Sheldon v. Grand River Dam Authority
| Decision Date | 01 February 1938 |
| Docket Number | 28318. |
| Parties | SHELDON v. GRAND RIVER DAM AUTHORITY et al. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. The act, chapter 70, art. 4, Sess.L.1935, 82 Okl.St.Ann. §§ 861-881, and amendment thereto chapter 70, arts. 1 and 2 Sess.L.1937, 82 Okl.St.Ann.§ 881 and note, and § 861 creating the Grand River Dam Authority, is not special and local, but is general legislation, and does not violate sections 32, 46, and 59 of article 5 of the Oklahoma Constitution.
2. The Grand River Dam Authority is not one of the "political corporations, or other political subdivisions of the State," within the meaning of section 26, art. 10 Oklahoma Constitution, but is a governmental agency of the state.
3. The acts creating the Grand River Dam Authority, and providing for the issuance of bonds not to exceed the sum of $15,000,000, payable solely out of a special fund to be created by the revenues from the sale of electric power and water to be produced by the project, when completed, and the revenues from its properties in other respects, but not pledging directly, indirectly, or contingently any existing revenues, which may be available for general purposes, and where the fund is not to be fed from any revenues derived from taxation either on an ad valorem basis, or by special taxes, do not create a debt within the meaning of sections 23 and 25, art. 10, Oklahoma Constitution.
4. The acts creating the Grand River Dam Authority do not violate sections 31 and 32 of article 2; sections 5, 34, 35, 50 of article 5, section 3 of article 16, or sections 1 and 4(a) of article 18 of the Oklahoma Constitution.
Appeal from District Court, Craig County; N. B. Johnson, Judge.
Suit by William Sheldon against the Grand River Dam Authority and others to enjoin the named defendant from proceeding to issue the bonds authorized by the statute creating the Grand River Dam Authority. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
L. Keith Smith, of Jay, for plaintiff in error.
C. B. Cochran and R. L. Wagner, both of Oklahoma City, amici curiæ.
Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., Randell S. Cobb, Asst. Atty. Gen., R. L. Davidson, of Tulsa, and Jack L. Rorschach, of Vinita, for defendants in error.
This action involves the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature and an amendment thereto creating the Grand River Dam Authority. The act, chapter 70, article 4, Sess. L. 1935, 82 Okl.St.Ann. §§ 861-881, creates a conservation and reclamation district consisting of that area included within the boundaries of seventeen counties located in the northeast part of the state, namely: Adair, Cherokee, Craig, Delaware, Mayes, Muskogee, Nowata, Ottawa, Rogers, Tulsa, Wagoner, Sequoyah, Osage, Washington, McIntosh, Creek, and Okmulgee. The district is declared to be a "governmental agency and body politic and corporate, with the powers of government." The act provides that nothing therein contained "shall be construed as authorizing the District to levy or collect taxes or assessments, or to create any indebtedness payable out of taxes or assessments, or in any manner to pledge the credit of the State of Oklahoma, or any subdivision thereof." The act contemplates the construction of a dam on Grand River with the erection of a hydro electric power plant, which will also make available the water necessary for irrigation, soil conservation, and recreational purposes and will facilitate in flood control. The act provides that the district can not engage in the retail marketing of electric power, but can sell it only at the turbines for wholesale purposes. It provides for the creation of a board of nine directors, requiring that they be "residents of and freehold property taxpayers in the District," and set out in detail the powers, rights, and privileges to be exercised. The district is given authority to issue bonds, not to exceed $15,000,000 payable solely out of the revenues received by the district from the sale of electric power and other revenues received in respect to its properties. The act further provides that before any bonds shall be sold, a certified copy of the proceedings for the issuance thereof shall be submitted to the Attorney General, and if he shall find that they have been issued in accordance with law, he shall approve them and issue his certificate to that effect, which shall be filed in the office of the State Auditor.
