Shepherd Fleets, Inc. v. Opryland USA, Inc.

• Decision Date: 27 May 1988
• Citation: 759 S.W.2d 914
• Parties: SHEPHERD FLEETS, INC., d/b/a Dollar Rent A Car, Plaintiff, v. OPRYLAND USA, INC., d/b/a Opryland Hotel, Defendant. Martha L. Hall CROCKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. OPRYLAND USA, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

Page 914

759 S.W.2d 914

SHEPHERD FLEETS, INC., d/b/a Dollar Rent A Car, Plaintiff, v. OPRYLAND USA, INC., d/b/a Opryland Hotel, Defendant.

Martha L. Hall CROCKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. OPRYLAND USA, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Tennessee,

Middle Section, at Nashville.

May 27, 1988.

Permission to Appeal Denied by

Supreme Court Oct. 24, 1988.

Brenda Measells Dowdle, Nashville, for plaintiff-appellant.

Rose P. Cantrell, Richard K. Smith, Nashville, for defendant-appellee.

OPINION

TODD, Presiding Judge.

This appeal should be captioned, "Martha L. Hall Crocker, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Opryland USA, Inc., defendant-appellee", for the following reasons:

Separate suits were brought in General Sessions Court by Shepherd Fleets, Inc., and Martha L. Hall Crocker against Opryland, USA, Inc., and Roland Ighodara. The General Sessions Court rendered judgments against Ighodara who did not appeal. Upon appeal to Circuit Court by the plaintiffs, Ighodara was included in the caption of both cases. The suits were consolidated for trial; and a non-jury judgment dismissed both suits against Opryland USA, Inc., but did not mention Ighodara. Ighodara is not before this Court. Shepherd Fleets, Inc., did not appeal from the dismissal of its suit against Opryland USA, Inc., hence Shepherd Fleets is not before this Court.

As to the controversy between Martha L. Hall Crocker and Opryland USA, Inc., the facts were stipulated in substance as follows:

On August 16, 1985, plaintiff entered the defendant's hotel as a guest, at which time she delivered to a hotel employee her automobile with keys to be stored in the "Valet Parking Lot" of the hotel to which only hotel employees were admitted. The hotel had complete care, custody and control of the vehicle while it was in the Valet Parking Lot.

On the same date, Roland Ighodara, an employee of the defendant who had completed his day's work, was driving his personal automobile from work to home along a drive or road adjoining the Valet Parking Lot when he lost control of his vehicle, left the road, traversed an earth berm, or embankment 27 3/4 to 42 inches high and covered with shrubbery, severed a six inch pine tree, became airborne and crashed into five automobiles in the Valet Parking Lot, including that of plaintiff.

There is no evidence of any negligence by defendant or by any of its employees acting within the scope of their employment. The only ground of possible liability of the hotel is the asserted common law rule that an innkeeper is "practically an insurer" of property of a guest left in the custody of the innkeeper.

The issue on appeal is whether the asserted rule is the law of Tennessee, and whether it is applicable to the facts of this case.

No enactment of the Legislature has been found which would make the asserted rule a part of the law of this State. However, Article XI, Section 1 of the present (1870) Constitution of Tennessee provides:

Existing laws not affected by this Constitution.--All laws and ordinances now in force and use in this State, not inconsistent with this Constitution, shall continue in force and use until they shall expire, be altered or repealed by the Legislature; but ordinances contained in any former Constitution or schedule thereto are hereby abrogated.

By the provisions of the Constitution of 1796 and the cession act of North Carolina contained in Acts 1789, Ch. 3 § 1, condition 8, all laws in force in North Carolina at the time said cession act became effective in the ceded territory which became this State and laws in effect in the ceded territory at the time of the adoption of the 1796 Constitution became effective in Tennessee, except those inconsistent with the Constitution. By Acts 1715, ch. 31 §§ 6, 7 and Acts 1778, ch. 5 § 2 all the common law and English statutes passed before the fourth year of James I, 1607, previously in force and use in the territory and the acts of the general assemblies not destructive of, repugnant to or inconsistent with the freedom and independence of North Carolina and the form of government therein established, and which had not otherwise been provided for in whole or in part, not abrogated, repealed, expired or become obsolete were declared to be in full force and effect in the State of North Carolina. Glasgow's Lessee v. Smith, 1 Tenn. (1 Overton) 144 (1799), and many authorities since published.

All public and general statutes of the State, including the English statutes and statutes of North Carolina then existing and in force in this State were repealed by the Code of 1858. State v. Miller, 79 Tenn. (11 Lea) 620 (1883).

