Sherrod v. Webber (Ex parte Webber)
Decision Date | 27 June 2014 |
Docket Number | 1121443. |
Citation | 157 So.3d 887 |
Parties | Ex parte Larry WEBBER. (In re Donald Sherrod et al. v. Larry Webber). |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Kori L. Clement of Hare & Clement, P.C., Hoover, for petitioner.
William J. Donald III of Donald, Randall & Donald, Tuscaloosa; and Albert G. Lewis III of Lewis, Smyth, Winter & Ford, Tuscaloosa, for respondents.
Larry Webber petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Pickens Circuit Court to vacate its August 19, 2013, order denying Webber's motion to dismiss an action filed against him by Donald Sherrod, Helen Sherrod, and State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (“State Farm”). We grant the petition.
In June 2011, the Sherrods hired Webber to paint the interior of their house. The Sherrods and State Farm allege that Webber and his employees did not cover objects in the house before painting and that overspraying damaged the walls, floors, countertops, fixtures, appliances, and a number of items of personal property in the house.
On July 12, 2011, Donald Sherrod sued Webber in the small-claims court in Pickens County (“the small-claims-court action”). It is undisputed that Sherrod's wife Helen was not a party to the small-claims-court action. The complaint alleged that Webber owed Sherrod $3,000 because the “[p]ainting on the inside of my home was not completed [and the] overspray paint all over the inside of the house” had caused damage.
Following a bench trial, the district court—the small-claims court—entered an order on November 8, 2011, which recounted that the complaint alleged that “the painting on the inside of [the Sherrods'] home was not completed, and that [Webber] oversprayed paint such that the inside of the house and other items were damaged and had to be cleaned.” The district court concluded that Donald Sherrod “is entitled to recover from [Webber] for the damage caused to his home due to overspraying of paint in the amount of $3,000, plus cost in the amount of $136.09.”
Webber paid the judgment amount of $3,136.09 on November 21, 2011, and the district court entered an order acknowledging satisfaction of the judgment on November 28, 2011.1
In an affidavit filed in the present action, Helen Sherrod stated in part that In their response to Webber's motion to dismiss this action, the Sherrods and State Farm stated that, “[i]n December 2011, after investigating the Sherrods' claim, State Farm paid $41,996.19 to the Sherrods.” In her affidavit, Helen Sherrod stated that State Farm's payment was 2
On March 25, 2013, the Sherrods and State Farm filed an action in the Pickens Circuit Court against Webber (“the circuit-court action”). The complaint in the circuit-court action stated:
On May 24, 2013, Webber filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata and the prohibition against double recovery. On June 14, 2013, the Sherrods filed a response to the motion to dismiss in which they argued that Helen Sherrod owned an undivided one-half interest in the personal property in the Sherrods' residence, that she was not a party to the small-claims-court action, and that she did not recover anything herself in that action. On June 21, 2013, the Sherrods and State Farm filed a second response to the motion to dismiss in which they argued that Helen Sherrod and State Farm were not parties to the small-claims-court action, that there was not “substantial identity of the parties” between the two actions, and that the small-claims court was not a court of competent jurisdiction, for purposes of res judicata. On June 25, 2013, Webber filed a reply to the the Sherrods and State Farm's response to his motion to dismiss. In that reply, Webber noted that, as a subrogee, State Farm “steps into the shoes of its subrogor and that [a] subrogee only gets those rights that its subrogor has.” On June 27, 2013, the Sherrods and State Farm filed a “Supplemental Response” to the motion to dismiss in which they argued that Webber's motion was procedurally flawed because, they said, he should have raised the defenses of res judicata and double recovery in a motion for a summary judgment rather than in a motion to dismiss.
On August 19, 2013, the circuit court entered an order denying the motion to dismiss without explaining its reasons. This petition followed.
In Lloyd Noland Foundation, Inc. v. HealthSouth Corp., 979 So.2d 784, 792 (Ala.2007), we observed:
In this case, the complaint did not acknowledge the existence and nature of the judgment that resulted from the small-claims-court action. Instead, Webber submitted a copy of that judgment with his motion to dismiss. The circuit court was due to consider that attachment, thus effectively converting Webber's motion to dismiss to a motion for a summary judgment. See, e.g., Graveman v. Wind Drift Owners' Ass'n, Inc., 607 So.2d 199, 202 (Ala.1992) ( ).
A petition for a writ of mandamus is an appropriate method by which to seek this Court's review of the denial of a motion to dismiss or for a summary judgment predicated on the doctrine of res judicata. Ex parte LCS Inc., 12 So.3d 55, 56 (Ala.2008) (citing Ex parte Sears, Roebuck & Co., 895 So.2d 265 (Ala.2004) ). See also Ex parte Jefferson Cnty., 656 So.2d 382 (Ala.1995).
Ex parte Cupps, 782 So.2d 772, 774–75 (Ala.2000) (quoting Ex parte Edgar, 543 So.2d 682, 684 (Ala.1989) ).
Our standard of review for a ruling on a motion for a summary judgment is as follows:
Smith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 952 So.2d 342, 346 (Ala.2006).
Webber's primary argument is that the circuit-court action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
Greene v. Jefferson Cnty. Comm'n, 13 So.3d 901, 910 (Ala.2008) (emphasis added). “ ‘If those four elements are present, then any claim that was, or that could have been, adjudicated in the prior action is barred from further litigation.’ ” Ex parte LCS Inc., 12 So.3d at 57–58 (quoting Equity Res. Mgmt., Inc. v. Vinson, 723 So.2d 634, 636 (Ala.1998) ).
“ ‘ “Res judicata is a broad, judicially developed...
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