Shelton v. Poynor, 5347

Decision Date15 July 1959
Docket NumberNo. 5347,5347
Citation326 S.W.2d 583
PartiesA. A. SHELTON et ux., Appellants, v. Curtis POYNOR, Appellee.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Montague & Thurmond, Del Rio, for appellants.

Maurice R. Bullock, James R. Kerr, Fort Stockton, for appellee.

ABBOTT, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order of the 112th District Court of Pecos County, Texas, overruling the plea of privilege of A. A. Shelton and wife, Lillie Shelton, defendants below. The suit was instituted by Curtis Poynor, as plaintiff, against A. A. Shelton and wife, Lillie Shelton, residents of Terrell County, Texas, and A. J. Shelton and wife, Edmina Shelton, residents of Tulare County, California, as defendants, for damages alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff by reason of an alleged breach of a written contract for the sale of ranch lands. Defendants A. J. Shelton and wife were served with proper process, but did not enter an appearance in the case. A. A. Shelton and wife filed their plea of privilege to be sued in Terrell County, Texas, as the county of their residence, and plaintiff filed his controverting affidavit thereto. Upon hearing the trial court entered its order overruling defendants' plea of privilege, and they have perfected their appeal to this court.

Briefly, the facts are: On July 26, 1957, Curtis Poynor, appellee, entered into a written contract with A. A. Shelton, Lillie B. Shelton, Alfred J. Shelton and Edmina Shelton, to purchase the Shelton ranch, consisting of 26,940 acres of land, more or less, said land lying in Pecos, Terrell and Brewster counties, Texas, for a consideration of $10 per acre. The terms of the purchase payments were fully set out in the contract. Upon acceptance of merchantable title, or waiver of any defects thereto, appellants were to deliver to appellee, in Pecos County, Texas, a warranty deed to said property. Appellee notified appellants by letter, on October 16, 1957, that he was ready to accept title, and demanded consummation of the contract. Again, on November 13, 1957, demand was made by appellee, and appellants refused, both orally and in writing, to deliver the required warranty deed. On April 9, 1958, appellee filed suit against appellants for damages in the amount of $4 per acre, or $107,956, this amount alleged to be the difference in market value of the land from the time of the contract until the time of the alleged breach of contract.

After the denial of the plea of privilege, appellants bring to this court two points of error:

'First Point

'The Court erred in failing to sustain the plea of privilege filed by the defendants, A. A. Shelton and wife, Lillie Shelton.

'Second Point

'The Court erred in sustaining the controverting affidavit of plaintiff, Curtis Poynor, to the plea of privilege of the defendants A. A. Shelton and wife, Lillie Shelton.'

Article 1995, section 5, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes, provides:

'Contract in writing. If a person has contracted in writing to perform an obligation in a particular county, expressly naming such county, or a definite place therein, by such writing, suit upon or by reason of such obligation may be brought against him, either in such county or where the defendant has his domicile.'

Our venue statutes provide that a defendant is entitled, as a valuable right, to be sued in the county of his residence unless he can be qualified under one or more of the exceptions contained in Article 1995, V.A.C.S. Subdivision 5 of this article deals with written contracts which ordinarily are determined by the principal right asserted in the petition and the nature of the relief sought, and the character of the suit will be determined from the petition. Traweek v. Ake, Tex.Civ.App., 280 S.W.2d 297; Allison v. Yarborough, Tex.Civ.App., 228 S.W.2d 930.

With regard to subsection 5, article 1995, V.A.C.S., it has been long held that the writing sued on must expressly name the county where performance is...

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10 cases
  • Swinehart v Stubbeman & McRae
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • June 7, 2001
    ...Mortgage Invs. v. Fleming-Woods, 650 S.W.2d 928, 936 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Shelton v. Poynor, 326 S.W.2d 583, 585 (Tex. Civ. App.--El Paso 1959, writ dism'd); 63 Tex. Jur. 3d Real Estate Sales § 597 (1988). Therefore, because Swinehart's claim for the unassigned m......
  • Kleberg Cnty. v. URI, Inc.
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • January 28, 2016
    ...performance. See Carrico v. Kondos, 111 S.W.3d 582, 588 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied) ; Shelton v. Poynor, 326 S.W.2d 583, 585 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1959, writ dism'd). When the non-breaching party sues for specific performance, then it affirms the contract and requests the court ......
  • Brazos Valley Harvestore Systems, Inc. v. Beavers, 899
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • April 8, 1976
    ...rule is used to determine which, if any, venue exception applies to the circumstances of the case. See Shelton v. Poynor, 326 S.W.2d 583 (Tex.Civ.App.--El Paso 1959, writ dism'd); Traweek v. Ake, 280 S.W.2d 297 (Tex.Civ.App.--El Paso 1955, n.w.h.); Miller v. Howell, 234 S.W.2d 925 (Tex.Civ.......
  • Carrico v. Kondos
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • April 24, 2003
    ...performance of that right. See id. It does not require the holder to seek specific performance. Cf. Shelton v. Poynor, 326 S.W.2d 583, 585 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1959, writ dism'd) (holding that upon breach of contract for sale of real property, nonbreaching party may sue for either specific......
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