Shelton v. Angelone

• Decision Date: 23 January 2002
• Docket Number: No. 7:99CV00750.,7:99CV00750.
• Citation: 183 F.Supp.2d 830
• Parties: Tyrone SHELTON, Plaintiff, v. Ronald ANGELONE, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia

183 F.Supp.2d 830

Tyrone SHELTON, Plaintiff, v. Ronald ANGELONE, et al., Defendants.

No. 7:99CV00750.

United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Roanoke Division.

January 23, 2002.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Tyrone Shelton, Waverly, VA, pro se.

Christopher Garrett Hill, Office of Attorney General, Richmond, VA, for Defendants.

Heather M. Kofron, David Ernest McCammon, Wright, Robinson, Osthimer & Tatum, Richmond, VA, for M. Mullins.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SARGENT, United States Magistrate Judge.

This case is before the court on the defendants' motions for summary judgment, (Docket Item Nos. 36, 97), and the plaintiff's motion for sanctions, (Docket Item No. 106). Based on my review of the evidence provided and the arguments and representations of the parties, and for the reasons set forth below, I will grant the defendants' motions for summary judgment in part and I will deny the motions in part. I also will deny the plaintiff's motion for sanctions.

I. Facts

The plaintiff, Tyrone Shelton, a prisoner who was previously incarcerated in Red Onion State Prison, ("Red Onion"), in Wise County, Virginia, brings this action against the defendants, Virginia Department of Corrections Director Ronald Angelone, Deputy Director Gene M. Johnson, Chief of Operations Gary Bass, Regional Director Richard A. Young, former Red Onion Warden George Deeds, Red Onion Assistant Warden of Programs Yvonne Elswick, Red Onion Operations Officer S. Shortridge, Treatment Program Supervisor J. Bentley, Nurse M. Mullins and correctional officers Major R. Rowlette, Captain L. Fleming, Captain D. Taylor and Sergeant Pientka.¹ In his complaint, Shelton seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendants subjected him to the excessive use of force, denied him access to medical treatment and violated his due process rights in changing his custody classification in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (Complaint, (Docket Item No. 2), at 9-22.) Shelton is seeking declaratory, monetary and injunctive relief. (Complaint at 22-24.) He is suing the defendants in both their official and individual capacities. (Complaint at 4-8.)

Through his sworn complaint and various affidavits, Shelton alleges that on September 21, 1998, he was beaten and repeatedly shocked with an electric stun gun by Fleming, Taylor and Pientka during his intake at Red Onion. (Complaint at 9.) Shelton claims that this assault occurred without any justification and while he was in leg irons and handcuffs attached to a waistchain. (Complaint at 9.)

Shelton also alleges that Elswick and Bentley violated his due process rights by reclassifying his security status without affording him proper procedural protections in violation of existing reclassification regulations and by the use of false information. (Complaint at 11-12.) Shelton further alleges that Young, Bass, Shortridge Johnson and Angelone violated his due process rights in that, once they were made aware of the improper classification, they took no action to correct Elswick's and Bentley's actions. (Complaint at 14-15, 18-22.)

Shelton also claims that Rowlette refused to provide adequate medical treatment in that he would not allow Shelton to be provided with a special pair of tinted eyeglasses. (Complaint at 16-17.) Shelton claims that excessively bright fluorescent lighting in his cell led to a "serious twitching condition" in his left eye, which, in turn, led to difficulty sleeping, stress, headaches and weight loss. (Complaint at 15-16.)

The defendants do not dispute that Shelton was an inmate at Red Onion. (Defendant's Memorandum In Support Of Their Motion For Summary Judgment, ("Defendants' Brief"), (Docket Item No. 37), at 1.) The defendants also do not dispute that Shelton was received at Red Onion on September 21, 1998, nor that he was shocked with an electronic Ultron II stun gun by Taylor. (Defendants' Brief at 4; Affidavit of D. Taylor, ("Taylor Affidavit"), (Exhibit A to Docket Item No. 37), at 2.) The defendants do dispute, however, that Shelton was physically assaulted during the intake process. (Defendants' Brief at 4; Taylor Affidavit at 3.)

II. Analysis

As stated above, this matter is before the court on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The defendants argue that summary judgment should be entered in their favor on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiff is suing the defendants in their official capacities, and the defendants are immune from suit in their official capacities for damages;

2. Plaintiff's claim of excessive force does not show an infliction of unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering;

3. Plaintiff does not allege that defendants Angelone, Young and Johnson had any direct participation in the incident of September 21, 1998, or in the alleged deprivation of his due process rights;

4. Plaintiff was afforded procedural due process with regard to his security classification;

5. Plaintiff suffered no undue hardship as a result of the alleged violation of his due process rights;

6. Plaintiff was not denied adequate medical treatment by the defendants; and

7. The defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from the claims brought against them in their individual capacities.

(Defendants' Brief at 2-8; Defendant's Memorandum In Support Of Their Supplemental Motion For Summary Judgment, ("Defendants' Second Brief"), (Docket Item No. 98), at 3-5.)

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), the court should grant summary judgment only when the pleadings, responses to discovery and the record reveal that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Miller v. Leathers, 913 F.2d 1085, 1087 (4th Cir.1990) (en banc), cert denied, 498 U.S. 1109, 111 S.Ct. 1018, 112 L.Ed.2d 1100 (1991); and Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 364 (4th Cir. 1985). A genuine issue of fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the facts and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Inc., 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348; Nguyen v. CNA Corp., 44 F.3d 234, 237 (4th Cir.1995); Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 850 (4th Cir.1990); Ross, 759 F.2d at 364; Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1092 (4th Cir.1980). In other words, the nonmoving party is entitled "to have the credibility of his evidence as forecast assumed." Miller, 913 F.2d at 1087 (quoting Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir.1979)). Therefore, in reviewing the defendants' motion, the court must view the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

With regard to the defendants' first argument, that the defendants are not subject to a suit in their official capacity for monetary damages, I agree. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). The plaintiff's complaint, however, clearly states that he is suing each defendant in both their official and individual capacities. (Complaint at 4-8.) Furthermore, the defendants' own brief admits that they are being sued in this case in both their official and individual capacities. (Defendants' Brief at 2.) Both the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit have held that state officials, sued in their individual capacities, are "persons" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and are not absolutely immune from personal liability under § 1983 solely by virtue of the official nature of their acts. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991); White v. Gregory, 1 F.3d 267, 269-70 (4th Cir.1993).

As to the defendants' second argument, the specific constitutional right at issue is the Eighth Amendment prohibition against the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishment." U.S. CONST.AMEND. VIII. This amendment not only prohibits excessive sentences, but it also protects inmates from inhumane treatment and conditions while imprisoned. See Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir.1996). The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain by a prison official through the use of excessive force upon an inmate has been clearly established as a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment for a number of years. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986). The determination of whether the use of force by a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment includes both a subjective and objective component. See Williams, 77 F.3d at 761 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991)).

Specifically, Eighth Amendment analysis necessitates inquiry as to whether the prison official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind (subjective component) and whether the deprivation suffered or injury inflicted on the inmate was sufficiently serious (objective component).

Williams, 77 F.3d at 761.

To meet the subjective component in an excessive force case, the inmate must show that the prison official applied force "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078. The inquiry under the subjective standard is "whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to...