Shelton v. The Ritz Carlton Hotel Co., LLC

• Decision Date: 08 May 2008
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 07-2171(RMC).
• Citation: 550 F.Supp.2d 74
• Parties: Elaine SHELTON, Plaintiff, v. THE RITZ CARLTON HOTEL COMPANY, LLC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

550 F.Supp.2d 74

Elaine SHELTON, Plaintiff, v. THE RITZ CARLTON HOTEL COMPANY, LLC, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 07-2171(RMC).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

May 8, 2008.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Steven Charles Kahn, Law Offices of Steven C. Kahn, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Tina M. Maiolo, Carr Maloney PC, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROSEMARY M. COLLYER, District Judge.

Elaine Shelton is an African American woman employed as a cook at The Ritz Carlton Hotel ("The Ritz") in Washington, D.C. She alleges that she twice applied for a promotion and The Ritz denied her application based on her race and gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f). The Ritz seeks dismissal, claiming that Ms. Shelton must arbitrate. Ms. Shelton opposes. As explained below, the Court grants the motion in part and denies it in part, as the parties' arbitration agreement applies only to one of the alleged incidents of discrimination.

I. FACTS

Ms. Shelton began working at The Ritz on 22d Street in Washington, D.C. in September 2000.¹ The Ritz operates several departments that employ cooks: an Employee Dining Room, a Banquet Kitchen, the Gardemanger Kitchen, and In Room Dining. The cooking hierarchy in these departments from top down includes an Executive Chef, two Sous Chefs, Cook I, Cook II, and Cook III. Ms. Shelton was hired as a Cook III, and within one month, The Ritz promoted her to the position of Cook II. As a Cook II, Ms. Shelton worked primarily in the Employee Dining Room. Her duties included prepping, cooking, developing menus and recipes, and tracking inventory. Sometimes in the absence of a chef she took a "lead role" in the kitchen. Compl. ¶ 8.

In May 2005, Ms. Shelton applied for an opening as a Cook I in the Banquet Kitchen. The Ritz did not interview her or select her for the position. Instead, The Ritz hired an Hispanic male. Ms. Shelton alleges, "Ritz-Carlton filled the opening with an Hispanic male, an out-of-state candidate who was subsequently forced to resign because of poor work performance." Id. ¶ 10.

In September 2005, Ms. Shelton applied for the position of Cook I in the Gardemanger Kitchen. She alleges that she was the sole applicant for the job. Id. ¶ 11. The Executive Chef, a Caucasian male, told her that as part of the application process she would be required to participate in a tasting test and her food would be judged based on taste, presentation, food temperature, and organizational skills in preparing the meal. The Sous Chef, an Hispanic male, administered the test. He complained that she did not cut the asparagus properly or use the right plate for her presentation. Ms. Shelton alleges that no other applicant for a Cook I position had ever been required to take a tasting test before. The Ritz then withdrew the job posting for the Cook I in the Gardemanger Kitchen. Instead, The Ritz created a new Junior Sous Chef position and hired a white male for the position. Ms. Shelton contends that The Ritz has never hired an African-American as a Cook I at its 22d Street location. Id. ¶ 16.

Ms. Shelton filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC"), alleging that The Ritz denied her promotion to the May 2005 and the September 2005 Cook I positions based on her race and gender. The EEOC investigated and on May 29, 2007, issued a Determination that The Ritz discriminated against Ms. Shelton in violation of Title VII and asked The Ritz to conciliate. The Ritz declined the EEOC's invitation to conciliate, and on July 25, 2007, the EEOC issued a notice of right to sue. Within 90 days, on October 23, 2007, Ms. Shelton filed a Complaint in D.C. Superior Court, alleging a single count of discrimination under Title VII.²

On November 30, 2007, the Ritz removed this suit to federal district court, and now The Ritz seeks dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction, contending that the parties are bound by an agreement to arbitrate. On June 17, 2005, Ms. Shelton had signed an employment agreement. The agreement provides for arbitration of employment-related disputes as follows:

I must request Arbitration if I wish to challenge my termination for any reason or for management decisions that I believe are discriminatory or retaliatory. Arbitration is a process in which my workplace issue is presented to a neutral third party, the arbitrator, for a final and binding decision. The arbitrator, who is provided by the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") runs the privately held proceedings. My Arbitration shall be governed by the AAA's Rules fo Employee Dispute Resolution.

