Shelton v. State

• Decision Date: 19 September 2018
• Docket Number: No. 10-16-00270-CR,10-16-00270-CR
• Parties: ANTHONY TAD SHELTON, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

ANTHONY TAD SHELTON, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

No. 10-16-00270-CR

STATE OF TEXAS IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

September 19, 2018

From the 18th District Court Johnson County, Texas

Trial Court No. F50740

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Anthony Tad Shelton was convicted by a jury of the offense of possession with intent to deliver four grams or more but less than two hundred grams of methamphetamine. After finding the enhancement paragraphs "True," the jury sentenced Shelton to a term of incarceration of seventy-five years. Shelton appeals his conviction in three issues, asserting that the trial court erred in denying his motions to suppress. We will affirm.

Issues

Shelton specifically argues the following:

Issue Number One: The trial court erred in denying Shelton's motion to suppress as the search warrant affidavit and search warrant were not signed by a magistrate.

Issue Number Two: The trial court erred in denying Shelton's motion to suppress as the search warrant affidavit did not establish probable cause.

Issue Number Three: The trial court erred in admitting the statement made by Shelton to law enforcement because Shelton was under the influence and was not expressly given his Miranda¹ rights, and because the statement contained extraneous and prejudicial information.

Background

Shelton was indicted under four separate Cause Numbers: F49899, F50524, F50739, and F50740. Each indictment charged Shelton with various offenses related to methamphetamine trafficking and arose out of the same criminal episode. The State proceeded to trial in Cause Number F50740, in which Shelton was charged specifically with one count of possession with intent to deliver four grams or more but less than two hundred grams of methamphetamine. The indictment also included two felony enhancement paragraphs.

Prior to trial, Shelton filed two motions to suppress.² The motion filed in Cause Number F50524 challenged the validity of the search warrant on a variety of grounds,including those raised in his present appeal—that the warrant was not properly signed by the magistrate and that the warrant did not sufficiently establish probable cause.³ The trial court denied the motion after a hearing. The motion filed in Cause Number F50740, entitled "Motion to Determine Admissibility of Statement," argued that the statement Shelton gave to law enforcement should not be admitted at trial due to the same grounds presented in this appeal—Shelton was under the influence when the statement was taken, Shelton was never told that his statement could be used as evidence in his trial, and the statement included hearsay and matters that were extraneous and prejudicial in nature. After a hearing, the trial court partially granted Shelton's motion and ruled that statements related to Shelton's prior conviction, incarceration, and parole should be deleted from the audio recording to be played to the jury. The trial court signed findings of fact and conclusions of law in regard to both motions on September 1, 2016, after Shelton was sentenced.⁴

Standard of Review

We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a bifurcated standard of review. Cole v. State, 490 S.W.3d 918, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016);Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In reviewing the trial court's decision, we do not engage in our own factual review. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Best v. State, 118 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). The trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24-25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Richardson v. State, 494 S.W.3d 302, 304 (Tex. App.—Waco 2015, no pet.). The trial court is entitled to believe or disbelieve all of part of a witness's testimony—even if that testimony is uncontroverted—because he is in the best position to observe the witness's demeanor and appearance. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Therefore, we give almost total deference to the trial court's rulings on: (1) questions of historical fact, even if the trial court's determination of those facts is not based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor; and (2) application-of-law-to-fact questions or mixed questions of law and fact that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 108-09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652-53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). But when application-of-law-to-fact questions do not turn on the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, we review the trial court's rulings on those questions de novo. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Johnson, 68 S.W.3d at 652-53.

When reviewing the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at24; Kelly v. State, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). When the trial court makes explicit fact findings, we determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, supports those fact findings. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d at 818. We then review the trial court's legal ruling de novo unless its explicit fact findings that are supported by the record are also dispositive of the legal ruling. Id.

A. Magistrate's Signature. Article 18.04 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires that a search warrant be dated and signed by the issuing magistrate. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.04 (West Supp. 2017).⁵ As noted, Shelton argues that the search warrant and search warrant affidavit were not signed by a magistrate. Shelton does not argue that the search warrant and affidavit contained no signature, but rather that the signature appended to the documents was not that of the alleged signatory—Judge C.C. "Kit" Cooke. At the hearing on Shelton's motion to suppress, Shelton's attorney cross-examined Investigator Mark Goetz, who prepared the search warrant and affidavit, about the signatures. Goetz testified that Judge Cooke signed both. There was no other evidence regarding the signatures, and the trial court found that the warrant and affidavit were signed by Judge Cooke.⁶ Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to thetrial court's ruling, we find the evidence clearly supports the trial court's finding that Judge Cooke signed both the search warrant and the supporting affidavit. Shelton's first issue is overruled.

B. Probable Cause. As noted, a reviewing court generally applies a bifurcated standard of review when evaluating a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress. Cole, 490 S.W.3d at 922. However, a unique standard of review has evolved when the motion to suppress is based upon a magistrate's decision to issue a warrant. State v. Webre, 347 S.W.3d 381, 384 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, no pet.); see also State v. Crawford, 463 S.W.3d 923, 928 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, pet. ref'd). Because the trial court is constrained to the four corners of the affidavit, there are no credibility determinations to which we must defer. State v. McLain, 337 S.W.3d 268, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Instead, when we review a magistrate's decision to issue a warrant, we apply "a highly deferential standard of review because of the constitutional preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant. . . ." Bonds v. State, 403 S.W.3d 867, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We will uphold the magistrate's probable cause determination so long as the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. Id.; see also Jones v.State, 364 S.W.3d 854, 857 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Moreno v. State, 415 S.W.3d 284, 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Probable cause exists if, under the totality of the circumstances, there is at least a "fair probability" or "substantial chance" that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found at the specified location. Flores v. State, 319 S.W.3d 697, 702 (Tex. App. 2010). The supporting affidavit should be reviewed in "a commonsensical and realistic manner. . . ." Jones, 364 S.W.3d at 857 (footnoted citations omitted). "Although the reviewing court is not a 'rubber stamp,' 'the magistrate's decision should carry the day in doubtful or marginal cases, even if the reviewing court might reach a different result upon de novo review.'" Id. (quoting Flores, 319 S.W.3d at 702).

The trial court made the following pertinent findings of fact in relation to the search warrant affidavit:

1. In the summer of 2015, S.T.O.P. Special Crimes Unit Investigator Mark Goetz was investigating the Defendant and his connection with the trafficking of controlled substances in Johnson County, Texas.

2. On August 13, 2015, Investigator Goetz enlisted the services of a confidential informant to do a controlled buy for seven (7) grams of methamphetamine from the defendant. Investigator Goetz had been provided information from this confidential informant on five (5) prior occasions and the information that was provided proved credible and reliable each time. Investigator Goetz met up with the confidential informant and searched the confidential informant's person and vehicle. Investigator Goetz then provided the confidential informant with $290 in cash, $250 for the methamphetamine and $40 for a third person who facilitated the buy. Investigator Goetz provided the confidential informant with audio/visual equipment, so that all of the confidential informant's movements could be monitored and recorded. The confidential informant traveled to the defendant's residence, located at 1305North Anglin Street in Cleburne, Johnson County, Texas. The confidential informant was able to make a controlled buy from the defendant and then returned to Investigator Goetz's location. The confidential informant provided Investigator Goetz with approximately 6.55 grams of what was field tested to be

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