The decisions of the Courts of Tennessee, announced prior to the enactment of the Code of 1858, construing and applying ancient English statutes, and establishing principles and rules of law and rules of property thereon, were not annulled by said Code. Such decisions had become a part of our own jurisprudence, not as English statutes, but as part of what may well be termed our own common law. State v. Miller, supra; Moss v. State, 131 Tenn. 94, 173 S.W. 859 (1914).

The Constitution preserved the existing system of laws until changed by the Legislature unless changed or abolished by the Constitution itself. Prescott v. Duncan, 126 Tenn. 106, 148 S.W. 229 (1912).

The natural and necessary inquiry is, what rules of law regarding innkeepers' liability were preserved by the present constitution.

The earliest reported Tennessee Decision on the liability of an innkeeper is Dickerson v. Rogers, 23 Tenn. (4 Humph) 179 (1843), wherein the horse of a guest was injured when his head was lodged in a defective stall partition of a stable of the inn. The Supreme Court affirmed a judgment for the guest and said:

The court charged the jury, in substance, that an innkeeper is bound to take all possible care of the goods of his guests; and that if, through any default of him or his servants, any injury or loss should occur, he will be liable in damages for the value of the property lost. But, if the injury occur through accident, and from no default or neglect of the innkeeper of his servant, he will be exonerated from liability.

An innkeeper is bound to provide safe stabling for the horses of his guests, and so constructed and arranged that the horses placed within it will be secure and safe from injury; and, if owing to the defective and imperfect construction of the stable or its stalls, an injury is done to the horse of the guest, the innkeeper will be responsible for the injury. But, if an injury result to a horse in consequence of his viscous (sic) habits, and not through any negligence or want of care of the innkeeper and his servants, he would not be liable therefor.

....

It is not seriously insisted that the charge of the court is erroneous, nor, indeed, could it have been done successfully. It is laid down by Chancellor Kent (2 Com. 593), upon the authority of the English cases, that an innkeeper is bound to keep safe the goods of his guest deposited within the inn, except where the loss is occasioned by inevitable casualty, or by superior force, as robbery. And Mr. Justice Story says (Law of Bailments, 306, sec. 470) that an innkeeper is bound to take, not ordinary care only, but uncommon care of the goods and baggage of his guests. If, therefore, the goods or baggage of his guest are damaged in his inn, or are stolen from it by his servants or domestics, or by another guest, he is bound to make restitution.

Rigorous as this rule may seem, and hard as its operation may be in a few instances, it is founded on the great principle of public utility, to which all private considerations ought to yield. "For," as Sir William Jones justly observes (Bailments, 95), "travelers, who are most numerous in a rich and commercial country, are obliged to rely almost implicitly on the good faith of the innkeepers, whose education and morals are none of the best, and who might have frequent opportunities of associating with ruffians and pilferers, while the injured guest would seldom or never obtain legal proof of such combinations, or even of their negligence, if no actual fraud had been committed by them."

Upon these principles it is clear that the circuit court was right in holding that the innkeeper was bound to provide safe stables for the horses of his guests, and that any injury sustained by the horse, the result of negligence in securing him properly, or of an imperfect and badly constructed stable, must be compensated in damages by the innkeeper. 23 Tenn. at 180-181

The quoted opinion mentions a rule of strict liability, subject to exceptions for inevitable casualty or superior force; but the decision is based upon approval of the jury charge of liability for "any default of him or his servants" and exoneration from liability for injuries through accident without fault of the innkeepers or his servants.

In Manning v. Wells, 28 Tenn. (9 Humph) 746 (1849) suit was filed against a boarding house for loss of property stolen from the room of plaintiff. The Supreme Court dismissed and said:

The court charged the jury that the defendant was liable for the coat, if lost or stolen from his house, unless it happened by the act of God or public enemies; but if the plaintiff had exclusive use and possession of the room, then the defendant would not be liable.

The jury found for the plaintiff the value of the coat, and the defendant appealed to this court.

The question now is, Did his honor err in the instructions to the jury? And we think he did. The doctrine stated by his honor is certainly the true one as applicable to the goods of a guest in an inn. But a guest is a traveller or wayfarer, who comes to an inn and is accepted. Story on Bail, sec. 477. A neighbor or friend who comes to an inn on the invitation of the innkeeper is not deemed a guest. Bac. Abr., Inn and innkeeper, 5; Com. dig., action on case for negligence, B. 2. Nor is a person a guest, in the sense...