Shreeves v. United States

• Decision Date: 15 November 1978
• Docket Number: No. 9233.,9233.
• Citation: 395 A.2d 774
• Parties: Bruce H. SHREEVES, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

Page 774

395 A.2d 774

Bruce H. SHREEVES, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.

No. 9233.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued June 13, 1978.

Decided November 15, 1978.

Robert B. McCaw, Washington, D. C., with whom John H. Pickering, Arthur F. Mathews, Timothy N. Black, and Arthur B. Spitzer, Washington, D. C., appointed by the court, were on the brief, for appellant.

Cheryl M. Long, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., with whom Earl J. Silbert, U. S. Atty., and John A. Terry, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee.

Before NEWMAN, Chief Judge, FERREN, Associate Judge, and MURPHY, Associate Judge, Superior Court of the District of Columbia.^*

NEWMAN, Chief Judge:

Appellant was tried by a jury in a bifurcated trial and found guilty of felony murder, second-degree murder, and armed robbery. In the second phase of the trial, the jury rejected his defense of insanity. Appellant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) denial of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when appellant was interrogated in the D.C. Jail by a Maryland police official without the consent of his attorney; (2) denial of due process by the trial court's failure to order an independent psychiatric examination at a pretrial extradition proceeding; (3) denial of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial; (4) the trial court's failure to suppress (a) evidence seized from appellant's car by Maryland police officials during the course of their investigation into crimes committed by appellant in that state, and (b) an admission made by appellant during a post-arrest interrogation; (5) the trial court's failure to give appellant's requested jury instruction on felony murder; and (6) denial of his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury as a result of substituting two alternate jurors at the close of the insanity phase of the trial. In Part I we set forth the facts. In Part II we address the issue of whether appellant's right to counsel was violated by the Maryland police official when he interrogated appellant without the presence of or permission of appellant's counsel. In Part III we discuss the issues concerning governmental delay; i.e., failure to order an immediate psychiatric examination at the time of the extradition proceedings and the speedy trial claim. The suppression questions are addressed in Part IV, and the claims of trial court error concerning jury instruction requests and juror substitution are analyzed in Part V. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

I. FACTS

At about 7:30 a.m. on January 26, 1973, appellant and Carroll Milburn robbed and killed Charles R. Myles in front of Myles' home in the District of Columbia. Milburn, who pled guilty to a charge of second-degree murder before appellant's trial, was the principal government witness. He testified that appellant and he robbed Myles and that appellant shot and killed him with a 38 caliber revolver.

According to Milburn, appellant and he drove to the District of Columbia from St. Mary's County, Maryland in appellant's 1966 maroon Pontiac during the late afternoon of January 24, 1973. The next day they spent some time shooting target practice with three firearms at appellant's cousin's house in Montgomery County, Maryland. On their way back to the District, appellant and Milburn stopped for dinner at a restaurant. Appellant suggested that they rob Myles, who was known to carry large amounts of cash on his person.

Appellant and Milburn trailed Myles from his liquor store to a restaurant, and at about 1:00 or 2:00 a.m. they drove to Myles' house to await his return. Appellant told Milburn to go into an apartment building directly across the street from Myles' house and to come out when appellant pulled the gun.

Myles arrived at home between 7:00 and 7:30 a.m. Appellant and Milburn left the car, walked up the street to Myles' house, and started to carry out their plan. In the midst of the robbery, Milburn heard several shots and began to run away. Appellant caught up with him and the two fled the scene in appellant's car.

Appellant returned to Maryland and, the following day, January 27, engaged in several additional acts of violence, including killing a building contractor in White Oak, Maryland.¹ That evening appellant shot a St. Mary's County police officer who stopped his car to investigate the Maryland crimes. Following that incident, the St. Mary's County police posted lookouts for appellant and his maroon Pontiac.

