Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. v. Della Ghelfa

• Decision Date: 26 March 1985
• Docket Number: No. 2130,2130
• Citation: 489 A.2d 398,3 Conn.App. 432
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: SHELBY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. Dennis DELLA GHELFA et al.

Page 398

489 A.2d 398

3 Conn.App. 432

SHELBY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. Dennis DELLA GHELFA et al.

No. 2130.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 5, 1984.

Decided March 26, 1985.

[3 Conn.App. 433] Marc N. Needelman, Hartford, with whom was Edward Seltzer, West Hartford, for appellant-appellee (plaintiff).

Donald C. Simmons, Waterbury, with whom was William A. Conti, Torrington, for appellee-appellant (defendant Zbigniew S. Rozbicki).

Paul R. Griffin, Torrington, for appellee (named defendant).

Before DUPONT, C.P.J., and HULL and BORDEN, JJ.

BORDEN, Judge.

The principal issue in this appeal ¹ is whether the plaintiff, an automobile no-fault insurer which has paid more than $5000 to its insured for his economic loss, as defined in General Statutes § 38-319(b), is, upon the insured's recovery from a third party tortfeasor, limited to a lien of $5000. The trial court rendered a summary judgment holding that the plaintiff is so limited. As to this principal issue, we find error in that part of the summary judgment limiting the plaintiff's recovery to $5000. We also find error in part on the cross appeal.

The plaintiff's complaint is in two counts. The first count, which is against its insured, Dennis Della Ghelfa, alleges the following facts: As a result of an automobile collision on September 12, 1975, between Della Ghelfa and an automobile owned by Albert A. Seitz, operated by Michael Seitz and insured by Nationwide Insurance Company, the plaintiff paid Della Ghelfa, or for his benefit, $11,989.02 in basic reparations benefits under its automobile insurance policy with him. The plaintiff gave notice to Della Ghelfa and to his attorney, the defendant Zbigniew S. Rozbicki, of its statutory rights of reimbursement under General Statutes § 38-325(b). On October 4, 1979, Della Ghelfa, represented by Rozbicki, obtained a judgment of $18,000 against the Seitzes which Nationwide paid to Della Ghelfa. The plaintiff claimed reimbursement of the $11,989.02 under General Statutes § 38-325(b). The second count, which is against Rozbicki, alleges the same facts, and adds that Rozbicki obtained the $18,000 payment and, in violation of the plaintiff's lien under General Statutes § 38-325(b), wrongfully disbursed the proceeds of it.

Della Ghelfa filed an answer to the complaint. Rozbicki moved to strike the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that General Statutes § 38-325(b) did not create a lien against him as Della Ghelfa's attorney. The court, O'Donnell, J., denied the motion. Rozbicki thereupon filed an answer to the complaint. He also filed twenty-two separate special defenses.

The plaintiff moved to strike all twenty-two of Rozbicki's special defenses, asserting that none of them stated a legally sufficient ground to defeat its claim. The court, Aspell, J., granted the plaintiff's motion to strike as to twenty-one of the twenty-two special defenses; it denied it only as to the eighth special defense, which asserts that the lien created by General Statutes § 38-325(b) is limited to $5000. The court reasoned that, because it could not at that point conclude that this defense was insufficient to defeat that part of the plaintiff's claim in excess of $5000, the motion to strike should be denied as to that special defense.

The plaintiff thereupon moved for summary judgment in the amount of $11,989.02 against both Della Ghelfa and Rozbicki, supplying affidavits and documents in support of all the facts alleged in its complaint. Rozbicki filed an objection to the motion, but filed no affidavit or other document in opposition to it. Della Ghelfa filed nothing in response to the motion. The court, Satter, J., granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment against both Della Ghelfa and Rozbicki in the amount of $5000 only. The plaintiff appealed, claiming that the court erred in limiting its recovery to $5000. Rozbicki cross appealed, claiming error in the denial of his motion to strike the plaintiff's complaint, in the granting of the plaintiff's motion to strike all but one of his twenty-two special defenses, and in the granting of the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.

