Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. v. Della Ghelfa

• Citation: 200 Conn. 630,513 A.2d 52
• Parties: SHELBY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, v. Dennis DELLA GHELFA et al.
• Decision Date: 29 July 1986
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut

Page 52

513 A.2d 52

200 Conn. 630

SHELBY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, v. Dennis DELLA GHELFA et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 10, 1986.

Decided July 29, 1986.

Wesley W. Horton, Hartford, with whom were Paul R. Griffin, Torrington, and, on brief, Kimberly A. Knox, Law Student Intern, for appellants (defendants).

Marc N. Needelman, West Hartford, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before ARTHUR H. HEALEY, SHEA, DANNEHY, SANTANIELLO and CALLAHAN, JJ.

SANTANIELLO, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal, after certification, from a judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the decision of the Superior Court which granted the plaintiff insurer summary judgment in the amount of $5000. We granted certification to review the Appellate Court's judgment that: (1) a no-fault automobile insurer that has paid more than $5000 to its insured as part of extended reparations coverage under the No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act (the act), General Statutes §§ 38-319 through 38-351, was entitled to full reimbursement upon the insured's recovery from a third party tortfeasor; and (2) a no-fault insurer under the pre-1981 version of the act may enforce its right to reimbursement and right to a lien against the insured's attorney where the attorney received the funds on behalf of the insured. We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The decision of the Appellate Court fully sets forth the underlying facts and circumstances. Shelby Mutual Ins. Co. v. Della Ghelfa, 3 Conn.App. 432, 434-35, 489 A.2d 398 (1985). As a result of an automobile accident occurring in 1975, the defendant Dennis Della Ghelfa received $11,989.02 under his no-fault automobile insurance policy with the plaintiff, Shelby Mutual Insurance Company. The plaintiff was required by state insurance regulations then in effect to offer, in addition to the statutory minimum of $5000, optional increased coverage of $10,000, $15,000 and $25,000 as reparations benefits. Regs., Conn.State Agencies § 38-330-1. The defendant had purchased coverage in an amount exceeding the $11,989.02 which he had received as reparations benefits. After the plaintiff paid Della Ghelfa, it gave him and his attorney, the defendant Zbigniew S. Rozbicki, notice of its statutory right of reimbursement under General Statutes (Rev. to 1979) § 38-325. On October 4, 1979, Della Ghelfa, represented by Rozbicki, obtained a judgment of $18,000 against a third party tortfeasor for a claim arising out of the accident. The recovery was paid to Rozbicki who in turn disbursed the proceeds to Della Ghelfa.

The plaintiff, by complaint dated April 15, 1980, filed this action seeking reimbursement of the insurance benefits paid to Della Ghelfa. The suit was brought in two counts, one alleging that Della Ghelfa wrongfully retained the amount recovered in the third party action and one alleging that Rozbicki wrongfully turned the money over to Della Ghelfa. The plaintiff claimed that under General Statutes (Rev. to 1979) § 38-325(b) it possessed a statutory right of reimbursement and that the defendants failed to honor that lien. Rozbicki moved to strike the complaint on the ground that § 38-325(b) did not create a lien against him as Della Ghelfa's attorney, but the court, O'Donnell, J., denied his motion. Rozbicki then filed twenty-two special defenses which the plaintiff thereafter moved to strike. The court, Aspell, J., ruled that twenty-one of the twenty-two special defenses did not state legally sufficient grounds to defeat the plaintiff's claim and granted the motion to strike as to those defenses. As to the remaining defense, that the act limited the plaintiff's recovery to $5000, the court denied the motion to strike. The plaintiff later moved for summary judgment in the amount of $11,989.02, the full amount of the benefits paid to Della Ghelfa. The court, Satter, J., granted the plaintiff's motion but limited the recovery to $5000 on the ground that the lien created by § 38-325(b) is limited to a maximum of $5000 by virtue of § 38-320(a) and (d).

The plaintiff appealed the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court claiming error in the court's limitation of recovery. Rozbicki cross appealed claiming that the court erred in denying his motion to strike the plaintiff's complaint, in granting the plaintiff's motion to strike all but one of his twenty-two special defenses, and in granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Court found error on the plaintiff's appeal and determined that summary judgment should have been granted in the full amount of $11,989.02. The court, however, also found that the trial court should not have stricken one of Rozbicki's special defenses and found error in part on the cross appeal. The court therefore ordered that the trial court's "judgment [be] set aside and the case [be] remanded with direction to render judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $11,989.02 against the defendant Della Ghelfa, and against the defendant Rozbicki unless he establishes his nineteenth special defense in a hearing limited to that issue." Shelby Mutual Ins. Co. v. Della Ghelfa, supra, 450, 489 A.2d 398.

