Sheppard v. Dist. of D.C., Civil Action No. 10–0834 (RMU).

• Decision Date: 03 June 2011
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 10–0834 (RMU).
• Citation: 791 F.Supp.2d 1
• Parties: Elizabeth SHEPPARD, Plaintiff,v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

791 F.Supp.2d 1

Elizabeth SHEPPARD, Plaintiff,

v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 10–0834 (RMU).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Feb. 22, 2011.Opinion Denying Reconsideration June 3, 2011.

Kirk D. Williams, Law Offices of Kirk D. Williams, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.Sarah Ann Sulkowski, Office of the Attorney General, DC, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Granting the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

RICARDO M. URBINA, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

The plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated her due process and equal protection rights as guaranteed under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, respectively, when they failed to process her disability benefits claim brought under the provisions of the District of Columbia Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (“the Act”), D.C. Code § 1–623.24. The defendants now move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), contending that the plaintiff's claim has already been adjudicated by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Because res judicata bars the plaintiff's claims, the court grants the defendants' motion.

II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1983, the plaintiff suffered a work-related injury while working for the government of the District of Columbia (“the District”). Compl. ¶ 12. The plaintiff continued to work for the District until July 1998, when her injury worsened. Defs.' Mot., Ex. 2 (Pl.'s Petition before the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (“Pl.'s D.C. Pet.”)) at 1.¹ Soon thereafter, the plaintiff filed a claim for temporary total disability benefits with the District's Disability Compensation Program (“DCP”), which accepted the claim and began to pay benefits. Id.

In January 2006, the plaintiff's physician determined that her injury had reached the point of “maximum medical improvement” and that she had sustained a permanent impairment as a result of the injury. Id. The plaintiff immediately filed a claim for permanent partial disability benefits with the DCP (“the January 2006 claim”). Compl. ¶ 15.

At the time, the Act provided that within thirty days of the filing of a disability claim, the DCP must make findings of facts and decide whether to award payment of compensation to an applicant for disability benefits. D.C. Code § 1–623.24(a) (2006). The DCP's failure to do so meant that the claim would automatically “be deemed accepted,” with “payment of compensation [commencing] on the 31st day following the date the claim was filed.” Id. § 1–623.24(a–3)(1) (2006). Thus, after thirty days passed without any decision by the DCP, the plaintiff sought an order from an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) declaring that her claim for permanent partial disability benefits was deemed accepted and automatically payable pursuant to § 1–623.24(a–3)(1). Pl.'s D.C. Pet. at 2.

The ALJ, however, denied the plaintiff's request for an order after concluding that § 1–623.24(a–3)(1) applied strictly to an initial claim for benefits and that given the plaintiff's previously submitted claim for temporary total disability benefits submitted by the plaintiff, the plaintiff's January 2006 claim was not an initial claim and the statutory provisions did not apply. See Notice (Jan. 14, 2011), ALJ's Order at 3–5. The plaintiff then filed an application for review with the Compensation Review Board (“CRB”), which affirmed the ALJ's decision. See generally id., CRB Decision.

On May 5, 2009, the plaintiff petitioned the District of Columbia Court of Appeals for review of the CRB's decision, arguing, inter alia, that the CRB's application of § 1–623.24(a–3)(1) violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.² Pl.'s D.C. Pet. at 17–22. More specifically, the plaintiff argued that the CRB's interpretation of § 1–623.24(a–3)(1) deprived her of due process because it allowed the DCP to avoid rendering a final decision on her permanent partial disability benefits claim. Id. at 19–20. The plaintiff averred that without an administrative decision by the CRB either accepting or denying her claim for benefits, she would never be able to seek judicial review of the merits of her disability benefits claim. Id. at 17; see also D.C. CODE § 1–623.24(a–4)(1) (“A claimant who disagrees with a decision of [the DCP] ... shall have the right to request reconsideration of that decision ”) (emphasis added). The plaintiff also argued before the District of Columbia Court of Appeals that the CRB's interpretation of § 1–623.24(a–4)(1) violated the Equal Protection Clause by creating two categories of disability claims—those that the DCP decided on the merits and which therefore entitled a claimant to seek adjudicatory review, and those claims that the DCP did not decide, foreclosing any judicial review of the merits of the disability benefits claim. Pl.'s D.C. Pet. at 20.

Ultimately, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the CRB, concluding that under § 1–623.24(a–3)(1) the DCP was not obligated to pay partial disability benefits to the plaintiff for her January 2006 claim solely because a decision had not been issued within the thirty-day time frame. Sheppard v. D.C. Dep't of Emp't Servs., 993 A.2d 525, 528 (D.C.2010) (per curiam). The court did not, however, address the plaintiff's constitutional claims.

In May 2010, the plaintiff commenced this action, arguing that the DCP's failure to process her January 2006 claim deprives her of access to judicial review and thus violates her due process and equal protection rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Compl. ¶¶ 6, 7. The defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the doctrine of res judicata bars the plaintiff's claim. See generally Defs.' Mot. With the defendants' motion now ripe for consideration, the court turns to the parties' arguments and the applicable legal standards.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard for Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint.

Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C.Cir.2002). The complaint need only set forth a short and plain statement of the claim, giving the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Kingman Park Civic Ass'n v. Williams, 348 F.3d 1033, 1040 (D.C.Cir.2003) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) and Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). “Such simplified notice pleading is made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and defense to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues.” Conley, 355 U.S. at 47–48, 78 S.Ct. 99 (internal quotation marks omitted). It is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead all elements of his prima facie case in the complaint, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511–14, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002), or “plead law or match facts to every element of a legal theory,” Krieger v. Fadely, 211 F.3d 134, 136 (D.C.Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Yet, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (abrogating the oft-quoted language from Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46, 78 S.Ct. 99, instructing courts not to dismiss for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that “no set of facts in support of his claim [ ] would entitle him to relief”). A claim is facially plausible when the pleaded factual content “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

In resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must treat the complaint's factual allegations—including mixed questions of law and fact—as true and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the plaintiff's favor. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 165 (D.C.Cir.2003); Browning, 292 F.3d at 242. While many well-pleaded complaints are conclusory, the court need not accept as true inferences unsupported by facts set out in the complaint or legal conclusions cast as factual allegations. Warren v. District of Columbia, 353 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C.Cir.2004); Browning, 292 F.3d at 242. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

B. Legal Standard for Res Judicata

“The doctrine of res judicata prevents repetitious litigation involving the same causes of action or the same issues.” I.A.M. Nat'l Pension Fund v. Indus. Gear Mfg. Co., 723 F.2d 944, 946 (D.C.Cir.1983). Res judicata has two distinct aspects—claim preclusion and issue preclusion (commonly known as collateral estoppel)—that apply in different circumstances and with different consequences to the litigants. NextWave Pers. Commc'ns, Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 254 F.3d 130, 142 (D.C.Cir.2001); Novak v. World Bank, 703 F.2d 1305, 1309 (D.C.Cir.1983).

Under claim preclusion, “a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.” Drake v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 291 F.3d 59, 66 (D.C.Cir.2002) (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980...