Sheriff Officers Assoc., Inc., ex rel. Stasko v. Nassau Cnty.

• Court: New York Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Karen V. Murphy
• Citation: Sheriff Officers Assoc., Inc., ex rel. Stasko v. Nassau Cnty., 2012 NY Slip Op 3161, Index No. 4621/12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jun 12, 2012)
• Decision Date: 12 June 2012
• Docket Number: Index No. 4621/12
• Parties: In the Matter of the Application of SHERIFF OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, INC., EX REL MICHAEL STASKO and all other similarly affected members of the Sheriff Officers Association, Inc., Petitioner(s), For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 75 of the NY Civil Practice Law and Rules v. NASSAU COUNTY and the OFFICE OF THE NASSAU COUNTY COMPTROLLER, Respondent(s).

2012 NY Slip Op 3161

In the Matter of the Application ofSHERIFF OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,EX REL MICHAEL STASKO and all othersimilarly affected members of the Sheriff Officers Association, Inc., Petitioner(s),For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 75 of the NYCivil Practice Law and Rules

v. NASSAU COUNTY and the OFFICE OF THENASSAU COUNTY COMPTROLLER, Respondent(s).

Index No. 4621/12

SUPREME COURT - STATE OF NEW YORK TRIAL TERM. PART 11

Date: June 8, 2012

Date: June 12, 2012

NASSAU COUNTY

PRESENT:

Honorable Karen V. Murphy

Justice of the Supreme Court

Motion Submitted: 4/30/12

Motion Sequence: 001

The following papers read on this motion:

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                ¦Notice of Motion/Order to Show Cause¦X ¦
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                ¦Answering Papers                    ¦  ¦
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                ¦Reply                               ¦  ¦
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                ¦Defendant's/Respondent's            ¦XX¦
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Upon the foregoing papers, it is ordered that the Petitioners' application for preliminary injunctive relief pending disposition, through arbitration, of an interrelated contract grievance is determined as hereinafter articulated.

The instant proceeding emanates from a dispute between contracting parties, the Sheriff Officers Association, Inc. (hereinafter "ShOA") and the County of Nassau (hereinafter "County"), respectively, and concerns the latter's obligation to pay health insurance premiums for certain former employees.

Under an existing Memorandum of Agreement (hereinafter "MOA"), which served to extend and modify an extant collective bargaining agreement, the County, with respect to the provision of health insurance coverage, is contractually obligated to "[p]ay the full cost of the premium for enrollment for its active, retired, and retiring employees, pursuant to the law and regulations now in force or as hereinafter amended."(Ex B, Petition, MOA § 19 [a])

Michael Stasko, for whose immediate and direct benefit the instant proceeding was initiated, was a correction lieutenant employed by the County and a member of ShOA at the time of his retirement on December 31, 2011. (see, Petition, ¶ 2)

Mr. Stasko avers: "In total, I was employed as a uniformed officer for 23 years." (Ex D, Petition, Stasko Affidavit, ¶ 2)

Mr. Stakso further avers: "In 2011 I purchased (sic) two years of my prior military service to have those two years deemed 'creditable service' so that I could retire with my full pension with 25 total years of 'creditable service.' " (Ex D, Petition, Stasko Affidavit, ¶ 3)

Mr. Stasko further avers: "I am presently receiving my full pension benefits with 25 years of 'creditable service' [and am] 51 years old." (Ex D, Petition, Stasko Affidavit, ¶¶ 4 -5)

By correspondence dated March 15, 2012 and directed to Mr. Stasko, the Office of the Nassau County Comptroller, a co-respondent herein, through its Assistant Director of Payroll and Benefits advised, in pertinent part, as follows: "We received your application for early retirement under the 25-Year Special Retirement Plan for Nassau County. We performed a review of your employment records, and concluded that you did not fulfill the service-years requirement to retire under this plan. We verified this with the State and received confirmation that you are not eligible to retire now because Nassau County requires you to have 25 years of service in a correctional officer title, and does not recognize service in other titles or military service for health insurance purposes. Please note that while some services may qualify as creditable service for pension retirement purposes, they do not always qualify for health benefit retirement.

"However, based on your length of employment (23 years) you are eligible to vest until you reach the age of 55 ... To keep this right you must enroll as a vestee and maintaincontinuous enrollment until you are 55 years; otherwise you will permanently lose your right to retire with health benefits.

"Please submit payment of $4,688.40 for the period beginning February 1, 2012 thru April 30, 2012 ... If we do not receive your payment by March 30,2012 your coverage will be cancelled retroactively to February 1, 2012 . . . ." (Ex G, Petition [emphasis supplied])

It is asserted that the deadline for payment was extended to April 13, 2012. (see, Petition, ¶ 24; see also, Ex I, Petition, Jaronczyk Affidavit, ¶ 15)

By Order of this Court dated April 12, 2012, the Respondents, pending hearing and determination of the instant application, were "enjoined from stopping County paid medical health insurance contributions... on behalf of retired corrections officers, including Michael Stasko," and, through this proceeding, the Petitioners seek to extend such provisional relief through disposition of a corresponding contract grievance in an arbitral forum.