We granted certification to review the judgment of the Appellate Court that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the full amount of benefits paid to Della Ghelfa and that the plaintiff could assert its statutory right to reimbursement against Rozbicki. ¹ "In this appeal the focus of our review is not the judgment of the Superior Court but of the Appellate Court. We do not hear the appeal de novo. The only questions we need consider are those squarely raised by the petition for certification and the appellee's preliminary statement of issues, and we will ordinarily consider these issues in the form in which they have been framed in the Appellate Court. See Practice Book §§ 3012(a), 3154; State v. Beckenbach, 198 Conn. 43, 47, 501 A.2d 752 (1985); State v. Torrence, 196 Conn. 430, 433, 493 A.2d 865 (1985)." Petrowski v. Norwich Free Academy, 199 Conn. 231, 234, 506 A.2d 139 (1986).

I

We turn first to the issue concerning the limitation on reimbursement. The Appellate Court held "that where the insurer has paid benefits for economic loss in excess of $5000 pursuant to increased coverage which it was required to provide by a regulation of the insurance commissioner, the entire amount of those benefits paid constitutes 'basic reparations benefits' and is subject to the reimbursement and lien rights created by § 38-325(b)." Shelby Mutual Ins. Co. v. Della Ghelfa, supra, 3 Conn.App. 437, 489 A.2d 398. We agree with the Appellate Court's interpretation of the act.

Connecticut's no-fault automobile insurance provisions require the no-fault insurer "to pay, without regard to fault, basic reparations benefits under a uniform separately identifiable coverage of five thousand dollars per person per accident for economic loss...." General Statutes § 38-320(a). ² "Basic reparations insurers may offer optional added reparations coverages providing other benefits as compensation for injury" and may be required by the insurance commissioner to offer specific optional added reparations coverages. General Statutes § 38-330. ³ "Whenever a person who receives basic reparations benefits for an injury recovers damages ... the insurer is entitled to reimbursement from the claimant to the extent that said basic reparations benefits have been paid and shall have a lien on the claimant's recovery to such extent." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes (Rev. to 1979) § 38-325(b). ⁴ "Basic reparations benefits" is defined as "benefits reimbursing persons suffering economic loss through injury arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a private passenger motor vehicle...." General Statutes § 38-319(k). No monetary limit is given in the statutory definition, but § 38-320(d) provides that "[t]he maximum amount of basic reparations benefits payable for all economic loss resulting from injury ... shall not exceed five thousand dollars...." ⁵

The Appellate Court found that the term "basic reparations benefits" as used in § 38-325(b) includes not only the first $5000 of coverage, but also payments made pursuant to extended coverage purchased under § 38-330. The court reasoned that the legislative history and the basic purposes of the act indicate that the legislature sought to provide insurers with reimbursement for all payments made under the obligations imposed on them by the act. Further, the court noted that an interpretation limiting the lien to $5000 "would lead to difficult and bizarre results...." Shelby Mutual Ins. Co. v. Della Ghelfa, supra, 443, 489 A.2d 398. The defendants claim that the language of § 38-320(a) and (d) makes it clear that the legislature intended the § 38-325(b) lien to be limited to the payment of $5000. Relying on the well established rule of statutory construction that when a statute is unambiguous, further inquiry into its background, history, objectives and underlying policy is unnecessary; see The B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Dubno, 196 Conn. 1, 8, 490 A.2d 991 (1985); they argue that the Appellate Court's analysis and subsequent conclusion was erroneous.

We cannot agree with the defendants that the language of the act is absolutely clear. We affirm the conclusion of the Appellate Court that an inquiry into the history and purpose of the act is necessary. In interpreting a particular provision like § 38-325(b), a reviewing court must, as far as possible, reconcile its wording with other statutes, especially those enacted as part of the same legislation, in order to render an overall reasonable interpretation. Peck v. Jacquemin, 196 Conn. 53, 64, 491 A.2d 1043 (1985); Dukes v. Durante, 192 Conn. 207, 214-15, 471 A.2d 1368 (1984). In this case, the apparent limitation on insurer liability established in § 38-320(a) and (d) does not foreclose the possibility that insurers will be obligated to pay more than $5000 as part of extended...