State v. Jones
| Decision Date | 29 April 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. CR-95-0342-AP,CR-95-0342-AP |
| Citation | 188 Ariz. 388,937 P.2d 310 |
| Parties | , 242 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 35 STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Barry Lee JONES, Appellant. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Defendant lived in a trailer park in Tucson. At the time of the murder, he had shared his trailer with Angela Gray and her three children for about three months. Defendant's daughter also lived with them. The victim in this case was Gray's youngest child, Rachel, who was four years old. On the day preceding her death, Rachel was hit many times. One blow to her abdomen was so severe that it ruptured her small intestine. Rachel also received injuries to her labia and vagina with no associated injuries to her thighs or buttocks, indicating that she had been sexually assaulted. The injuries to Rachel's genitals were contemporaneous with her other physical injuries.
The following evidence linked defendant to Rachel's injuries: on the day Rachel received her injuries, defendant left his trailer three times with Rachel in his van; two children saw defendant hitting her while he drove; defendant stopped at a Quik-Mart to get ice for Rachel's head injury; and police found traces of Rachel's blood type on defendant's clothing and in his van.
Rachel was very ill between the time of the injuries and her death--vomiting, crying, and looking very pale. During the evening, a friend and her son came to defendant's trailer. While they were there, the friend's son noticed Rachel's condition and asked defendant about it. Defendant falsely stated that he had taken Rachel to the fire department, and that the paramedics had examined her and had said she was all right. By the time defendant and Gray took Rachel to the hospital the following morning, she was already dead of peritonitis--an infection of the lining of the abdomen caused by a ruptured intestine.
Defendant was charged with one count of sexual assault (count one), three counts of child abuse (counts two, three, and four), and felony murder (count five). The trial judge instructed the jurors that two of the child abuse charges and the sexual assault charge could be predicate felonies for the felony murder charge. The trial judge further instructed the jurors that the child abuse charges could only be predicate felonies if defendant committed them intentionally or knowingly under circumstances likely to produce death or serious physical injury.
Defendant was convicted on all counts. The jurors further found that the child abuse charges that qualified as predicate felonies for felony murder were committed under circumstances likely to cause serious physical injury or death and that defendant's mental state was intentional or knowing.
At the aggravation/mitigation hearing on the murder count, the trial judge found two aggravating factors: A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6) (especially cruel), and A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(9) (). The judge found no statutory or non-statutory mitigating factors. Therefore, defendant was sentenced to death for the murder count and to terms of years for the other counts. Appeal is automatic. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.2(b). We have jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. (A.R.S.) §§ 13-4031 and 13-4033 and Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 5(3). We affirm defendant's convictions and sentences.
I. Whether Defendant Was Properly Convicted of Child Abuse (Count Four).
II. Whether Child Abuse (Count Four) Was Properly Used as a Predicate Felony for Felony Murder.
III. Whether the Trial Court Erred by Refusing Evidence That Angela Gray Had Previously Hit One of Her Other Children.
IV. Whether the Court Erred in Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress
the Evidence Found in His Trailer.
V. Whether the Evidence Was Sufficient to Support a Guilty Verdict on the Sexual Assault Charge.
VI. Whether Sexual Assault Was Properly Used as a Predicate Felony for Felony Murder.
VII. Whether the Prosecutor Committed Misconduct by Referring to a Photograph That Was Not Admitted Into Evidence.
SENTENCING ISSUES
I. Whether the Death Penalty May Be Imposed When the Court Does Not Know Which Predicate Felony the Jury Used in Finding Felony Murder.
II. Whether the Enmund-Tison Finding Was Proper.
III. Whether the Aggravating Factors, Weighed Against the Proffered Mitigation, Support the Death Penalty.
I. Whether Defendant Was Properly Convicted of Child Abuse (Count Four).
A person is guilty of child abuse under A.R.S. § 13-3623(B) if, while having "care or custody of [a] child," the person causes or permits the health of a child to be injured or causes or permits the child "to be placed in a situation where its person or health is endangered." 1 Defendant's challenge to his conviction for child abuse revolves around the statutory words "care or custody" and particularly the word "care." He claims that he did not have "care" of Rachel within the meaning of section 13-3623(B) and, therefore, could not be convicted of child abuse. See A.R.S. § 13-3623(B). On these grounds, defendant urged a Rule 20 motion for judgment of acquittal on Count Four, which the trial court denied.
Neither "care" nor "custody" is defined in A.R.S. § 13-3623. When a term is not defined in a statute, the court looks first to the statute's language to determine the legislative intent, as the language is the "best and most reliable index of a statute's meaning." State v. Williams, 175 Ariz. 98, 100, 854 P.2d 131, 133 (1993) (quoting Janson v. Christensen, 167 Ariz. 470, 471, 808 P.2d 1222, 1223 (1991)). A statute is to be "construed according to the fair meaning of [its] terms to promote justice and effect the objects of the law." A.R.S. § 13-104. If the language of the statute is plain, the court looks no further. Williams, 175 Ariz. at 100, 854 P.2d at 133. We assume that the legislature accords words their natural and obvious meanings unless otherwise stated. State v. Johnson, 171 Ariz. 39, 41, 827 P.2d 1134, 1136 (1992). A dictionary may define a word's natural and obvious meaning. State v. Bews, 177 Ariz. 334, 336, 868 P.2d 347, 349 (App.1993).
