

93 N.E.3d 870

Susan SHEA

v.Michael CAMERON.

No. 16–P–1479

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Essex..

Argued October 4, 2017.

Decided February 9, 2018.

John Taylor for the plaintiff.

Mikalen E. Howe (Alan K. Posner also present) for the defendant.

Present: Agnes, Sacks, & Lemire, JJ.

LEMIRE, J.

This appeal concerns whether a defendant's alleged fraudulent inducement to marry constitutes a valid civil cause of action. The plaintiff, Susan Shea, and the defendant, Michael Cameron, were married before receiving a judgment of annulment which incorporated their joint stipulation of Cameron's fraud. Following the annulment, Shea filed a civil action relating to Cameron's marriage fraud in Superior Court. Cameron filed counterclaims alleging fraud by Shea regarding entry of the stipulation and annulment. Cameron moved for summary judgment on all of Shea's claims. After granting Cameron's motion for summary judgment, the judge reported his order to this court pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 64(a), as amended, 423 Mass. 1403 (1996), and stayed Cameron's counterclaims. We affirm.

Background. Shea began a consensual romantic relationship with Cameron in June, 2005. By October, 2005, Cameron had moved into Shea's home, and soon thereafter, the two became engaged. Shea and Cameron married on September 22, 2007. In 2010, Shea transferred title to her home from herself individually to Shea and Cameron as joint tenants and Cameron was added to the mortgage. Over the course of their relationship, Shea and Cameron exchanged money, shared bank accounts, and worked together professionally.

In 2011, Shea discovered that Cameron was having an affair and subsequently filed for divorce on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown. On April 30, 2012, Shea withdrew her complaint for divorce and filed a complaint for annulment. At a deposition related to the annulment proceeding, Cameron admitted to being "unable to love [Shea] very early in the marriage" and that he did not ever believe that Shea was his "one true love."

On June 7, 2013, Shea and Cameron entered into a joint stipulation of annulment based on Cameron's fraud, ending the marriage ab initio.¹ Unbeknownst to Cameron, Shea filed a complaint in Probate and Family Court on June 6, 2013, related to this stipulated fraud. Immediately following the entry of the judgment of annulment, Shea served Cameron with her complaint as he left the court room.

Shea's complaint was dismissed by the Probate and Family Court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Shea then filed the same claims in Superior Court. Shea's theory of recovery on all claims is related to Cameron's false claims of love, Cameron's emotionally harmful conduct during their relationship, and Cameron's improper use of their shared finances. Cameron's counterclaims allege that but for Shea's deliberate concealment of her claims, he would not have entered into the stipulation of annulment.

The judge entered summary judgment in favor of Cameron on all eight of Shea's claims. In his memorandum and decision, the judge accepted that Cameron made misrepresentations "about the genuineness of his love and commitment to Shea," but concluded as a matter of law that the court was unable to intrude into private and personal relationships and provide remedy for the alleged harms. Following the entry of summary judgment the judge reported his decision to this court under Mass.R.Civ.P. 64(a) as an interlocutory finding and stayed Cameron's counterclaims.

Report. As a threshold matter, we consider the propriety of the report on which this case comes before us. A Superior Court judge is authorized to report a case when "an interlocutory finding or order made by [him] so affects the merits of the controversy that the matter ought to be determined by the appeals court before any further proceedings in the trial court." Mass.R.Civ.P. 64(a). "Interlocutory matters should be reported only where it appears that they present serious questions likely to be material in the ultimate decision, and that subsequent proceedings in the trial court will be substantially facilitated by so doing."

John Gilbert, Jr., Co. v. C.M. Fauci Co., 309 Mass. 271, 273, 34 N.E.2d 685 (1941). See Cooney v. Compass Group Foodservice, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 632, 635, 870 N.E.2d 668 (2007).

Facially, Shea's eight claims in her amended complaint and Cameron's five counterclaims appear inextricable. However, a closer inspection into the underlying factual circumstances show that the reported question as to Shea's claims is not material to the stayed counterclaims. Shea's claims rest on the factual circumstances surrounding Cameron's alleged amatory torts, alleged emotional harm, and alleged unjust dispossession of property. On the other hand, Cameron's counterclaims are based almost entirely on allegations regarding the parties' stipulation of fraud and the resulting judgment of annulment.² Any guidance to the Superior Court on the reported issue will not materially impact the decision on the stayed counterclaims and we have some doubt as to whether this case is appropriate for a report under Mass.R.Civ.P. 64(a).³ See Cusic v. Commonwealth, 412 Mass. 291, 293–294, 588 N.E.2d 665 (1992). However, as the parties have fully briefed the issue and the answers are reasonably clear, this court can express its view. See, e.g., Brown v. Guerrier, 390 Mass. 631, 632–633, 457 N.E.2d 630 (1983) ; Morrison v. Lennett, 415 Mass. 857, 859, 616 N.E.2d 92 (1993).

