Shipman v. Vilsack
Decision Date | 12 March 2010 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 09-0567 (RWR). |
Parties | Deborah F. SHIPMAN, Plaintiff, v. Thomas James VILSACK, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Deborah F. Shipman, Temple Hills, MD, pro se.
Andrea McBarnette, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
In this action brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq., plaintiff claims that while employed at the Department of Agriculture, she was harassed and discriminated against because of her gender and age and was retaliated against because of her equal employment opportunity ("EEO") activity. Defendant moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule (b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or for summary judgment under Rule 56 Dkt. No. 8. Upon consideration of the parties' submissions and the entire record, defendant's motion will be granted.
Plaintiff had been employed with the Department since 1987 when, in 2005, she became a GS-7 Public Affairs Assistant in the Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration under the supervision of William Crutchfield. Def.'s Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is No Genuine Dispute ("Def.'s Facts") ¶ 1; Pl.'s Response to Statement of Material Facts Dkt. No. 11 ("Pl.'s Resp.") ¶ 1. "Beginning around 2005," defendant conducted a mandatory study "to `determine the overall feasibility of successfully competing activities with the private sector under an Office of Management and Budget A-76 cost comparison.'" Plaintiff's position was identified as "one that could be considered a candidate for competitive sourcing," Def.'s Facts ¶ 2, and was one of 25 positions "listed as appropriate for removal." Id. ¶ 3; Def.'s Reply Dkt. No. 15 at 4, n.1 ( ). In response to an agency reorganization in late 2005 unrelated to the A-76 study, Def.'s Facts ¶ 4, Crutchfield "asked all of his employees if they planned to retire or find other jobs." Def.'s Facts ¶ 7; see Pl.'s Resp. ¶ 3 ().
Def.'s Attachment Dkt. 8-8 (Report of Investigation ("ROI")). On February 13, 2009, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") affirmed the agency's ruling against plaintiff and notified her of her right to sue. Compl. Attachment. Plaintiff filed this action on March 26, 2009.
Defendant seeks dismissal of any unexhausted claims under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment ("Def.'s Mem.") at 4, n.1 ( ). "Because the exhaustion requirement under Title VII, though mandatory, is not jurisdictional," Douglas v. Donovan, 559 F.3d 549, 556 n. 4 (D.C.Cir. 2009), defendant's motion to dismiss will be considered under Rule 12(b)(6).
"Title VII requires that a person complaining of a violation file an administrative charge with the EEOC and allow the agency time to act on the charge." Park v. Howard University, 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C.Cir.1995). "A Title VII lawsuit following the EEOC charge is limited in scope to claims that are `like or reasonably related to the allegations of the charge and growing out of such allegations.'" Id. ( ). Plaintiff has not refuted that she did not exhaust certain claims and she has not provided any argument for equitable tolling.2 See Hewitt v. Rice, 560 F.Supp.2d 61, 64 (D.D.C.2008) () (citations omitted). Therefore, any unexhausted claims—i.e., those beyond the issue of "whether the agency subjected the Complainant to discriminatory harassment based on sex (female), age (54), and reprisal (prior EEO activity)," ROI at 1,—are dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). See Hairston v. Tapella, 664 F.Supp.2d 106, 110 (D.D.C.2009) ( )(quoting Hopkins v. Whipple, 630 F.Supp.2d 33, 40 (D.D.C.2009)) (other citations omitted).
Defendant argues that plaintiff has not stated a harassment claim under Title VII. Given the reliance on matters beyond the pleadings, this claim is analyzed under the standards for summary judgment. On a motion for summary judgment, "the inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is a need for a trial—whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Summary judgment may be granted only where "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2); see also Moore v. Hartman, 571 F.3d 62, 66 (D.C.Cir.2009). A material fact is one that is capable of affecting the outcome of the litigation. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A genuine issue is one where the "evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party," id., as opposed to evidence that "is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A court considering a motion for summary judgment must draw all "justifiable inferences" from the evidence in favor of the nonmovant. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The nonmoving party, however, must do more than simply "show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Rather, the nonmovant must "come forward with `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (emphasis omitted). In the end, "the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment ... against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
Title VII forbids employers from creating a workplace so abusive as to affect a "`term, condition, or privilege' of employment."3Davis v. Coastal Intern. Sec. Inc., 275 F.3d 1119, 1122 (D.C.Cir. 2002) (citation omitted); see Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 146, 124 S.Ct. 2342, 159 L.Ed.2d 204 (2004) ( ). To establish a prima facie case of a hostile work environment, a plaintiff must show that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment occurred because of her race or gender; (4) the harassment had the effect of unreasonably interfering with her work performance and creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment; and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment, but failed to take any action to prevent it. Roberson v. Snow, 404 F.Supp.2d 79, 96-97 (D.D.C.2005). "A hostile work environment exists when `the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.'" Id. at 97 n. 8 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998) ( ). Courts should consider all the circumstances, including the "`frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; and whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance.'" Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787-88, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, 114 S.Ct. 367). Not all abusive behavior creates a hostile work environment; the hostile work environment must be the result of discrimination based on a protected status. Roberson, 404 F.Supp.2d at 97.
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