Shelton v. City of Springfield

• Decision Date: 23 March 2004
• Docket Number: No. 25561.,25561.
• Citation: 130 S.W.3d 30
• Parties: Larry M. SHELTON, Claimant-Appellant, v. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, Employer-Respondent, and Treasurer of the State of Missouri, As Custodian for the Second Injury Fund, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

130 S.W.3d 30

Larry M. SHELTON, Claimant-Appellant, v. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, Employer-Respondent, and Treasurer of the State of Missouri, As Custodian for the Second Injury Fund, Respondent.

No. 25561.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division Two.

March 23, 2004.

Richard D. Crites, Springfield, for appellant.

Patrick J. Platter, Neale & Newman, LLP, Springfield, for respondent.

NANCY STEFFEN RAHMEYER, Chief Judge.

Larry M. Shelton ("Shelton") appeals the denial of his claim for workers' compensation against the City of Springfield and the Second Injury Fund of the State of Missouri (collectively, "Respondents"). We affirm.

On April 14, 1975, Shelton began working for the Springfield Police Department as a patrol officer. He continued to work in that capacity for the next several years, and was on patrol in his police cruiser during the event that gave rise to his claim for workers' compensation. On June 11, 1989, at a little after 11:30 p.m., Officer Ron Hutchison ("Hutchison") initiated a vehicular pursuit of a blue truck that had failed to stop at a red traffic signal at an intersection in Springfield, Missouri. Hutchison activated his emergency equipment and attempted to effectuate a traffic stop, but the driver of the vehicle ignored Hutchison's efforts and continued driving, failing to stop at a subsequent stop sign in the process. Hutchison contacted police headquarters and informed Sergeant William Buron ("Sergeant Buron") that he was in pursuit of the truck and Shelton joined the pursuit as a secondary unit soon thereafter.

At some point during the pursuit, after the chase had extended beyond the city limits of Springfield, Sergeant Buron instructed the officers to discontinue their pursuit. At this time, Hutchison disengaged his emergency equipment, turned around, and began driving back toward Springfield. Shelton, however, continued driving eastbound, on the same road and in the same direction taken by the suspect truck. Shelton testified that, at some point, he turned his car around and, while attempting to drive back to Springfield, he encountered an accident scene involving the suspect truck, which had driven off the roadway and struck a tree. The driver, a male, was able to exit the truck, but a female passenger was rendered unconscious by the accident and remained trapped inside the vehicle on the passenger's side. Shelton requested an ambulance and a rescue unit, but was otherwise unable to assist the passenger who died at the scene of the accident.

Following the accident, Sergeant Buron referred the incident to the Internal Affairs Department for an investigation into whether Shelton committed misconduct in the course of the vehicular pursuit. From June 11, 1989, the date of the incident, until July 14, 1989, Shelton worked a total of eleven days, while taking sixteen days of vacation, holiday, and leave. On July 11, 1989, Shelton visited his personal physician, who diagnosed him with depression. On July 19, 1989, Shelton was admitted to the Marian Center at St. John's Regional Health Center because he was severely depressed and suicidal. He remained at the Marian Center until September 22, 1989, when he was discharged as an outpatient.

On October 16, 1989, Shelton filed an Application for Disability Benefits under the Springfield Policemen's and Firemen's Pension Plan ("Pension Plan"), alleging that he was entitled to a duty-related disability pension because he suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD") as a result of his involvement in the June 11, 1989 incident. Following a hearing, the Pension Board found that Shelton suffered PTSD as a result of his involvement in the June 11, 1989 incident; that he was disabled as a result of his PTSD; and that his disability "was a direct result of his occupational duties." As a result of these findings, the Pension Board approved Shelton's application for duty-related pension disability benefits.

