Shepherd v. Stade, No. A07-1220 (Minn. App. 6/3/2008)
| Decision Date | 03 June 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. A07-1220.,A07-1220. |
| Parties | Rosemary Shepherd, Respondent, v. Melinda Stade, f/k/a Melinda Zander, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the District Court, Scott County, File No. 70-CV-07-6059.
Erick G. Kaardal, William F. Mohrman, Mohrman & Kaardal, P.A., (for respondent).
Kevin J. Wetherille, Dennis Patrick Moriarty, Jaspers, Moriarty & Walburg, P.A., (for appellant).
Greg S. Paulson, Kurt V. BlueDog, BlueDog, Paulson & Small, P.L.L.P., (for amicus Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community)
Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Connolly, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant challenges the district court's denial of her motion to dismiss respondent's complaint on the ground that it is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Appellant asserts that the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community (the tribe) is an indispensable party to the suit and that, because the tribe cannot be joined, the suit must be dismissed. We conclude that the tribe is neither a necessary nor an indispensable party and therefore affirm the district court's decision.
Appellant Melinda Stade is an enrolled member of the tribe. Respondent Rosemary Shepherd, who is of Native American descent but is not a member of the tribe, was employed by Mystic Lake Casino, a business owned by the tribe. Shepherd's employment was terminated when the tribe issued a no-trespass order against her, which precluded her from reporting to work and has also prevented her from accessing free health care on the reservation.
Shepherd initiated a civil action against Stade in district court, alleging that statements made by Stade led to the tribe's issuance of the no-trespass order and asserting claims of tortious interference with contract; tortious interference with prospective contractual relations; tortious interference with health care and physician-client relationship; and defamation. Shepherd has not named the tribe as a defendant to this action.
In her complaint, Shepherd alleges that Stade dated Shepherd's adult son and that, when the relationship ended, Stade harbored anger toward the entire Shepherd family. Shepherd claims that Stade went to Shepherd's supervisors at Mystic Lake Casino and falsely claimed that Shepherd was "monitoring [Stade's] gaming habits through the casino's computer system in an effort to claim that [Stade] was spending too much time at the casino and not enough time with her children." Shepherd alleges that, as a result of Stade's statements, the tribe issued a no-trespass order to Shepherd, stating that she "presented a threat to the life, health, safety and general welfare of the community, its members, other residents and guests." And Shepherd alleges that Stade intended her statements to cause Shepherd's loss of employment and access to free health care.
An appeal generally is not available from the denial of a motion to dismiss. See Minn. R. App. P. 103.03 (identifying appealable orders). But orders denying dismissal based on immunity or jurisdictional grounds are collateral orders subject to immediate review because they fall within "`that small class which finally determine claims of right, separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.'" McGowan v. Our Savior's Lutheran Church, 527 N.W.2d 830, 833 (Minn. 1995) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524-25, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 2814 (1985)). For similar reasons, orders denying dismissal based on indispensable-party determinations under Minn. R. Civ. P. 19 are also subject to immediate review. See Hunt v. Nev. State Bank, 285 Minn. 77, 90, 172 N.W.2d 292, 301 (1969) ().
Stade requests that we also review the district court's determination that Shepherd has stated a viable claim for tortious interference with the physician-patient relationship, which claim Stade urges has not been recognized by the Minnesota courts. Because this issue is unrelated to the court's indispensable-party determination, interlocutory review is not available under the collateral-order doctrine. See Meier v. City of Columbia Heights, 686 N.W.2d 858, 863 (Minn. App. 2004) (citing Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 50-51, 115 S. Ct. 1203, 1212 (1995)) ( that we decline to provide interlocutory review to additional issues unless they are inextricably intertwined with the appealable issue). Nor do we find that review will serve the interests of justice. See Minn. R. App. P. 103.04 (). Thus, we decline review of this issue.
We review the denial of a motion to dismiss under rule 19 for abuse of discretion. See Hoyt Props., Inc. v. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C., 716 N.W.2d 365, 377 (Minn. App. 2006). Joinder analysis under the rule involves a two-part inquiry. Minn. R. Civ. P. 19.01, 19.02; see U.S. ex rel. Hall v. Tribal Dev. Corp., 100 F.3d 476, 478-79 (7th Cir. 1996) (describing bifurcated analysis). First, the court must determine the existence of a person or entity to be joined if feasible, sometimes referred to as a "necessary party." Minn. R. Civ. P. 19.01; see Tribal Dev. Corp., 100 F.3d at 478 (). A party is "necessary" if (1) complete relief cannot be accorded without joining that party or (2) disposition of the action in that party's absence will impair that party's ability to protect an interest or subject other parties to a substantial risk of inconsistent obligations in relation to that interest. Minn. R. Civ. P. 19.02.
The court's identification of a necessary party, however, does not end the inquiry. Tribal Dev. Corp., 100 F.3d at 479. If a necessary party is subject to the court's jurisdiction, that party must be joined in the action. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 19.01. Most rule 19 issues, however, arise in the context of identification of necessary parties who are not subject to the court's jurisdiction. When a necessary party cannot be joined, the court must determine whether that party is indispensable. Id.
An indispensable party is a party "`without whom the action could not proceed in equity and good conscience.'" Hoyt, 716 N.W.2d at 377 (quoting Murray v. Harvey Hansen-Lake Nokomis, Inc., 360 N.W.2d 658, 661 (Minn. App. 1985)); see Minn. R. Civ. P. 19.02. In determining whether a party is indispensable, the court should consider factors including
(a) to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to the person or those already parties;
(b) the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided (c) whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; and
(d) whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
Minn. R. Civ. P. 19.02; see Hoyt, 716 N.W.2d at 377.
Applying these factors, the district court concluded that the tribe was not an indispensable party, noting that Shepherd's claims against Stade are "separate and distinct" from any claim that she may have against the tribe and that she is not claiming a breach of contract or defamation by the tribe. The court rejected Stade's assertion that disposition of the action would impede the tribe's ability to protect its interests and expressed skepticism of Stade's assertion that Shepherd has an adequate remedy in tribal court. The district court did not expressly distinguish between the necessary-party analysis of rule 19.01 and the indispensable-party analysis of rule 19.02. The court's written decision, however, suggests in its conclusion that the tribe was neither necessary nor indispensable. We agree.
Stade asserts that the tribe is a necessary party because the district court cannot grant complete relief in this case without joining the tribe as a party. And the tribe, appearing as amicus curiae, echoes this concern. But neither Stade nor the tribe is able to offer any support for their assertions. As the district court found, Shepherd seeks only money damages and only from Stade, an individual member of the tribe. Thus, the district court can grant all relief requested.
Stade and the tribe next assert that the tribe's interests are implicated by the litigation because "[t]he no-trespass order issued by the Tribe is the sole cause of Respondent's employment termination, and that decision by the Tribe cannot be challenged in district court." The tribe focuses much attention on its sovereign right to exclude individuals from tribal property. But Shepherd does not challenge the tribe's right to enter the no-trespass order, nor does she seek reinstatement of her employment or any other type of relief from the tribe.
With respect to Shepherd's tortious-interference-with-contract claim, Stade asserts that the tribe will be prejudiced if not joined because the claim requires a determination that the tribe breached a contract with Shepherd. Shepherd cites Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi v. Prudential Sec. Group, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (ENI). In that case, the court found that it would be compelled to determine whether an absent party had breached a contract and thus held that that party was indispensable under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19. Id. at 454. But there is ample contrary authority. See Ark. v. Tex., 74 S. Ct. 109, 110, 346 U.S. 368, 370 (1953) (...
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