Shinabargar v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of D.C.

Decision Date01 February 2016
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 15-330 (BAH)
Citation164 F.Supp.3d 1
Parties Nancy Shinabargar, Plaintiff, v. Board of Trustees of the University of the District of Columbia, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

Nancy Shinabargar, Reno, NV, pro se.

Anessa Abrams, Gary L. Lieber, Ford & Harrison, LLP, Washington, DC, Yoora Pak, Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker, LLP, McLean, VA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BERYL A. HOWELL, United States District Judge

The plaintiff, Nancy Shinabargar, proceeding pro se , brings this lawsuit against the Board of Trustees of the University of the District of Columbia (UDC), where the plaintiff formerly attended law school, and ten UDC employees, including the Dean and Associate Dean of the Law School, five professors, the Director of Public Safety, who also serves as the Campus Police Chief (“Director of Public Safety”), and the Assistant to the Vice President for Student Affairs, to challenge her suspension from the school. First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶¶ 9–19, ECF No. 12.1 The gravamen of the plaintiff's complaint is that she was suspended in retaliation for both her repeated reports of plagiarism by professors and other law students and for her repeated requests for accommodations for her alleged disabilities, see FAC ¶¶ 149–203, contrary to the stated explanations for her suspension, after three hearings, that the plaintiff engaged in threatening and otherwise inappropriate conduct, id. ¶¶ 150, 153. The defendants have moved to dismiss this case, see Defs.' Mot. Dismiss (“Defs.' Mot.”), ECF No. 52, and, for the reasons set forth below, this motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

At the outset, the Court notes that the record on this motion to dismiss is extensive. The plaintiff's First Amended Complaint references numerous documents, 57 pages of which are attached as exhibits to her pleading. See generally FAC. The defendants' moving papers include 35 additional pages of documentation referenced in the plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, see Defs.' Mot., Exs. A–F, ECF No. 52-1,2 and the plaintiff, in opposition to the defendants' motion, submitted over 200 pages of further documentation as exhibits, see Pl.'s Opp'n Defs.' Mot. Dismiss (“Pl.'s Opp'n”), Exs. 1–35, ECF No. 54-1. In resolving the pending motion, the exhibits referenced in and attached to the plaintiff's First Amended Complaint are considered. Mpoy v. Rhee , 758 F.3d 285, 291 n. 1 (D.C.Cir.2014) (“ ‘In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, we may consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of which we may take judicial notice.’ ” (quoting EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch. , 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C.Cir.1997) )). In addition, because the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, any additional exhibits, “including those in [ ] opposition to [ ] [defendants'] motion to dismiss,” must be considered in construing the sufficiency of the plaintiff's claims. Brown v. Whole Foods Market Grp., Inc. , 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C.Cir.2015) (reversing dismissal order where district court did not consider “the facts alleged in all of [the plaintiff's] pleadings” (emphasis in the original)). The relevant facts distilled from this ample record are summarized below.

The plaintiff matriculated at the University of District of Columbia's David A. Clarke School of Law (“UDC Law School”) on August 15, 2011, and completed only one semester, before her suspension on February 9, 2012. FAC ¶¶ 69, 101; Pl.'s Opp'n at 5. During her brief tenure at the law school, she made repeated complaints of purported acts of plagiarism, starting as early as only several days after classes began.3 In total, the plaintiff made at least fourteen reports of plagiarism to UDC officials, FAC ¶ 22, and several more to various government officials, including a United States Senator, the Secretary of Education, and the Director of the FBI, Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 19 (Pl.'s Letter to Sen. Reid, dated Sept. 10, 2011) at 101, ECF No. 54-1; Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 19 (Pl.'s Letter to Sen. Reid, dated Feb. 6, 2012) at 98, ECF No. 54-1; FAC, Ex. C (Pl.'s Letter to the Secretary of Education, dated Sept. 4, 2013) at 67, ECF No. 12; Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 17 (Pl.'s Letter to Director of FBI, dated Dec. 8, 2011), ECF No. 54-1.

