Sherfield v. State

• Decision Date: 14 June 1973
• Docket Number: A--16774,Nos. A--16773,s. A--16773
• Citation: 511 P.2d 598
• Parties: Charles Anthony SHERFIELD, Appellant, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee. Thomas Roy HENDRIX, Appellant, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

Page 598

511 P.2d 598

Charles Anthony SHERFIELD, Appellant, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.

Thomas Roy HENDRIX, Appellant, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.

Nos. A--16773, A--16774.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

June 14, 1973.

An Appeal from the District Court of Oklahoma County; Robert L. Berry, judge.

Charles Anthony Sherfield and Thomas Roy Hendrix, appellants, were convicted for the offense of Second Degree Rape and each sentenced to five years imprisonment, and they appeal. Judgment and sentence affirmed.

Jeff L. Hirzel, Staff Atty., Legal Aid Society, Oklahoma City, for appellants.

Larry Derryberry, Atty. Gen., Michael Cauthron, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ray Parks, Legal Intern, for appellee.

OPINION

BRETT, Judge:

Appellants, Charles Anthony Sherfield and Thomas Roy Hendrix, hereinafter referred to as defendants, were convicted in the District Court of Oklahoma County, Case No. CRF--71--443, of Second Degree Rape and each sentenced to five (5) years imprisonment on April 5, 1971. At the time of their conviction, the defendants were juveniles, being fifteen years of age, and were certified for criminal prosecution as adults by the Juvenile Division of the District Court of Oklahoma County, Case No. JF--71--8 (Sherfield) and Case No. JF--71--9 (Hendrix). In this appeal defendants claim the juvenile court certification process was defective and further claim the provisions of the Juvenile Act, 10 O.S. § 1112, providing for certification of juveniles for criminal prosecution as adults, is unconstitutional.

Defendants were taken into custody of the Juvenile Court by virtue of a complaint that they had forcibly raped a sixteen year old girl on January 1, 1971. On January 5, 1971, the district attorney filed in the Juvenile Court an 'Application to Certify Juvenile to be Prosecuted as an Adult,' alleging that the defendants had committed the offense of Second Degree Rape and alleging that each defendant had 'sufficient mental capacity to know the difference between right and wrong and the consequences of his acts.' On January 15, 1971, the Juvenile Court ordered each defendant committed to Central State Griffin Memorial Hospital 'for the purpose of determining by observation whether or not said child is mentally ill.' On February 3, 1971, Dr. Loraine Schmidt, M.D., court case consultant at the hospital, wrote the Juvenile Court a letter concerning defendant Sherfield stating that upon completion of 'psychiatric evaluation' it was found that Charles Sherfield 'is not mentally ill according to the laws of the State of Oklahoma. He is able to distinguish between right and wrong and is capable of advising an attorney in his own defense. Charles' capacity to comprehend the nature and quality of his behavior is consistent with his chronological age of fifteen.' On the same date Dr. Schmidt sent the court an identical letter concerning Thomas Hendrix.

On February 19, 1971, a hearing was held in the Juvenile Court on the State's application to certify defendants for trial as adults. The defendants were present and represented by counsel, Wendell Wrightman and Jeff Hirzel, of the Legal Aid Society. At the hearing a female juvenile, age sixteen, testified that on January 1, 1971, during the early morning hours, Sherfield, Hendrix, and two other males had sexual intercourse with her against her will and without her consent. Counsel for Sherfield and Hendrix cross-examined the complaining witness and called Lucretia Hendrix, mother of the defendant Hendrix, whose testimony tended to impeach the complaining witness. The complaining witness' mother was then called as a rebuttal witness by the State. Dr. Schmidt's letters stating her psychiatric evaluations were admitted into evidence.