Standard of review. Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c), as amended, 436 Mass. 1404 (2002). See also Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 716, 575 N.E.2d 734 (1991). We review a decision to grant summary judgment de novo, construing all facts in favor of the nonmoving party. See Miller v. Cotter, 448 Mass. 671, 676, 863 N.E.2d 537 (2007). "[A] party moving for summary judgment in a case in which the opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial is entitled to summary judgment if [it] demonstrates, by reference to material described in Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c), unmet by countervailing materials, that the party opposing the motion has no reasonable expectation of proving an essential element of that party's case." Kourouvacilis, supra. See Flesner v. Technical Communications Corp., 410 Mass. 805, 809, 575 N.E.2d 1107 (1991). Hence, the moving party may satisfy its burden either by submitting affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the opposing party's case or by demonstrating that the opposing party has no reasonable expectation of proving an essential element of his case at trial. Flesner, supra at 809, 575 N.E.2d 1107.

Discussion. 1. Stipulation of fraud.⁴ Before reaching Shea's substantive claims, we address the effect, if any, of the prior stipulation of fraud on our de novo review. Generally, stipulations of fact serve an important function for the efficiency of the court in ruling on motions for summary judgment. See Mitchell v. Walton Lunch Co., 305 Mass. 76, 80, 25 N.E.2d 151 (1940). "[S]uch stipulations are binding on the parties ... and respected by the courts, unless a court determines that to do so would be improvident or not conducive to justice." Goddard v. Goucher, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 41, 45, 44 N.E.3d 878 (2016), quoting from Loring v. Mercier, 318 Mass. 599, 601, 63 N.E.2d 466 (1945). See Mass. G. Evid. § 611(g)(1) (2017). Factual stipulations from prior trials may even be considered as evidence in subsequent litigation. See Household Fuel Corp. v. Hamacher, 331 Mass. 653, 656–657, 121 N.E.2d 846 (1954), citing Wigmore on Evidence § 2593 (3d ed. 1940).

In contrast to stipulations of fact, courts are not bound by stipulations of law, especially when the legal stipulations are based on incomplete and misleading facts, incorrect applications of the law, or are self-serving. See Goddard, supra at 46–47, 44 N.E.3d 878. Accordingly, treating the stipulation of Cameron's fraud in the annulment case as a legal conclusion would not be binding in the instant case. See Swift & Co. v. Hocking Valley Ry. Co., 243 U.S. 281, 289, 37 S.Ct. 287, 61 L.Ed. 722 (1917) ("The duty of this court, as of every judicial tribunal, is limited to determining rights of persons or of property .... No stipulation of parties or counsel, whether in the case before the court or in any other case, can enlarge the power, or affect the duty, of the court in this regard" [quotation omitted] ).

Even if the prior stipulation is a mixed issue of fact and law, any factual component here must also be disregarded. See Goddard, supra at 45–46, 44 N.E.3d 878. Factual stipulations are context specific and "[t]he scope of the stipulation is determined by the circumstances in which it is made and the nature of the proof required by the issues raised." Costello v. Commissioner of Rev., 391 Mass. 567, 570, 462 N.E.2d 322 (1984). Here, the one-sentence stipulation omits all necessary information or context concerning the fraud. Under these circumstances, we conclude that any factual component to the stipulation must also be set aside as "improvident or not conducive to justice." Children's Hosp. Medical Center v. Boston, 354 Mass. 228, 233, 236 N.E.2d 878 (1968). See Huard v. Forest St. Housing, Inc., 366 Mass. 203, 208–209, 316 N.E.2d 505 (1974). Therefore, neither the legal nor factual components of the parties' stipulation to Cameron's fraud impact our de novo review of the judge's grant of summary judgment.

2. Shea's substantive claims. Shea's amended complaint asserts eights claims which can be categorized by their underlying factual basis. First, the claims of fraud and deceit (count II), misrepresentation (count IV), and battery (count VIII) are each based on alleged false professions of love which induced Shea to enter into the romantic relationship and annulled marriage. The claims of...