Shepperd v. Fisher
Decision Date | 13 July 1907 |
Parties | SHEPPERD et al. v. FISHER, Administrator, et al., Appellants |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Henry Circuit Court. -- Hon. W. W. Graves, Judge.
Reversed and remanded.
C. C Dickinson and Parks & Son for appellants.
(1) In cases where, by the common law or statute law of England, any person might become seized in fee tail of any lands, by virtue of any devise, gift, grant or other conveyance, or by any other reasons whatever, such person, instead of being seized thereof in fee tail, shall be deemed and adjudged to be, and shall become, seized thereof for his natural life only, and the remainder shall pass in fee simple absolute to the person to whom the estate tail would, on the death of the first grantee, devisee, or donee in tail, first pass according to the course of the common law, by virtue of such gift, devise, grant or conveyance. Sec. 4592, R. S. 1899. (2) Where a remainder shall be limited to the heirs, or heirs of the body, of a person to whom a life estate in the same premises shall be given, the persons who, on the termination of the life estate, shall be the heir or heirs of the body of such tenant for life shall be entitled to take as purchasers in fee simple, by virtue of the remainder so limited to them. Sec. 4594, R. S. 1899. (3) If any person, by last will devise any real estate to any person, for the term of such person's life, and after his or her death, to his or her children or heirs or right heirs in fee, such devise shall vest an estate for life only in such devisee, and remainder in fee simple in such children. Sec. 4645, R. S. 1899. (4) Section 4592, Revised Statutes 1899, converts the estate tail, created at common law, into a life estate in the first taker, with a contingent remainder in fee simple in favor of these persons who should answer to the description of the heirs of the body of such first taker. Goodman v Simmons, 113 Mo. 127; Emmerson v. Hughes, 110 Mo. 631; Woods v. Kice, 103 Mo. 329; Chiles v. Bartelson, 21 Mo. 344; Phillips v. LaForge, 89 Mo. 72. (5) In Missouri, an estate tail has been, by statute, converted into an estate for life with remainder in fee in second taker. Rozier v. Graham, 146 Mo. 359; Clarkson v. Clarkson, 125 Mo. 386; Reed v. Lane, 122 Mo. 311.
W. E. Owen and C. A. Calvird for respondents.
(1) Any limitation of an estate, by deed or by devise, which possibly may not vest within a life or lives in being, and twenty-one years thereafter, with the addition of the period of gestation of a child en ventre sa mere, or a limitation to the unborn child of an unborn child, is void. 1 Washburn on Real Prop. (4 Ed.), p. 110, sec. 57, ch. 4; 2 Washburn on Real Prop. (4 Ed.), p. 703, sec. 3, ch. 7; Rice Mod. Law Real Prop., secs. 270, 271, 272, 274, 275; Lockridge v. Mace, 109 Mo. 162. (2) Where there is a gift or devise to a class, as children, heirs or issue, upon a contingency that may possibly arise beyond the limits of the rule against perpetuities as to a part of the members of the class, the gift or devise in such case is void as to all. Gray on Perpetuities, secs. 369 to 382; 2 Washburn on Real Prop. (4 Ed.), p. 704; Lockridge v. Mace, 109 Mo. 162; Gates v. Seibert, 157 Mo. 254; Thomas v. Thomas, 73 Am. St. Rep. 427; Coggins' Appeal, 124 Pa. St. 10; In re Walkerly, 49 Am. St. Rep. 136; Barnum v. Barnum, 26 Md. 119; 22 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law (2 Ed.), 724; Johnson's Estate, 185 Pa. St. 179. (3) Possibility of issue is never extinct so long as life lasts. 1 Washburn, Real Prop. (4 Ed.), p. 103, sec. 36; Rozier v. Graham, 146 Mo. 359. (4) A contingent remainder is subject to the rule against perpetuities. Gray on Perpetuities, sec. 204, 213; Gates v. Seibert, 157 Mo. 254. (5) The devise to the heirs of Mrs. Swindell and Mrs. Shepperd would, but for the limitation over by way of reversion to grantor and his heirs, be a life estate in said heirs liable to enlarge, upon the birth of issue to them or any of them, into a fee. In other words, a conditional fee, at common law. Yocum v. Siler, 160 Mo. 313; Halbert v. Halbert, 21 Mo. 282; Moore v. Wingate, 53 Mo. 410; 2 Rice on Real Prop., secs. 278, 288; Tiedeman on Real Prop. (1 Ed.), sec. 271. (6) The conditional limitation over by way of executory devise, in the event of the heirs of Mrs. Swindell and Mrs. Shepperd themselves dying without issue, limits the estate devised to the heirs of said daughters, to a life estate, remainder in fee to their issue (issue of heirs) if any survive; but on failure of said issue (issue of heirs) then over to grantor and his heirs in fee. Thompson v. Craig, 64 Mo. 312; Farrar v. Christy, 24 Mo. 453; Harbison v. Swan, 58 Mo. 147; Yocum v. Siler, 160 Mo. 281; Halbert v. Halbert, 21 Mo. 281. (7) If it shall be held that the fee under the terms of the will would vest as indicated, in either of the last two points, 5 and 6, then the limitation must fail for remoteness, for in either case the fee may not vest for more than twenty-one years and ten months after the death of all persons in being at the time of the death of the testator. Or it may vest in the unborn child of an unborn child. (8) Where a devise constitutes one general disposition of the life estate and fee, and any part of it violates the rule against perpetuities, the whole devise will, as to the land, be held void; and the life estate of the widow being void she will take a dower interest. Lockridge v. Mace, 109 Mo. 162; St. Armour v. Rivard, 2 Mich. 294; Donahue v. McNichol, 91 Pa. St. 78; Hawley v. James, 16 Wend. 120.
OPINION
The plaintiffs filed this bill of equity in the circuit court of Henry county against the defendants, having for its object the construction of the last will and testament of C. S. Fisher, deceased, and a prayer for partition of the real estate.
The petition alleged, substantially, that C. S. Fisher died testate, in the county of Henry, and State of Missouri, on the -- day of February, 1901; that his will was duly probated, and Adam Fisher qualified as executor and was then acting as such; that said will is in words and figures as follows (formal parts omitted):
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