Shen v. Albany Unified Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 29 January 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:17-cv-02478-JD
• Citation: 436 F.Supp.3d 1305
• Parties: Philip SHEN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ALBANY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California

436 F.Supp.3d 1305

Philip SHEN, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.ALBANY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 3:17-cv-02478-JD

United States District Court, N.D. California.

Signed January 29, 2020

Darryl Dale Yorkey, Berkeley, CA, Alan Alexander Beck, Law Offices of Alan Beck, San Diego, CA, Catherine Anne Beekman, Beekman Cortes, LLP, Benicia, CA, Joseph Salama, San Rafael, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Katherine A. Alberts, Louis A. Leone, Seth L. Gordon, Leone & Alberts, APC, Concord, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER RE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND STATE LAW CLAIM

Re: Dkt. No. 199

JAMES DONATO, United States District Judge

This case arises out of actions taken by the Albany Unified School District ("AUSD") and its employees in response to racist and derogatory content posted on an Instagram account by several students at Albany High School ("AHS"). Plaintiff Philip Shen was one of the students associated with the postings. The individual defendants are Valerie Williams, the former superintendent of AUSD; Jeff Anderson, the former principal of AHS; and Melisa Pfohl, a former assistant principal at AHS.

The factual details about the Instagram posts are provided in the Court's earlier summary judgment order, which resolved plaintiffs' First Amendment and related state law claims. Dkt. No. 109. After other orders, see Dkt. Nos. 191, 198, and settlements, all that remains in the litigation are Shen's claims for: 1) unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment (Claim 5); 2) state-created danger under the Fourteenth Amendment (Claim 7); and 3) state-created danger under Article I, Section 7 of the California Constitution (Claim 8). Dkt. No. 112 (First Amended Complaint).

These claims are based on events that occurred when Shen returned to AHS after being suspended for involvement with the Instagram account. The events included a student "sit-in" demonstration and a "restorative justice" meeting. The meeting was arranged by school administrators, and brought together the students who were the victims of the posts and the students who participated in the Instagram account, such as Shen. It was a day of high emotion and agitation at AHS, and Shen was punched in the head by another student.

Defendants filed a summary judgment motion for qualified immunity to the federal constitutional claims. Dkt. No. 199. Qualified immunity is granted for all defendants on the Fourth Amendment claim. It is denied on the Fourteenth Amendment claim for Williams and Anderson, but granted for Pfohl. Defendants also sought summary judgement on a parallel state law claim, which is granted.

LEGAL STANDARDS

Parties "may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense -- or the part of each claim or defense -- on which summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court may dispose of less than the entire case and even just portions of a claim or defense. Smith v. Cal. Dep't of Highway Patrol , 75 F. Supp. 3d 1173, 1179 (N.D. Cal. 2014). A dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is material if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. To determine whether a genuine dispute as to any material fact exists, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw "all justifiable inferences" in that party's favor. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. This is because the purpose of summary judgment "is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The individual defendants assert qualified immunity on the federal constitutional claims. Qualified immunity is "an immunity from suit." Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (citation omitted). It "balances two important interests -- the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably." Id. A public official is entitled to qualified immunity unless "(1) the facts adduced constitute the violation of a constitutional right; and (2) the constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation." Mitchell v. Washington , 818 F.3d 436, 443 (9th Cir. 2016). The first prong "calls for a factual inquiry" while the second is "solely a question of law for the judge." Dunn v. Castro , 621 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). "[B]oth prongs must be satisfied for a plaintiff to overcome a qualified immunity defense." Shafer v. Cty. of Santa Barbara , 868 F.3d 1110, 1115 (9th Cir. 2017).

"The linchpin of qualified immunity is the reasonableness of the official's conduct." Rosenbaum v. Washoe Cty. , 663 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Anderson v. Creighton , 483 U.S. 635, 638-39, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) ). Qualified immunity does not demand absolute perfection from officers in the performance of their duties. So long as the challenged conduct was objectively reasonable in light of the legal rules prevailing at the time it occurred, the officer will be immune from suit. See id. at 1075-76 (quoting Creighton , 483 U.S. at 638-39, 107 S.Ct. 3034 ). "Summary judgment on qualified immunity is not proper unless the evidence permits only one reasonable conclusion." Munger v. City of Glasgow Police Dep't , 227 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000).

Shen alleges the same factual allegations for the federal and California state-created danger constitutional claims. Because qualified immunity is a federal doctrine, it does not bar potential state law liability. Venegas v. Cty. of Los Angeles , 153 Cal. App. 4th 1230, 1243, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 741 (2007) (citing Ogborn v. City of Lancaster , 101 Cal. App. 4th 448, 460, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 238 (2002) ).

DISCUSSION

I. FOURTH AMENDMENT

The Fourth Amendment prohibition against an unreasonable seizure applies "in the school context, [but] the reasonableness of the seizure must be considered in light of the educational objectives." Doe ex rel. Doe v. Hawaii Dep't of Educ. , 334 F.3d 906, 909 (9th Cir. 2003). The qualified immunity analysis must take into account the fact that the Constitution's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures already builds in an allowance for reasonable error. Rosenbaum , 663 F.3d at 1076 n.1 ; see also Heien v. North Carolina , 574 U.S. 54, 60-61, 135 S.Ct. 530, 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014) ("To be reasonable is not to be perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment allows for some mistakes on the part of government officials, giving them ‘fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community's protection.’ " (quoting Brinegar v. United States , 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949) )).

The record establishes, without any genuine dispute of fact, that Shen was not subjected to an unreasonable seizure. "Such a seizure occurs when there is a restraint on liberty to the degree that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave." Doe , 334 F.3d at 909. This "requires an intentional acquisition of physical control." Brower v. Cty. of Inyo , 489 U.S. 593, 596, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989). There is no evidence that occurred here. Shen testified at his deposition that attendance at the restorative meeting was not mandatory, and that he participated because he "thought it would be productive." Dkt. No. 201, Ex. A, ECF pp.16-17. He also testified that he went out to see the students in the sit-in at the suggestion of some of the victims of the Instagram account, adding that he "didn't mind" complying with the request. Id. at 29. Later that day, when some of the suspended students left school, Shen chose to stay because he "wanted to finish the schoolday [sic ]." Id. at 35-36.

These facts demonstrate that Shen was never "seized" for Fourth Amendment purposes. Shen tries to overcome this by saying that defendants' actions had the effect of trapping him in a conference room surrounded by hostile students, but that is not enough to make out a Fourth Amendment violation. "To constitute a seizure, the governmental conduct must be purposeful, and cannot be an unintentional act which merely has the effect of restraining the liberty of the plaintiff." Nelson v. City of Davis , 685 F.3d 867, 876 (9th Cir. 2012).

Consequently, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for the Fourth Amendment claim. While the consolidated complaint describes Shen's Fourth Amendment claim as an excessive force issue under Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989), his opposition to the summary judgment motion treated it purely as a matter of an unreasonable seizure. Even if the excessive force claim had been developed and argued beyond the complaint, which did not happen, it would stumble on the second prong of the qualified immunity test -- the need for a clearly established right. See Pearson , 555 U.S. at 236, 129 S.Ct. 808 ("The judges of the district courts and courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand."). The Supreme Court has held that Graham 's objective reasonableness standard "is far too general a proposition" to constitute clearly established law sufficient to overcome a qualified immunity defense. City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan , 575 U.S. 600, ––––, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1775, 191 L.Ed.2d 856 (2015).

Although qualified immunity bars only suits for money damages against the individual de...