Sheppard v. Judkins
| Decision Date | 28 December 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 8039,8039 |
| Citation | 476 S.W.2d 102 |
| Parties | Leuna SHEPPARD, Appellant, v. Juanita JUDKINS et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Michael A. Hatchell, Ramey, Brelsford, Flock, Devereux & Hutchins, Tyler, for appellant.
William McDowell, Smith, Johnson & McDowell, Sulphur Springs, for appellees.
The opinion handed down in this case on November 2, 1971, is withdrawn and the following is submitted in lieu thereof.
This is a damage suit filed as a result of a collision of two automobiles where two highways crossed each other at almost complete right angles with four stop signs requiring all traffic to stop before proceeding across the highway intersection. Plaintiffs-Appellees, Juanita Judkins and Adaline Murray, sued Defendant-Appellant, Leuna Sheppard, for damages for personal injuries and damages to their car as a result of the collision which occurred on November 23, 1969.
This is a controlled highway intersection case. The accident occurred at a place where Highway No. 67 intersects Highway No. 271 in the City of Mt. Pleasant, Titus County, Texas. At this intersection, Highway No. 67 is a two-lane highway running east and west. Highway No. 271 at the point of intersection is divided into a four-lane highway running north and south. Appellee, Judkins, was driving an automobile that belonged to Appellee, Murray, going east on Highway 67, when she reached the highway intersection. In obedience to the laws, she approached the intersection and brought the car to a complete stop. She looked to her left and to her right . She saw the car being driven by Appellant, which was approaching the intersection from the north, about one or two city blocks away. Both appellees testified that they knew that it was a four-way stop sign and it looked to them as if Appellant was going to stop in obedience to the law. They then proceeded to cross the highway. Appellant disregarding the laws that she must stop, drove her car into the side of the car being occupied by Appellees. Not only did the Appellees testify that they thought the Appellant was going to stop, but, also, Edgie Peoples, a sister of Appellant who was in the car with Appellant, testified that she, too, thought Appellant was going to stop. There are red flashing lights and four large stop signs; one at each of the four entrances to the highway intersection .
The case was tried before a jury. The jury answered all of the special issues in favor of the Appellees except Special Issue No. 16 in which it found that the Appellee, Judkins, proceeded into the intersection when it was not safe to do so without interference or collision with the Appellant's vehicle. The jury then exonerated the Appellee, Judkins, of any contributory negligence, by their answer to Special Issue No. 17 where it found from the preponderance of the evidence that such conduct was not negligence.
Since there is much to be said about the submission of the special issues at a controlled highway intersection, we will copy the special issues as submitted to the Trial Judge and the jury's answer thereto. They read as follows:
'SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 1
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Leuna Sheppard failed to keep such a lookout as an ordinarily prudent person in the exercise of ordinary care would have kept under the same or similar circumstances?
Answer 'We do' or 'We do not.'
ANSWER: We do.
If you have answered the foregoing special issue 'We do' then answer the following issue; otherwise do not answer:
'SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 2
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that such negligence, if any, was a proximate cause of the collision in question?
Answer 'We do' or 'We do not.'
ANSWER: We do.
'SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 3
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that defendant Leuna Sheppard's failure to stop in obedience to the flashing red light on the occasion in question was negligence?
Answer 'We do' or 'We do not.'
ANSWER: We do.
If you have answered the foregoing special issue 'We do' then answer the following issue, otherwise, do not answer:
'SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 4
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that such negligence, if any, was a proximate cause of the collision in question?
Answer 'We do' or 'We do not.'
ANSWER: We do.
'SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 5
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that defendant Leuna Sheppard's failure to apply her brakes on the occasion in question was negligence?
Answer 'We do' or 'We do not'.
ANSWER: We Do
If you have answered the foregoing special issue 'We do', then answer the following issue; otherwise do not answer.
'SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 6
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that such negligence, if any, was a proximate cause of the collision in question?
Answer 'We do' or 'We do not'.