"A court evaluating a motion for a preliminary injunction must be mindful that '[t]he purpose of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo, not to determine the ultimate rights of the parties' (Matter of Wheaton/TMW Fourth Ave., LP v. New York City Dept. of Bldgs., 65 A.D.3d 1051, 1052, 886 N.Y.S.2d 41 (2d Dept., 2009); see Coinmach Corp. v. Alley Pond Owners Corp., 25 A.D.3d 642, 643, 808 N.Y.S.2d 418 [2d Dept., 2006])." (Masjid Usman, Inc. v. Beech 140, LLC, 68 A.D.3d 942,942 - 943, 892 N.Y.S.2d 430 [2d Dept., 2009]).

"Although the purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending a trial, the remedy is considered a drastic one, which should be used sparingly (see McLaughlin, Piven, Vogel v. Nolan & Co., 114 A.D.2d 165, 172, 498 N.Y.S.2d 146 [2d Dept., 1986]). As a general rule, the decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction lies within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court (see Doe v. Axelrod, 73 N.Y.2d 748, 750, 532 N.E.2d 1272, 536 N. Y.S.2d 44 [1988]). In exercising that discretion, the Supreme Court must determine if the moving party has established: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction, and (3) a balance of the equities in favor of the injunction (see Aetna Ins. Co. v. Capasso, 75 N.Y.2d 860, 862, 552 N.E.2d 166, 552 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1990); W.T. Grant Co. v. Srogi, 52 N.Y.2d 496, 517, 420 N.E.2d 953, 438 N.Y.S.2d 761 (1981); Apa Sec, Inc. v. Apa, 37 A.D.3d 502, 503, 831 N.Y.S.2d 201 (2d Dept., 2007); Matter of Merscorp, Inc. v. Romaine, 295 A.D.2d 431, 432, 743 N.Y.S.2d 562 (2d Dept., 2002); Albini v. Solork Assoc., 37 A.D.2d 835, 326 N.Y.S.2d 150 [2d Dept., 1971])." (Trump on the Ocean, LLC v. Ash, 81 A.D.3d 713, 715, 916 N.Y.S.2d 177 (2d Dept., 2011), Iv dismissed 17 N.Y.3d 875, 956 N.E.2d 1270, 932 N.Y.S.2d 425 [2011]).

"[PJursuant to CPLR § 7502(c), the Supreme Court may grant a preliminary injunction ' in connection with an arbitration that is pending or that is to be commenced inside or outside this state,' but such relief may be granted 'only upon the ground that the [arbitration] award to which the applicant may be entitled may be rendered ineffectual without such provisional relief (CPLR § 7502 [c]). A party seeking relief under this provision must also make a showing of the traditional equitable criteria for the granting of temporary relief under CPLR article 63 (see Matter of K.W.F. Realty Corp. v. Kaufman, 16 A.D.3d 688, 689-690, 793 N.Y.S.2d 67 [2d Dept., 2005])." (Winter v. Brown, 49 A.D.3d 526, 528 - 529,853 N.Y.S.2d 361 (2d Dept., 2008) [emphasis supplied]; see also, Alexander, Supplemental Practice Commentaries, Mc Kinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y, Book 7B, § 7502:6)

In this Court's view, application of the governing legal principles to the facts presented in the Record supports the issuance of preliminary injunctive relief.

"A grievance may be submitted to arbitration only where the parties agree to arbitrate that kind of dispute, and where it is lawful for them to do so. In determining whether a grievance is arbitrable, we therefore follow the two-part test enunciated in Matter of Acting Supt. of Schools of Liverpool Cent. School Dist. (United Liverpool Faculty Ass'n.), 42 N.Y.2d 509,369 N.E.2d 746,399 N.Y.S.2d 189 (1997) (Liverpool) and Matter of Board of Educ. of Watertown City School Dist. (Watertown Educ. Ass'n), 93 N.Y.2d 132, 143, 710 N.E.2d 1064, 688 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1999) [Watertown]). We first ask whether there is any statutory, constitutional or public policy prohibition against arbitration of the grievance (see Liverpool, 42 N.Y.2d at 513). This is the 'may-they-arbitrate' prong. If there is no prohibition against arbitrating, we then examine the CBA to determine if the parties have agreed to arbitrate the dispute at issue (see Watertown, 93 N.Y.2d at 140; Liverpool, 42 N.Y.2d at 513-514). This is the 'did-they-agree-to-arbitrate' prong" (Matter of City of Johnstown (Johnstown Police Benevolent Ass'n), 99 N.Y.2d 273, 278, 784 N.E.2d 1158, 755 N.Y.S.2d 49 [2002]).

Lacking a statutory, constitutional or public policy argument against the grievance's submission to arbitration, the Court's focus narrows to the scope of the parties' agreement. (see, Matter of Village of Horseheads (Horseheads Police Benevolent Assn., Inc.), 94 A. D.3d 1191, 941 N.Y.S.2d 785 [3d Dept., 2012]).

The controlling aspects of the parties' agreements provide for binding arbitration of any unresolved grievance arising thereunder which implicates the meaning, interpretation or application of its substantive provisions, (see, Ex A, Petition, CBA, §§ 2-4; 20; see also, Ex B, Petition, MOA § 33) "Where, as here, there is a broad arbitration clause and a 'reasonable relationship' between the subject matter of the dispute and the general subject matter of the parties' collective bargaining agreement, the court 'should rule the matter arbitrable, and the arbitrator will then make a more exacting interpretation of the precise scope of the substantive provisions of the [collective bargaining...