By the time of her suspension, the plaintiff, who suffers from spinal disorder and lymphangioma in her foot, also made numerous requests for reasonable accommodations to help her in “managing her 80-85 pound daily Law Book load,” since her conditions affected her mobility and her ability to lift weight. FAC ¶¶ 5, 138. In October 2011, the plaintiff obtained, through a lottery, a book locker, Pl.'s Opp'n at 5, but she complained, that this locker was inadequate because it was located “outside of Defendant University Law School's Steam Room where the nightly steam damaged [her] expensive law books if ... left ... overnight,” FAC ¶ 139. Unsatisfied with the accommodation she received, the plaintiff requested for herself, and on behalf of “similarly situated students at the Law School,” lockers in another location to prevent steam damage to her books. Id. Additionally, the plaintiff, who does not allege that her accessibility to classrooms and libraries was in any way limited, requested, as a reasonable accommodation, that the school turn a room into a private “study carrel area for ADA students,” accessible “by means of a card-reading pass key lock,” and better seating assignments for students with mobility devices. Id. Ultimately, the plaintiff alleges she made “28 explicit requests for ADA reasonable accommodation from Defendant Board,” including requests she made to a United States Senator, an Ombudsman for the United States Department of Education, the Equal Opportunity, ADA and Title IX Coordinator at UDC, and the Secretary of Education. Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 1 (“List of 28 ADA Requests”) at 2, 8 ECF No. 54-1. The plaintiff claims that UDC rejected these requests for accommodations. FAC ¶ 139.

On February 8, 2011, during the plaintiff's second semester at UDC Law School, the plaintiff received an email notice from the Assistant to the Vice President for Student Affairs about “an incident report,” accusing her of violating the UDC Code of Student Conduct, and directing her to “appear for a ... hearing ... on Wednesday, February 15, 2012.” Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 21 (“Notice of Disciplinary Hearing, dated Feb. 8, 2012) at 114–15, ECF No. 54-1. The Notice accused the plaintiff of the following inappropriate conduct: (1) “using lewd, threatening, and racially insensitive remarks towards another UDC Law School Student,” on February 4, 2012; (2) making “false remarks/statements (rumors) about another UDC Law School student to [sic] where [she] made claims and speculated that the student was addicted to drugs and looked ‘strung out,’ and “spreading rumors ... that this same student ... is the victim of spousal abuse,” on February 7, 2012; and (3) being “verbally abusive and accused another UDC Law School student of stealing [her] Civ Pro notes,” on February 8, 2012. Id. at 114. The Notice advised the plaintiff of her “right to bring to this hearing any information, evidence, witnesses, or an advisor.” Id. at 115.

The next day, on February 9, 2012, the plaintiff alleges she met with the Associate Dean of Students to discuss, among other things, an FBI report the plaintiff made regarding a potential security threat near the White House. Pl.'s Letter to the Secretary of Education, dated Sept. 4, 2013 at 71. The Associate Dean, however, understood the plaintiff's statements during the conversation to represent a threat upon the life of the President of the United States, prompting the Associate Dean to email the Dean of the Law School to report the threat. Id. at 75. Later the same day, at around 1p.m., the Associate Dean appeared with “five UDC PD in tow, with guns and handcuffs,” FAC ¶ 62, and they led the plaintiff to a conference room “at gunpoint,” id. ¶ 63. The plaintiff alleges that two United States Secret Service Agents then arrived to interrogate the plaintiff for two hours regarding her “politics and about ‘assassinations.’ Id. ¶ 64. According to the plaintiff, the interrogation was fake and “staged” by the Associate Dean, as evidenced by the fact the “two ‘U.S. Secret Service Agents' did not seem to know [ ] Judge Pryor[,] a senior judge on the D.C. Court of Appeals, and a criminal law professor at UDC Law School. Pl.'s Letter to the Secretary of Education, dated Sept. 4, 2013 at 71.

After the interrogation, the plaintiff alleges five UDC campus policemen approached her as she was walking towards the library. FAC ¶ 68. One of the police officers pushed her “against the wall until Plaintiff fell to the ground,” id. at which point, the Assistant to the Vice President for Student Affairs “thrust” another letter notifying the plaintiff that she had been placed on “interim suspension,” id. ¶ 69, due to misconduct in the office of the Associate Dean earlier in the same day. The letter accused the plaintiff of “inappropriate behavior” in violation of, inter alia , a section of the UDC Code of Student Conduct section regarding “Terroristic Threats.” Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 25 (“Notice of Interim Suspension, dated Feb. 9, 2012) at 133, ECF No. 54-1. A disciplinary hearing was scheduled for February 14, 2012, to determine whether the plaintiff should remain suspended. Id. The letter, again, advised the plaintiff that she had “the right to bring to this hearing any information, evidence, witnesses, or an advisor.” Id. at 134.

On February 14, 2012, the plaintiff attended the scheduled disciplinary hearing, where she “denied all of the terms and contents ascribing wrongdoing to her in the University's official notices.” FAC ¶¶ 72, 80, 85. During the hearing, the plaintiff alleges that (1) no evidence or a list of witnesses” were provided; (2) no fact-finding process...

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