On Sunday, January 28, Deputy Sheriff Donald W. Purdy of the St. Mary's County Police Department was notified that a car registered to appellant and believed to have been involved in two shooting incidents in Maryland had been parked on private land behind a farmers' market in Mechanicsville, Maryland, for approximately seven hours. The farmers' market was approximately three miles from where appellant had last been seen on the previous evening. When Purdy arrived at the location of the car, it began to rain. This impeded taking fingerprints from the exterior of the car. Purdy ordered the car towed to a private garage in Mechanicsville where prints were taken from the exterior and the inside of the car was examined. Rifle ammunition was found on the seat of the car and seized; a revolver holster, a rifle sheath, a pair of binoculars, and a stocking cap found under the front seat were seized. Inside the glove compartment, Purdy found a District of Columbia personal appearance bond and a traffic ticket receipt naming appellant. In addition, the police found a slip of paper on which was written the name "Miles Anderson" and the license number of a vehicle registered to Charles P. Myles, the decedent. No warrant had been sought before the search of the car.

Appellant was arrested by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the District on February 2, 1973, at about 9:40 p.m. He was charged with unlawful flight to avoid prosecution on homicide charges in Maryland. He was advised of his Miranda² rights at the scene of his arrest and again at the FBI District of Columbia field office. He signed a form indicating that he understood and waived his rights.³ Although he signed the waiver form and willingly gave the agents routine descriptive data about himself, he refused to answer questions concerning the Maryland homicides.

A few minutes later, Detective Hugh Triggs of the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) arrived at the field office and introduced himself as an MPD detective. Triggs inquired whether appellant understood his rights as already read to him, and whether he would consent to talk to him. Appellant replied that he understood his rights and would consent to speak to Triggs. Without stating that he was investigating the Myles homicide, Triggs asked appellant whether he had been in the District of Columbia on January 26, 1973. After denying his presence in the District of Columbia on that date, he admitted that he had driven into the city on that day to pay a traffic ticket. When Triggs asked whether he had driven along Warder Street that day, appellant answered, "I know what you're trying to get at. You're trying to get me involved in the shooting of the gambler." When Triggs again asked if appellant had been on Warder Street that day, he replied, "Well, I was driving down Warder Street on that day, and I saw the gambler falling. I must be a fool. I've said too much."

On the day after appellant's arrest, counsel was appointed to represent him in the extradition proceeding. On February 5, 1973, Deputy Sheriff Purdy ame to the District to attempt to persuade appellant to return voluntarily to St. Mary's County. On that day, when contacted by Purdy seeking to interview appellant, appellant's counsel informed Purdy that he would advise appellant not to talk to Purdy, but that appellant could make his own decision. When Purdy attempted to interview him, appellant said that he would not discuss the Maryland offenses at that time, but that he would do so at a later date. Between February 5 and March 7, Purdy did not see or speak to appellant, although Purdy drove into the District two or three times during that period in connection with the extradition proceedings. At those times, Purdy contacted appellant's counsel about interviewing appellant, but no interview occurred.

On March 7, however, Purdy, accompanied by a news reporter, went to the D.C. Jail to interview appellant without notifying his counsel about the intended interview.⁴ Purdy read appellant his Miranda rights, which he agreed to waive. Purdy did not tell appellant of his discussions with his trial counsel concerning the interview or that he had not informed counsel of this interview. Purdy did state that if appellant desired the presence of his attorney, he would be summoned. Shreeves stated that he understood his Miranda rights and that he did not want to call his attorney. He agreed to speak with Purdy, but before appellant would talk about the Maryland crimes he demanded that the news reporter leave the room. After the reporter had left, Purdy again read Shreeves his Miranda rights. Appellant then made admissions to Purdy about the crimes.

During this same time period, appellant's counsel, believing that there could be a serious question concerning appellant's mental status, arranged for a clinical psychologist, Dr. Eugene Stammeyer, to examine appellant at the D.C. Jail on February 10, 1973. When Dr. Stammeyer supported counsel's concerns about appellant's mental status, counsel moved, on March 1, for an independent psychiatric examination by the Forensic Psychiatry Division. In the motion, counsel argued "the right to a psychiatric examination as close in time to the offenses charged is an important component of his right to a fair trial and to due process." In its opposition, the government claimed the court had no power to order the requested examinations. Citing D.C.Code 1973, § 24-301(a), the government argued that...