Shoreham-Wading River Cent. School Dist. v. Town of Brookhaven, SHOREHAM-WADING

Decision Date11 March 1985
Docket NumberNo. 1,SHOREHAM-WADING,No. 2,1,2
Citation486 N.Y.S.2d 277,107 A.D.2d 219
Parties, 23 Ed. Law Rep. 985 RIVER CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Petitioner-Appellant-Respondent, v. TOWN OF BROOKHAVEN, et al., Respondents-Appellants. (Action) In the Matter of Rita RECH, et al., Petitioners-Respondents, v. Henrietta ACAMPORA, etc., et al., Respondents-Appellants. (Action)
CourtNew York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Lou Lewis and Jode Susan Millman, Poughkeepsie, for petitioner-appellant-respondent.

Allen I. Sak, Town Atty., Patchogue (Howard M. Bergson, East Setauket, of counsel), for respondents-appellants.

Block & Hamburger, Smithtown (Frederic Block, Smithtown, of counsel), for petitioners-respondents.

Before TITONE, J.P., and MANGANO, THOMPSON and RUBIN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

These consolidated appeals are from two judgments of Special Term construing Suffolk County Tax Act (SCTA) §§ 13 and 14 which govern the distribution of property tax moneys between the Town of Brookhaven and the school districts located within that town. In practical terms, we are asked to decide whether, under the SCTA, a shortage of real property tax revenues which is caused by a default in payment of taxes should be borne entirely by the school district in which the defaulting party's real property is situated, or whether such a shortage of moneys should be apportioned among all the school districts within the particular town. Special Term concluded that the full revenue shortage should be completely borne by the school district within which the defaulting taxpayer's real property is located. We come to a contrary determination and hold that the SCTA requires a fair apportionment of the shortage among all the school districts. Accordingly, we modify the judgments appealed from.

The facts upon which this controversy comes before us are relatively uncomplicated. The Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO) refused to pay its 1983-1984 property tax bill of some $52,000,000 assessed against its Shoreham Nuclear Power Generating Station which is situated entirely within the Shoreham-Wading River Central School District (Shoreham-Wading River). The Shoreham-Wading River District fixed its 1983-1984 tax levy, pursuant to SCTA § 8, at approximately $21,000,000. This figure was submitted to the County of Suffolk along with the tax levies of all the other school districts within the Town of Brookhaven, and on December 13, 1984, the county delivered a tax warrant to the town's Receiver of Taxes (F. Daniel Moloney). The Receiver then collected the taxes, and with the help of the Town Supervisor (Henrietta Acampora), allocated these revenues between the school districts as a group and the various other town expenses. The Town Supervisor distributed the school districts' portion of the tax moneys among the several school districts in a ratio proportional to each school's individual tax levy. By petitions dated February 13, 1984, and April 30, 1984, respectively, William Floyd Union Free School District (William Floyd) and Shoreham-Wading River challenged the propriety of these distributions and requested, inter alia, declaratory judgments as to the meaning of SCTA §§ 13 and 14. These provisions, insofar as they are relevant, read as follows:

"Sec. 13(a) TAX ROLL AND RECEIVER'S WARRANT. On or before the first day of December in each year or such date as may be designated by a resolution of the County Legislature, the County Legislature of the county shall cause to be annexed to the tax and assessment roll of each town a warrant under the seal of the county, signed by the presiding officer and clerk of the board, commanding the receiver of taxes of the town to whom the same shall be directed, to collect from the several persons and on the property named and described in the tax and assessment roll the several sums extended therein as taxes and assessments against the respective names and property, except taxes upon the shares of stock of banks and banking associations and further commanding him to pay over from time to time all moneys so collected, as follows:

"1. Within fifteen days after the delivery of the warrant to the supervisor of the town, in trust for the school districts therein, one-half of the amount of the tax levied for the purposes of the school districts of the town, or such part thereof as shall not, in the aggregate, exceed one-half of the total amount collected by said date.

"2. Within thirty days after such delivery, to the supervisor of the town, in trust for the school districts therein, the balance of the amount of the tax levied for the purposes of said school districts or such part thereof as shall not in the aggregate exceed one-half of the total amount collected by said date.

"3. Within the said first period of fifteen days and thereafter within the said second period of fifteen days, the remainder of the moneys then collected to the supervisor of the town on account of the moneys levied therein for the support of the highways and bridges, moneys to be expended by welfare officials for the support of needy persons, and moneys to defray any other town expenses or charges.

"4. After thirty days from the date of the delivery of the warrant, and at the expiration of each period of ten days thereafter, on account of the foregoing, to the officers above named, in proportion to the balance remaining unpaid, all moneys so collected until such balances are paid in full * * *

"Sec. 14. DISPOSITION OF SCHOOL MONEYS. Within three days after the receipt by the supervisor of the several amounts above directed to be paid to him in trust for the school districts the supervisor shall divide and pay over the same to the treasurer or other fiscal officer of the several school districts of the town in proportion to the several totals required by and raised for each district without compensation" (see L.1920, ch. 311, as amended).

The petitions challenging the Town of Brookhaven's compliance with the above provisions were consolidated by Special Term into a single declaratory judgment action.

Special Term essentially interpreted SCTA § 13(a)(1) through (4) as requiring the Town of Brookhaven and its official within the first and second 15-day periods following delivery of the tax warrant, to allocate and distribute to the school districts one half of all tax proceeds collected and to allocate the remaining one half to other town expenses, and at 10-day intervals thereafter to distribute tax moneys between the school districts and the town in proportion to the balances still due to each. Special Term then construed section 14 to mean that the Town of Brookhaven and its officials were required to distribute and pay over the tax moneys to the individual school districts in proportion to the several amounts actually collected within each school district, such that if no taxes were collected within a certain school district, that district would then receive no distribution of tax revenues. This interpretation apparently stems from the court's finding that the word "raised", as used in the phrase in SCTA § 14, "in proportion to the several totals required by and raised for each district", is actually synonymous with the word "collected".

In reviewing these constructions, we note at the outset that this matter is truly one of first impression. Neither our own careful research nor that of the parties has disclosed any law or administrative opinions dealing with the precise issues before us. Nevertheless, we fully agree with Special Term's interpretation of section 13(a)(1) through (4). The provisions are, in our view, clear and unambiguous on their face. The gist of section 13(a)(1) is that the town's Receiver of Taxes must, within 15 days after the delivery of the warrant, allocate to the school districts one half of the amount of their levies, but such amount is not to exceed one half of the total revenues collected as of that date. Likewise, section 13(a)(2) requires that the same procedure be followed for the second 15-day period following the tax warrant's delivery. Section 13(a)(3) merely requires that, during the 30 days encompassed by (1) and (2), those moneys not allocated to the school districts are to be allocated to the Town Supervisor to cover other town expenses. The language of section 13(a)(4) is also sufficiently clear to permit a "plain meaning" interpretation. That section provides that after the initial 30-day period, all moneys collected by the Receiver of Taxes are to be distributed, at 10-day intervals, between the school districts and the town "in proportion to the balance remaining unpaid * * * until such balances are paid in full". This simply mandates that after the first 30 days have elapsed, the tax...

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