In opposition to certification defense counsel argued that there were no guidelines for the proper exercise of discretion by the Juvenile Court and that the statutory provisions for certification were unconstitutionally vague. The Juvenile Court, Judge Stewart Hunter, replied that the hearing alone was perhaps not sufficient to exercise his jurisdiction and thereupon the judge reviewed 'all the files' relating to the defendants. The judge summarized defendant Hendrix' contacts with the Juvenile Court which began three years before in 1968. There had been complaints against Hendrix for shoplifting, riding with an unauthorized driver of a stolen vehicle, burglary, and truancy. The Juvenile Court had previously placed Hendrix on probation in the custody of his mother, but the probation had been revoked and he was confined to the Boley State School for Boys. As to Sherfield, there were complaints against him beginning in 1966 for shoplifting and disorderly conduct, which resulted in his being committed to the Taft State Home. Thereafter, while on probation, a complaint against Sherfield for theft returned him to his mother's custody under the supervision of the Department of Public Welfare.

In consideration of these factors the record of the juveniles, their psychiatric evaluation, and the testimony at the hearing, the Juvenile Court judge waived the exclusive jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court over Sherfield and Hendrix and certified them for prosecution as adults in the District Court. On April 5, 1971, while represented by the public defender, the defendants entered a plea of guilty and were each sentenced to five (5) years imprisonment. We granted certiorari. Title 22 O.S.1971, § 1051.

The governing statute, 10 O.S.1971, § 1112, provides in relevant part:

'(a) Except as hereinafter provided, a child who is charged with having violated any State statute or municipal ordinance shall not be tried in a criminal action, but in a juvenile proceeding in accordance with this Act . . .

'(b) If a child is charged with delinquency as a result of an offense which would be a crime if committed by an adult, the court, after full investigation and a preliminary hearing, may in its discretion continue the juvenile proceeding, or it may certify such child capable of knowing right from wrong and to be held accountable for his acts, for proper criminal proceedings to any other division of the court which would have trial jurisdiction of such offense if committed by an adult.'

As to the specifics of defendants' challenge, it is first contended that the Juvenile Court did not require a full investigation into the background of defendants, thus failing to comply with requirements of Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966). Defendants argue that 'a mere statement by a psychiatrist, Dr. Schmidt, is not a full investigation,' thus defendants' certification was improper under § 1112 and constitutional due process requirements.

As we read Kent v. United States, supra, the United States Supreme Court held that under the District of Columbia Juvenile Court Act providing for the Juvenile Court to waive jurisdiction over a juvenile after full investigation, as a condition to a valid waiver order, the juvenile was entitled as a matter of due process to a hearing, with counsel, including access by his counsel, to the social records and similar reports which might be considered by the court, and to a statement of reasons for the Juvenile Court's decision. The relevant statute in the Kent case and the Oklahoma Statute both require a 'full investigation' before waiver by the Juvenile Court of its jurisdiction.

However, the factors which lead the Supreme Court to find a due process violation in Kent are not present in the case before us. In Kent the 'Juvenile Court judge did not rule on (defense) motions. He held no hearing. He did not confer with petitioner or petitioner's parents or petitioner's counsel . . . He made no findings. He did not recite any reason for the waiver.' 383 U.S. at 546, 86 S.Ct. at 1049.

In contrast, in this case the Juvenile Court Judge, Stewart M. Hunter, waived his jurisdiction and certified Sherfield and Hendrix for prosecution only after a full hearing, assisted by counsel, with the right of confrontation, with testimony by witnesses for the State and the juveniles, and with proper notice to the parents prior to the hearing. Before waiver, the Juvenile Court judge reviewed the rather extensive record of the defendants in their prior contacts with the Juvenile Court. The judge did not act until he had the benefit of a psychiatric evaluation. After hearing full argument by both side, the judge acted on each of defendants' motions and did so with careful deliberation. The judge's reasons for his rulings and findings were stated in the record and supported by the evidence. We are of the opinion that the waiver and certification by the juvenile judge satisfied due process requirements as outlined in Kent. There is no hint of summary, arbitrary, or prejudicial waiver. Furthermore, there was no request by counsel for Sherfield or Hendrix for further investigation by the Juvenile Court, nor suggestion as to nature of further investigation. We are satisfied the full investigation and hearing requirements of § 1112 were met in this case.

Defendants next contend the waiver and certification was in error absent evidence of the juveniles' advanced emotional maturity, that is, maturity above and beyond their chronological age of fifteen. Defendants argue a juvenile, whose age places him under the protection of the Juvenile Act, 'is presumed to be incapable of...