The amendment (chapter 70, arts. 1 and 2, Sess. L. 1937, 82 Okl.St.Ann. § 881 and note and § 861,) does not re-enact the 1935 Act, 82 Okl.St.Ann. §§ 861-881, in its entirety, but merely eliminates three counties, Rogers, Osage, and Washington, from the district, and also eliminates any restriction on the retail marketing of electric power.
Plaintiff is a property owner and taxpayer within the district and brought this action seeking an injunction to prevent the Grand River Dam Authority from proceeding to issue bonds as authorized by the act. The injunction was denied, and plaintiff brings this appeal. He presents twenty reasons for asserting the unconstitutionality of the act. The principal contentions are: (1) That the legislation is local or special and violative of sections 32, 46, and 59 of article 5 of the State Constitution; and (2) that it violates the debt limitation provisions of sections 23, 25, and 26 of article 10 of the State Constitution. Amici curiæ briefs have been filed in which it is asserted that the act is violative of sections 32 and 59 of article 5, and section 26 of article 10, of the Constitution.
1. The first contention of the plaintiff and of the amici curiæ is that the act is special or local, rather than general, legislation, and violates sections 32, 46, and 59 of article 5 of the Constitution. Section 32 of this article provides that "no special or local law shall be considered by the Legislature until notice of the intended introduction" thereof shall have been published in some newspaper in the "city or county affected by such law." Section 46 provides that no local or special law upon twenty-eight specified subjects shall be passed. Section 59 requires that "laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the State, and where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted."
It is stipulated that no notice was published as required by section 32, but the contention of the defendants in answer to the application of all of these sections is that the act is general, and not special or local. The first question is regarding the test for determining whether an act is special and local or general. The defendants, or proponents of the act, contend that any law is a general law if it deals with a "subject-matter that is of general interest and state-wide concern, although it may have a restricted or local operation." On the other hand, amici curiæ contend that the fact that a law may be enacted for a public purpose does not make it a general law if, by its terms, it is confined in its operation to property and persons of a particular locality of the state. Without determining whether the position of the defendants has been misunderstood, as they claim, it is clear that by reason of section 59, an act to be general must have a uniform operation throughout the state. It is not necessary that it shall operate upon every person and every locality in the state. A law may be general and have a local application or apply to a designated class if it operates equally and uniformly upon all the subjects within the class for which it was adopted, and upon all persons and parts of the state that are brought within the relation and circumstances provided by it. It must affect alike all persons in like situations, and where it operates upon a class, the classification must not be arbitrary or capricious, but must be reasonable and pertain to some peculiarity in the subject-matter calling for the legislation. This principle is discussed in the following cases: Burks v. Walker, 1909, 25 Okl. 353, 109 P. 544; Leatherock v. Lawter, 1915, 45 Okl. 715, 147 P. 324, 326; Coyle v. Smith, 1911, 28 Okl. 121, 113 P. 944; School Dist. No. 85 v. School Dist. No. 71, 1928, 135 Okl. 270, 276 P. 186; City of Sapulpa v. Land, 1924, 101 Okl. 22, 223 P. 640, 35 A.L.R. 872.
In Leatherock v. Lawter, supra, it is said: "Whether an act of the Legislature be a local or general law must be determined by the generality with which it affects the people as a whole rather than the extent of territory over which it operates, and if it affects equally all persons who come within its range, it is neither local nor special."
In 59 C.J. 730, it is said: "While a statute which is applicable to all of the people of the state and which operates in all parts of the state is most general in its character it is not necessary that a law, in order to be general, shall affect all of the people of the state, or all of the state, nor need it include all classes of individuals; it may be intended to operate over a limited number of persons or things, or within a limited territory, and if every person or locality brought within the relations and circumstances provided for by the law is affected, the law may be general although presently operative on but a single individual, or thing, place, or political subdivision, such as a county or municipal corporation; and its general character is not affected by the number of persons, things, or localities which come within the scope of its operation."
Defendants rely by way of analogy, upon cases sustaining the validity of acts establishing superior courts in all counties having a certain population, with cities therein of a certain population (Burks...
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