Shinn v. Shinn
| Decision Date | 23 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | 20-1009 |
| Citation | 142 S.Ct. 1718 |
| Parties | David SHINN, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation and Reentry, Petitioner v. David Martinez RAMIREZ David Shinn, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation and Reentry, et al., Petitioners v. Barry Lee Jones |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Jon M. Sands, Federal Public Defender District of Arizona, Dale A. Baich, Timothy M. Gabrielsen, Cary Sandman, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, Tucson, AZ, for Respondents.
Robert M. Loeb, Counsel of Record, Thomas M. Bondy, Paul David Meyer, Geoffrey C. Shaw, Monica Haymond, Sarah H. Sloan, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Washington, DC, for Respondents.
Mark Brnovich, Attorney General, Joseph A. Kanefield, Chief Deputy and Chief of Staff, Brunn W. Roysden III, Solicitor General, Lacey Stover Gard, Chief Counsel, Counsel of Record, Laura P. Chiasson, Ginger Jarvis, William Scott Simon, Jeffrey L. Sparks, Assistant Attorneys General, Office of the Arizona Attorney General, Capital Litigation Section, Tucson, AZ, for Petitioners.
A federal habeas court generally may consider a state prisoner's federal claim only if he has first presented that claim to the state court in accordance with state procedures. When the prisoner has failed to do so, and the state court would dismiss the claim on that basis, the claim is "procedurally defaulted." To overcome procedural default, the prisoner must demonstrate "cause" to excuse the procedural defect and "actual prejudice" if the federal court were to decline to hear his claim. Coleman v. Thompson , 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). In Martinez v. Ryan , 566 U.S. 1, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012), this Court explained that ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel is "cause" to forgive procedural default of an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, but only if the State required the prisoner to raise that claim for the first time during state postconviction proceedings.
Often, a prisoner with a defaulted claim will ask a federal habeas court not only to consider his claim but also to permit him to introduce new evidence to support it. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the standard to expand the state-court record is a stringent one. If a prisoner has "failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings," a federal court "shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim" unless the prisoner satisfies one of two narrow exceptions, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A), and demonstrates that the new evidence will establish his innocence "by clear and convincing evidence," § 2254(e)(2)(B). In all but these extraordinary cases, AEDPA "bars evidentiary hearings in federal habeas proceedings initiated by state prisoners." McQuiggin v. Perkins , 569 U.S. 383, 395, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 185 L.Ed.2d 1019 (2013).
The question presented is whether the equitable rule announced in Martinez permits a federal court to dispense with § 2254(e)(2) ’s narrow limits because a prisoner's state postconviction counsel negligently failed to develop the state-court record. We conclude that it does not.
In this case, we address two petitions brought by the State of Arizona. See Ramirez v. Ryan , 937 F.3d 1230 (C.A.9 2019) ; Jones v. Shinn , 943 F.3d 1211 (C.A.9 2019).
On May 25, 1989, David Ramirez fatally stabbed his girlfriend, Mary Ann Gortarez, and her 15-year-old daughter, Candie, in their home. 937 F.3d at 1234–1235 ; State v. Ramirez , 178 Ariz. 116, 119, 121, 871 P.2d 237, 240, 242 (1994). Ramirez stabbed Mary Ann 18 times in the neck with a pair of scissors, and Candie 15 times in the neck with a box cutter. Id ., at 121, 871 P.2d at 242. Police also found physical evidence that Ramirez had raped Candie, and Ramirez later admitted that he had sex with the child on the night of the murders and four times before. Ibid. A jury convicted Ramirez of two counts of premeditated firstdegree murder. Ibid. The trial court sentenced Ramirez to death, ibid ., and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed on direct review, id. , at 132, 871 P.2d at 253.
Ramirez then filed his first petition for state postconviction relief. That petition raised myriad claims, but it did not raise the one at issue here: that Ramirez's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for "failing to conduct a complete mitigation investigation" or "obtai[n] and present available mitigation evidence at sentencing." App. 402. Ramirez did not raise this ineffective-assistance claim until he subsequently filed a successive state habeas petition, which the state court summarily denied as untimely under Arizona law. See ibid.