"Care" is defined in Webster's Third New International Dictionary as "charge, supervision, management: responsibility for or attention to safety and well-being." The example given is "under a doctor's care." "Care" is also defined as "custody" or "temporary charge." "Charge" is defined as "care, custody" and "management, supervision." "Custody" is defined as "protection, care, maintenance, and tuition." Webster's New Int'l. Dict. (3d ed. 1976). Therefore, both "custody" and "care," as they relate to A.R.S. § 13-3623, imply accepting responsibility for a child in some manner.
Defendant urges us to adopt a definition of "care" that he asserts was adopted by the court of appeals in State v. Swanson, 184 Ariz. 194, 908 P.2d 8 (App. 1995). Although we agree with the result in Swanson, we do not agree with all of its reasoning. In Swanson, defendant was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol. Id. at 195, 908 P.2d at 9. Because he had two children as passengers, he was also convicted of two counts of negligent child abuse. Id.; A.R.S. § 13-3623(C). On appeal, the defendant argued that he should have been acquitted of the child abuse charges. The Swanson court agreed, finding that the defendant did not have "care" of the children within the meaning of the child abuse statute. Id. In doing so, the court of appeals first referred to a statutory definition of "custody" found in A.R.S. § 8-101(5):
"Custody" means a status embodying all of the following rights and responsibilities:
(a) The right to have the physical possession of the child.
(b) The right and the duty to protect, train and discipline the child.
(c) The responsibility to provide the child with food, shelter, education and ordinary medical care, and the authority to consent to surgery or other extraordinary medical care in an emergency.
A.R.S. § 8-101(5); see Swanson, 184 Ariz. at 195-96, 908 P.2d at 9-10. This definition of "custody" is taken from the article of the code relating to adoptions, and its application is expressly limited to that article. A.R.S. § 8-101. Nothing indicates that the legislature intended this definition to relate to the child abuse statute, and we can think of no reason why the legislature would intend any such connection. See A.R.S. § 8-101(5).
Having referred to the adoption code's definition of "custody," the court of appeals then went on in Swanson to hold that the defendant did not have "care" of his two passengers necessary to bring him within the child abuse statute. Swanson, 184 Ariz. at 196, 908 P.2d at 10. The court stated that the word "care" "implies more than the general duty of care owed to anyone who may be injured by one's negligence." Id. We agree with this finding in Swanson. The general duty of "care" in negligence cases, properly rejected by the Swanson court, has no application in a criminal case. Under A.R.S. § 13-3623, a defendant must, at the very least, be criminally negligent before he can be convicted, although one might incur civil liability under a lesser standard. Under the facts of Swanson, we have no quarrel with the result because no evidence proved that defendant took responsibility for either child in any manner; he only allowed the children to ride in his car. That may have been sufficient to impose tort liability, but was not sufficient to prove criminal liability under the child abuse statute.
The court of appeals recently referred to Swanson in upholding a defendant's conviction for child abuse. State v....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Allen
... ... Lee , 243 Ariz. 46, 50 19, 401 P.3d 995, 999 (2017), rather care or custody "require[s] that the defendant accept responsibility for the child in some manner," State v. ( Barry L. ) Jones , 188 Ariz. 388, 394, 937 P.2d 310, 316 (1997). For example, substantial evidence revealed a defendant had care or custody of his girlfriend's child, who lived with him, because he acted as a caregiver to her and exercised control and responsibility over her when she was required to ask the ... ...
-
Shinn v. Shinn
... ... David Martinez RAMIREZ David Shinn, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation and Reentry, et al., Petitioners v. Barry Lee Jones No. 20-1009 Supreme Court of the United States. Argued December 8, 2021 Decided May 23, 2022 1 Jon M. Sands, Federal Public Defender District of ... Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. 142 S.Ct. 1727 A federal habeas court generally may consider a state prisoner's federal claim only if he has first presented that claim to the state court in accordance with state procedures. When the prisoner has 142 ... ...
-
State v. Payne
... ... This Court has similarly found the “care and custody” element of § 13–3623(A) to be an objective factual inquiry rather than an element for which mens rea must be proven. See State v. Jones, 188 Ariz. 388, 393–94, 937 P.2d 310, 315–16 (1997). ¶ 71 Moreover, the statute increases the offense level based on the actor's intent: If the offense is “done intentionally or knowingly,” it becomes a class 2 felony. A.R.S. § 13–3623(A)(1). It is a lesser offense if ... ...
-
State v. Kayer
... ... McMurdie, Chief Counsel Criminal Appeals Division, John Pressley Todd, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Attorneys for Appellee ... John M. Sears, Prescott, Attorney for Appellant ... OPINION ... JONES, Vice Chief Justice ... ¶ 1 A jury convicted defendant George Russell Kayer of first-degree murder for taking the life of Delbert L. Haas. The jury also convicted him of other felonies related to the killing. Because defendant was sentenced to death on the murder charge, direct ... ...
-
FELONY MURDER LIABILITY FOR HOMICIDES BY POLICE: TOO UNFAIR & TOO MUCH TO BEAR.
...acts had set in motion")). (179) The Arizona Supreme Court denied review on February 17, 1993. Id. at 478. (180) See State v. Jones, 937 P.2d 310, 319-21 (Ariz. 1997) (citing Lopez, 845 P.2d at 481, in support of affirming felony murder conviction on theory that defendant assaulted victim, ......