. . . .

To apply for Arbitration I must complete an Arbitration Request Form. I will be required to pay a $50.00 fee to contribute to the related expenses. I may consult an attorney or another advisor of my choice to participate in the Arbitration at my own expense. The Arbitrator shall be authorized to award whatever remedies are allowed by law. I may request an Arbitration hearing within one year of the management decision I wish to appeal. I understand that by signing this agreement, I am waiving the ability to file a lawsuit to challenge any termination or management decision that is covered by this Arbitration provision.

Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 1. at 11-12. Ms. Shelton contends that she is not bound by this arbitration provision.

II. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

The Ritz seeks dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and the law presumes that "a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). Because subject matter jurisdiction is an Article III as well as a statutory requirement, "no action of the parties can confer subject[]matter jurisdiction upon a federal court.'" Akinseye v. District of Columbia, 339 F.3d 970, 971 (D.C.Cir.2003). On a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999); see also McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 182-83, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936).

Because subject matter jurisdiction focuses on the court's power to hear the claim, however, the court must give the plaintiff's factual allegations closer scrutiny when resolving a Rule 12(b)(1) motion than would be required for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim. Macharia v. United States, 334 F.3d 61, 64, 69 (D.C.Cir.2003). Moreover, the court is not limited to the allegations contained in the complaint. Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 241 (D.C.Cir.1986), vacated on other grounds, 482 U.S. 64, 107 S.Ct. 2246, 96 L.Ed.2d 51 (1987). Instead, to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the claim, the court may consider materials outside the pleadings. Herbert v. Nat'l Acad. of Scis., 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C.Cir. 1992).

III. ANALYSIS

The question in this case is whether Ms. Shelton is bound by the terms of her June 2005 employment agreement to arbitrate both of her claims of discrimination, the May 2005 claim and the September 2005 claim. The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. § 1-16, was passed by Congress "to establish an alternative to the complications of litigation." Revere Copper & Brass Inc. v. Overseas Private Inv. Corp., 628 F.2d 81, 83 (D.C.Cir.1980). Further, "arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has' not agreed so to submit." Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 241, 82 S.Ct. 1318, 8 L.Ed.2d 462 (1962); accord AT & T Tech., Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648, 106 S.Ct. 1415, 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986). "By agreeing to arbitrate, a party trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the court [] for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration." Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991). An individual who agrees to arbitrate her claims does not forego her substantive rights afforded by statute; she merely submits to resolution in an arbitral rather than a judicial forum. Id. at 26, 111 S.Ct. 1647.

When a party seeks arbitration, first the Court must determine whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate. Nelson v. Insignia/Esg, Inc., 215 F.Supp.2d 143, 150 (D.D.C.2002). Then, the Court must determine whether the specific dispute falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement. Id. To determine whether there is a valid arbitration agreement, federal courts apply ordinary state law contract principles. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944, 115 S.Ct. 1920, 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995). Although the parties have failed to address the choice of law question, the Court concludes that D.C. law controls, because the formation and the performance of the contract occurred here, Ms. Shelton is a D.C. resident, and The Ritz does business in D.C. See Nelson, 215 F.Supp.2d at 150 (under D.C. choice of law rules, the law of the jurisdiction with the most substantial interest in the matter applies). Under D.C. law, the party asserting the existence of the contract has the burden of proving its existence, that there was a meeting of the minds as to all material respects. Bailey v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 209 F.3d 740, 746 (D.C.Cir. 2000). The party resisting arbitration bears the burden of proving that the claims asserted are not suited to or intended for arbitration. Nelson, 215 F.Supp.2d at 150 (citing Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91, 121 S.Ct. 513, 148 L.Ed.2d 373 (2000)).

A. Arbitration of May 2005 Claim Not Required

The Ritz asserts that the agreement to arbitrate set...