Ramirez also petitioned the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. As relevant here, the District Court held that Ramirez had procedurally defaulted his ineffective-assistance claim by failing to raise it before the Arizona courts in a timely fashion. See App. 402–403. Ramirez responded that the District Court should forgive the procedural default because his state postconviction counsel was himself ineffective for failing to raise the trial-ineffective-assistance claim and develop the facts to support it.
The District Court permitted Ramirez to file several declarations and other evidence not presented to the state court to support his request to excuse his procedural default. See 937 F.3d at 1238. Assessing the new evidence, the District Court excused the procedural default but rejected Ramirez's ineffective-assistance claim on the merits. See id. , at 1240.
The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. Like the District Court, it held that Ramirez's state postconviction counsel's failure to raise and develop the trial-ineffective-assistance claim was cause to forgive the procedural default. See id. , at 1247–1248. The Ninth Circuit also held that Ramirez's underlying trial-ineffective-assistance claim was substantial, and that Ramirez therefore had suffered prejudice. See id. , at 1243–1247. But, unlike the District Court, the Court of Appeals declined to decide the merits of Ramirez's claim. The court remanded the case for further factfinding because, in its view, Ramirez was "entitled to evidentiary development to litigate the merits of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim." Id. , at 1248.
Arizona petitioned for rehearing en banc, arguing that the Ninth Circuit's remand for additional evidentiary development violated 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). The Ninth Circuit denied rehearing over an eight-judge dissent by Judge Collins. See 971 F.3d 1116 (2020).
On May 1, 1994, Barry Lee Jones repeatedly beat his girlfriend's 4-year-old daughter, Rachel Gray. See 943 F.3d at 1215–1216 ; State v. Jones , 188 Ariz. 388, 391, 937 P.2d 310, 313 (1997). One blow to Rachel's abdomen ruptured her small intestine
. See id. , at 391, 937 P.2d at 313. She also sustained several injuries to her vagina and labia consistent with sexual assault. Ibid. Early the next morning, Jones drove Rachel to the hospital, where she was pronounced dead on arrival. See ibid. Rachel died of peritonitis —"an infection of the lining of the abdomen caused by a ruptured intestine." Ibid. A jury convicted Jones of sexual assault, three counts of child abuse, and felony murder. Ibid. The trial judge sentenced Jones to death, ibid. , and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed on direct review, see id. , at 401, 937 P.2d at 323.
Jones then petitioned for state postconviction relief. He alleged ineffective assistance by his trial counsel, but not the specific trial-ineffective-assistance claim at issue here: that his counsel "fail[ed] to conduct sufficient trial investigation." 943 F.3d at 1218. The Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied relief. See ibid.
Jones next filed a habeas petition in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. The District Court held that Jones' trial-ineffective-assistance claim was procedurally defaulted, so Jones, like Ramirez, invoked his postconviction counsel's ineffective assistance as grounds to forgive the default. Ibid. To bolster his case for cause and prejudice, Jones also moved to supplement the undeveloped state-court record. Ibid. The District Court held a 7-day evidentiary hearing with more than 10 witnesses and ultimately decided to forgive Jones' procedural default. See id. , at 1219, 1225–1226. The court then relied on the new evidence from the cause-and-prejudice hearing to hold, on the merits, that Jones' trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance. See id. , at 1219.
Arizona appealed, arguing that § 2254(e)(2) did not permit the evidentiary hearing. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that § 2254(e)(2) did not apply because Jones' state postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to develop the state-court record for Jones' trial-ineffective-assistance claim. See id. , at 1220–1222.
As in Ramirez , Arizona petitioned for rehearing en banc. And, also as in Ramirez , the Ninth Circuit denied Arizona's petition over the dissent of Judge Collins, joined by seven other judges. Jones v. Shinn , 971 F.3d 1133 (2020).
As noted above, Arizona petitioned for a writ of certiorari in both Ramirez and Jones . The State maintains that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) does not permit a federal court to order evidentiary development simply because postconviction counsel is alleged to have negligently failed to develop the state-court record. Respondents do not dispute, and therefore concede, that their habeas petitions fail on the state-court record alone. We granted certiorari, 593 U.S. ––––, 141 S.Ct. 2620, 209 L.Ed.2d 748 (2021).1
A state prisoner may request that a federal court order his release by petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The writ may issue "only on the ground that [the prisoner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution...
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