ANSWER: We Do
'The driver of a vehicle approaching the intersection of a different street or roadway is required to stop, yield and grant the privilege of immediate use of such intersection in obedience to any stop sign, and, after so stopping, may only proceed when such driver may safely enter the intersection without interference or collision with traffic using such different street or roadway.
'SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 7
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the failure of Leuna Sheppard to yield to the vehicle driven by Juanita Judkins was negligence?
Answer 'We do' or 'We Do Not'.
ANSWER: We Do
If you have answered the foregoing special issue 'We do', then answer the following issue; otherwise, do not answer:
'SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 8
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the failure of Leuna Sheppard to yield to the vehicle driven by Juanita Judkins was a proximate cause of the occurrence in question?
Answer 'We do' or 'We do not'.
ANSWER: We Do
'SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 9
What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, do you find from a preponderance of the evidence would fairly and reasonably compensate Juanita Judkins for her injuries, if any, which you find from a preponderance of the evidence resulted from the occurrence in question?
You may consider the following elements of damages, if any, and none other:
a. Physical paid and mental anguish which she has suffered in the past.
b. Physical pain and mental anguish which, in reasonable probability, she will suffer in the future.
c. Loss of her earnings in the past.
d. Loss of earning capacity which, in reasonable probability, she will sustain in the future.
Answer in dollars and cents, if any.
ANSWER: $9,500.00
'SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 10
Find from a preponderance of the evidence the reasonable expenses, if any, for necessary medical and hospital care received by Juanita Judkins in the past for treatment of her injuries resulting from the occurrence in question.
Answer in dollars and cents, if any.
ANSWER: $368.95
'SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 11
What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, do you find from a preponderance of the evidence would be compensation for the reasonable expenses, if any, the necessary medical care which Juanita Judkins will, in reasonable probability, require in the future for treatment of her injuries resulting from the occurrence in question?
Answer in dollars and cents, if any.
ANSWER: $500.00
'SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 12
What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, do you find from a preponderance of the evidence would fairly and reasonably compensate Adaline Murray for her injuries, if any, which you find from a preponderance of the evidence resulted from the occurrence in question?
You may consider the following elements of damages, if any, and none other:
a. Physical pain and mental anguish which she has suffered in the past.
b. Physical pain and mental anguish which, in reasonable probability, she will suffer in the future.
Answer in dollars and cents, if any.
ANSWER: $500.00
'SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 13
Find from a preponderance of the evidence the reasonable expenses, if any, for necessary medical care received by Adaline Murray in the past for treatment of her injuries resulting from the occurrence in question.
Answer in dollars and cents.
ANSWER: $42.00
'MARKET VALUE' means the amount which would be paid in cash by a willing buyer who desires to buy, but is not required to buy, to a willing seller who desires to sell, but is under no necessity of selling.
'SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 14
Find from a preponderance of the evidence the market value in Titus County Texas, of Adaline Murray's automobile immediately before the occurrence in question.
Answer in dollars and cents, if any.
ANSWER: $850.00
'SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 15
Find from a preponderance of the evidence the market value in Titus County, Texas, of such vehicle immediately after the occurrence in question.
Answer in dollars and cents, if any.
ANSWER: $200.00
'You are instructed that the driver of a vehicle approaching the intersection of a different street or roadway is required to stop, yield and grant the privilege of immediate use of such intersection in obedience to any stop sign and, after so stopping, may only proceed when such driver may safely enter the intersection without interference or collision with traffic using such different street or roadway.
'SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 16
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that on the occasion in question Juanita Judkins proceeded into the intersection when it was not safe to do so without interference or collision with the Sheppard vehicle?
Answer 'We do' or 'We do not'.
ANSWER: We Do
If you have answered the foregoing special issue 'We do' then answer the following special issue, otherwise do not answer it.
'SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 17
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that such conduct, if any you have so found, was negligence?
Answer 'We do' or 'We do not'.
ANSWER: We do not
If you have answered the foregoing special issue 'We do' then answer the following special issue, otherwise do not answer it.
'SPECIAL ISSUE ...
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