Subsequently, on April 23, 1991, Shelton filed a workers' compensation claim with the Missouri Labor and Industrial Relations Commission ("Commission"). In his claim, Shelton alleged that he suffered a psychological injury, or an aggravation of a pre-existing personality disorder, while acting in the course and scope of his duties as a Springfield police officer. In particular, Shelton claimed that he was injured as a result of his participation in the June 11, 1989 pursuit and his inability to assist the female passenger who died in his presence. Following a hearing before the Division of Workers' Compensation, the ALJ found, inter alia, that Shelton's injury was not compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act and, consequently, Shelton's claim for benefits was denied. In making that determination, the ALJ specifically rejected Shelton's argument that, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the findings of the Pension Board were binding and dispositive in Shelton's claim for workers' compensation. Accordingly, the ALJ excluded from evidence Exhibits A, B, C, D, and AA, all of which pertained to Shelton's collateral estoppel claim.

On March 19, 2003, the Commission adopted the ALJ's findings and determined that Shelton was not entitled to compensation. This appeal follows.

Shelton presents three points on appeal. In his first point, he argues that the Commission erroneously excluded the exhibits he offered in support of his claim of collateral estoppel. In his second, Shelton alleges that the Commission erred in finding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not apply so as to preclude Springfield from litigating issues that were previously addressed and decided by the Pension Board. In his final point, Shelton contends that the Commission erred in finding that the June 11, 1989 incident did not cause a work-related psychological injury that resulted in his permanent disability because that finding was not supported by substantial evidence.

In reviewing an award by the Commission, our review is limited to a determination of whether, in light of the entire record, there is sufficient competent and substantial evidence to support the award. Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220, 223 (Mo. banc 2003). If an award "is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence," then it is not supported by competent and substantial evidence, and must be overturned on appeal. Id.

For ease of discussion, we first turn to Shelton's second point on appeal, namely that, the factual and legal issues decided by the Pension Board were the same issues presented in Shelton's workers' compensation claim, and, thus, the Commission erred in refusing to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Specifically, Shelton's point is that the doctrine should have been applied to his workers' compensation claim because:

(a) the burden of proof in [the workers' compensation] action is the same or less than that in the pension action; and (b) that the issues of (1) whether [Shelton] sustained an accident on or about June 11, 1989; and (2) if so, whether the accident was a direct result of [Shelton's] occupational duties; and if so (3) whether [Shelton] became disabled as a result of the June 11, 1989, which were presented in the pension board case were the same as these issues in [the workers' compensation] action; and (c) that the decision of the pension board was in fact a final adjudication between these parties, on the merits which qualify under Missouri law to be enforced by the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

Notwithstanding his arguments to the contrary, Shelton's second point must be denied because the elements of collateral estoppel are not satisfied in this case.

At the outset, we note that the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, provides that when an issue has been judicially determined in one action, that same issue may not subsequently be relitigated in another action. Green v. City of St. Louis, 870 S.W.2d 794, 797 (Mo. banc 1994). In determining whether it is appropriate to apply collateral estoppel to a particular case, the Missouri courts are to consider the following factors:

(1) whether the issue decided in the prior adjudication was identical with the issue presented in the present action;

(2) whether the prior adjudication resulted in a judgment on the merits;

(3) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or was in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and

(4) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior suit.

Shahan v. Shahan, 988 S.W.2d 529, 532-33 (Mo. banc 1999) (citing Oates v. Safeco Ins. Co., 583 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Mo. banc 1979)).

Here, Shelton's collateral estoppel argument is premised on the assertion that his application for a disability pension and his claim for workers' compensation essentially involved the same issues. Thus, the argument follows, in resolving and ruling on Shelton's pension application, the Pension Board effectively determined the viability of his workers' compensation claim as well. This argument, however, confuses both the scope of the Pension Plan and the nature of the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law¹ as well.

We first note that the Pension Plan expressly limits its coverage to disability pension awards under the terms of the Plan. Policemen's and Firemen's Pension Plan Sec. 2-441.² In other words, on its face, the Pension Plan itself makes clear that the function of the Pension Board is to determine only whether an employee is entitled to a disability pension under the contractual terms of the Plan. Thus, under the Pension Plan, benefit awards are governed solely—and narrowly—by the provisions of the pension contract.³

Conversely, an employee's claim for workers' compensation benefits is governed solely by the provisions of Missouri's Workers' Compensation Law, which is set forth in Chapter...