Sheetz v. Cnty. of El Dorado

• Decision Date: 19 October 2022
• Docket Number: C093682
• Citation: 84 Cal.App.5th 394,300 Cal.Rptr.3d 308
• Parties: George SHEETZ, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF EL DORADO, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

84 Cal.App.5th 394

300 Cal.Rptr.3d 308

George SHEETZ, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.COUNTY OF EL DORADO, Defendant and Respondent.

C093682

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Filed October 19, 2022

FisherBroyles, Paul James Beard II, Los Angeles, Matthew Howard Weiner, Burlingame, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Abbott & Kindermann, Glen C. Hansen, Sacramento; David Anthony Livingston, County Counsel for Defendant and Respondent.

Duarte, Acting P. J.

This is a land-use regulation case. Plaintiff George Sheetz challenges the $23,420 traffic impact mitigation fee (TIM fee or fee) imposed by defendant El Dorado County (County) as a condition of issuing him a building permit for the construction of a single-family residence on his property in Placerville. Sheetz appeals from the judgment entered after the trial court sustained the County's demurrer without leave to amend and denied his verified petition for writ of mandate. He contends reversal is required because the TIM fee is invalid under both the Mitigation Fee Act ( Gov. Code, § 66000 et seq. )¹ and the takings clause of the United States constitution, namely the special application of the "unconstitutional conditions doctrine" in the context of land-use exactions established in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n (1987) 483 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 97 L.Ed.2d 677 ( Nollan ) and Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994) 512 U.S. 374, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 ( Dolan ). Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Factual Background

In July 2004, the County adopted a new general plan, titled "2004 El Dorado County General Plan A Plan for Managed Growth and Open Roads; A Plan for Quality Neighborhoods and Traffic Relief" (2004 General Plan or general plan). As relevant here, the general plan required that new development pay for road improvements necessary to mitigate the traffic impacts from such development.

In August 2006, the County permanently amended the general plan to include a traffic impact mitigation fee program (TIM fee program or program) to finance the construction of new roads and the widening of existing roads within its jurisdiction. Under the program, the County is authorized to impose a TIM fee as a condition to the approval of a building permit to mitigate the traffic impacts on state and local roads from new development. The fee is comprised of two components: the Highway 50 component and the local road component. The amount of the fee is generally based on the location of the project (i.e., the specific geographic zone within the County) and the type of project (e.g., single-family residential, multi-family residential, general commercial). The program requires that new development pay the full cost of constructing new roads and widening existing roads without regard to the cost specifically attributable to the particular project on which the fee is imposed. In assessing the fee, the County does not make any "individualized determinations" as to the nature and extent of the traffic impacts caused by a particular project on state and local roads.

In February 2012, the County adopted new TIM fee rates, including the fee rate challenged in this case.

In July 2016, Sheetz applied for a building permit to construct a 1,854-square-foot single-family manufactured home on his property in Placerville, which is located in geographic Zone 6. The County agreed to issue the permit on the condition that Sheetz pay a TIM fee in the amount of $23,420, consisting of $2,260 for Highway 50 improvements and $21,160 for local road improvements. After Sheetz paid the fee, the project was approved and the building permit issued in August 2016.

In December 2016, Sheetz sent a letter to the County in which he protested the validity of the TIM fee under the Mitigation Fee Act on various grounds. Thereafter, Sheetz sent the County additional letters reiterating his challenge to the fee and requesting a refund. The County did not respond to any of the letters.