I THE APPEAL

The plaintiff's appeal requires us to consider the relationship among several sections of our No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act (the act). General Statutes §§ 38-319 through 38-351. These are §§ 38-319(k), ² 38-320(a), ³ 38-320(d), ⁴ 38-325(b), ⁵ and 38-330. ⁶

The trial court, Satter, J., held, as the defendants urge us to hold, that the phrase "basic reparations benefits," as used in § 38-325(b), is limited to a maximum of $5000, by virtue of §§ 38-320(a) and (d), and that any benefits paid by an insurer beyond that amount are "added reparations ... benefits" under § 38-330, which are not recoverable by the insurer under § 38-325(b). The plaintiff argues that those benefits are not limited by the dollar amounts contained in §§ 38-320(a) and (d) and are fully recoverable under § 38-325(b). Although the defendants' argument has some appeal based solely on the language of §§ 38-320(a), 38-320(d) and 38-330, we agree with the plaintiff. On the basis of the language of the various statutory sections, the history and purposes of the act, and the way in which the phrase "basic reparations benefits" is used throughout the act, we hold that where the insured has paid benefits for economic loss in excess of $5000 pursuant to increased coverage which it was required to provide by a regulation of the insurance commissioner, the entire amount of those benefits paid constitutes "basic reparations benefits" and is subject to the reimbursement and lien rights created by § 38-325(b).

A

"The objective of statutory construction is to give effect to the intended purpose of the legislature." State v. Delafose, 185 Conn. 517, 521, 441 A.2d 158 (1981). Although it is axiomatic that, where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, construction of the statute by reference to its history and purpose is unnecessary; Manchester v. Manchester Police Union, 3 Conn.App. 1, 6, 484 A.2d 455 (1984); that axiom only applies in full force "[w]here ... the language of a statute is ... absolutely clear" on its face and where no ambiguity is disclosed by reference to its background. (Emphasis in original.) Anderson v. Ludgin, 175 Conn. 545, 552-54, 400 A.2d 712 (1978). Where such absolute clarity is lacking and such an ambiguity is disclosed, the court must look to the language of the statute, its history, purpose, objective and underlying policy. Id. What appears to be clear statutory language should not be read to arrive at an "ambiguous or unreasonable result" or to "defeat a legislative intent which becomes evident when the statute is read in the light of its history and purpose." State v. Delafose, supra, 185 Conn. 522, 441 A.2d 158. Statutes should be considered as a whole, reconciling their separate parts so that a reasonable overall interpretation is achieved. Dukes v. Durante, 192 Conn. 207, 214, 471 A.2d 1368 (1984). Furthermore, the meaning of a particular phrase in a statute is to be determined by reference to the use of that phrase in other parts of the same statute. Doe v. Institute of Living, Inc., 175 Conn. 49, 57, 392 A.2d 491 (1978); Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed.) § 46.05. A meaning should not be ascribed to it which would render the meaning of those other uses difficult or bizarre; State v. Campbell, 180 Conn. 557, 563, 429 A.2d 960 (1980); Connecticut Natural Gas Corporation v. DPUC, 1 Conn.App. 1, 4, 467 A.2d 679 (1983); and it must be construed with common sense. State v. Privitera, 1 Conn.App. 709, 721, 476 A.2d 605 (1984).

Here, that absolute clarity is lacking and that ambiguity is disclosed. Although §§ 38-320(a) and (d) appear on their face to limit basic reparations benefits to $5000, and although § 38-330 on its face draws a distinction between basic reparations benefits and added reparations benefits, neither the definition of basic reparations benefits; see § 38-319(k), footnote 2, supra; nor the reimbursement mechanism of § 38-325(b); see footnote 5, supra; contains such a monetary limitation. The definition is cast in terms of the kind of coverage, not its amount. Likewise, § 38-325(b) provides for reimbursement "to the extent that ... basic reparations benefits have been paid...." We cannot conclude, as the defendants would have us do, that where the insurer has paid benefits for economic loss beyond that amount, the question of whether basic reparations benefits is limited to $5000 can confidently be answered solely by examining the language of §§ 38-320(a), 38-320(d) and 38-330, and by ignoring the other language of the act, its history, purpose and objective. We turn, therefore, to those other sources of enlightenment.

B

It is useful to begin with the legislative history of the act, including the subsequent regulatory action of the insurance commissioner in implementing it. ⁷ There is no question that, when it was enacted in 1972, as Public Acts 1972, No. 273, the act provided only for a package of basic reparations benefits of $5000. This is clear, not only from its language but from a perusal of its legislative history. See generally 15 H.R.Proc., Pt. 5, 1972 Sess., pp. 1843-1853 (remarks of Rep. Carrozzella); 15 S.Proc., Pt. 5, 1972 Sess., pp. 2143-2149, 2161 (remarks of Sen. Jackson). At that time, then, the statute contemplated basic reparations benefits of no more than $5000; that amount was all that insurers were obligated to provide and all that was available to insureds.

Contained within the act, however, was what is now § 38-330. See footnote 6, supra. That section looked to the future of the act and the solutions it offered, by providing that insurers may offer added reparations benefits, including coverage of losses otherwise excluded by the statutory limits on such items as funeral and burial expenses, work loss and survivor's benefits, and by giving the...