Procedural Background

In June 2017, Sheetz filed a verified petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging seven causes of action challenging the validity of the TIM fee and the program that authorized it.² As for his state law claims, Sheetz asserted that the fee violated the Mitigation Fee Act because there is no "reasonable relationship" between both (1) the amount of the fee and the cost of the public facilities (i.e., road improvements) specifically attributable to his development project, and (2) the traffic impacts caused by his development project and the need for road improvements within the County. Sheetz further asserted that the fee violated the Mitigation Fee Act because it included costs attributable to existing deficiencies in the County's "traffic infrastructure." As for his federal claims, Sheetz asserted that the fee violated the takings clause of the United States constitution, specifically the special application of the "unconstitutional conditions doctrine" in the context of land-use exactions established in Nollan and Dolan , as the County failed to make an individualized determination that an "essential nexus" and "rough proportionality" existed between the traffic impacts caused by or attributable to his project and the need for improvements to state and local roads. Finally, Sheetz asserted that the fee was invalid under state law because the County's decision to impose the fee as a condition of issuing him a building permit was not supported by legally sufficient findings, and the findings were not supported by legally sufficient evidence. Sheetz sought various relief, including the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate directing the County to refund the fee, an order declaring that the County failed to demonstrate a "reasonable relationship" and/or "essential nexus" and "rough proportionality" between the fee and any adverse traffic impact caused by his development project, an order declaring invalid the County's policy of requiring new development to pay the full cost of constructing new roads and widening existing roads without regard to the cost specifically attributable to the particular project on which the fee is imposed, and an injunction preventing the County from enforcing this policy.

In April 2018, the trial court sustained the County's demurrer to the declaratory relief causes of action (second through seventh causes of action) without leave to amend, and overruled the demurrer to the petition for writ of mandate (first cause of action) on the ground that it stated a cognizable claim under the Mitigation Fee Act, specifically section 66001, subdivision (a). As relevant here, the court concluded the TIM fee was not subject to the requirements of Nollan and Dolan (and therefore did not violate the "unconstitutional conditions doctrine" as a matter of law) because it is a legislatively prescribed development fee that is generally applicable to a broad class of property owners. The court also concluded that Sheetz's declaratory relief causes of action, which sought a declaration that the fee and the program that authorized it violated the Mitigation Fee Act and the "unconstitutional conditions doctrine," failed as a matter of law because the facial challenges were time-barred and the sole remedy for the "as applied" challenges is administrative mandamus, not declaratory relief.

After the administrative record was completed and the parties submitted additional briefing, the trial court denied the petition for writ of mandate in November 2020. As for the state law claim, the court concluded the County had met its burden to produce evidence showing that it used a valid method for imposing the TIM fee, one that established a reasonable relationship between the fee charged and the burden posed by Sheetz's development project. The court further concluded Sheetz had failed to cite evidence in the administrative record showing that the fee was arbitrary, capricious, entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or unlawfully or procedurally unfair. Sheetz did not show that the record before the County clearly did not support the underlying determinations regarding the reasonableness of the relationship between the fee and the development.³ In rejecting Sheetz's constitutional challenge under state law, the court found the administrative record established that the fee bore a reasonable relationship, in both intended use and amount, to the deleterious public impact of the project. As for the federal claim, the trial court rejected Sheetz's constitutional challenge to the fee, concluding (as it did in ruling on the demurrer) that the fee was not subject to the requirements of Nollan and Dolan because it is a legislatively prescribed development fee that is generally applicable to a broad class of property owners.

Sheetz timely appealed. He challenges the trial court's rulings with respect to his first (writ of mandate), fourth (declaratory relief), and fifth (declaratory relief) causes of action.

After delays in the briefing schedule, the case was fully briefed on May 4, 2022, and assigned to this panel on May 31, 2022. The court scheduled oral argument and the case was argued and submitted on September 21, 2022.

DISCUSSION

IGoverning Law

A. Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine

The takings clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, "provides that private property shall not ‘be taken for public use, without just compensation.’ " ( Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. (2005) 544 U.S. 528, 536, 125 S.Ct. 2074, 161 L.Ed.2d 876 ( Lingle ).)

The United States Supreme Court has identified two general categories of takings: "physical takings" and "regulatory takings." ( Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (2002) 535 U.S. 302, 321, 122 S.Ct. 1465, 152 L.Ed.2d 517.) Apart from these two general categories of takings, the Supreme Court has also identified a "special"...