Shriver v. Iowa Dept. of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., 87-1545

• Decision Date: 19 October 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-1545,87-1545
• Citation: 430 N.W.2d 921
• Parties: Francis Meredith SHRIVER, Appellant, v. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 921

430 N.W.2d 921

Francis Meredith SHRIVER, Appellant, v. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, Appellee.

No. 87-1545.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 19, 1988.

As Amended on Denial of Rehearing Nov. 23, 1988.

Thomas W. Polking of Wilcox, Polking, Gerken, Schwarzkopf & Hoyt, P.C., Jefferson, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., and Robert P. Ewald, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ames, for appellee.

Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and CARTER, LAVORATO, SNELL, and ANDREASEN, JJ.

LAVORATO, Justice.

In this judicial review proceeding Francis Meredith Shriver, the petitioner, asks us to decide two questions: (1) whether the Iowa Department of Transportation, the respondent, and the district court reasonably interpreted the driver's license revocation enhancement provision of Iowa Code section 321J.9 (1987) and (2) whether this statute is unconstitutionally vague. Although our interpretation of the enhancement provision is slightly different from the department's and the district court's, we conclude both correctly applied the provision in this case. In addition, we find no merit in the vagueness challenge. Accordingly, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On June 16, 1978, Shriver was arrested and charged with operating while under the influence of alcohol. After receiving a notice that his driving privileges would be revoked for a period of 120 days, he appealed. A period of fourteen months passed from the date of his administrative hearing until the department ruled. The department upheld the revocation, and Shriver appealed this ruling. A reviewing officer of the department upheld the hearing officer's decision.

Shriver sought judicial review of the department's ruling. Before the district court could rule on Shriver's petition for judicial review, Shriver and the department agreed to a sixty-day suspension, which became effective February 19, 1981, when his authority to drive actually terminated.

On January 28, 1987, Shriver was again charged with operating while under the influence. At the time of his arrest Shriver refused to submit to chemical testing. The arresting officer immediately served Shriver with a notice of revocation which, among other things, notified Shriver that his privileges to operate a motor vehicle were revoked under Iowa Code chapter 321J for a period of 540 days. The notice provided for a 540-day revocation pursuant to Iowa Code section 321J.9 because the officer believed Shriver's February 19, 1981, revocation had occurred "within the previous six years." See Iowa Code § 321J.9. Without such a previous revocation, the revocation period for the present incident would have been for a period of 240 days. See id.

Shriver asked for and received a hearing on the revocation of his license. Additionally, he was issued a temporary license by the department pending the results of the hearing.

The hearing officer upheld the 540-day revocation. On intra-agency appeal, the reviewing officer affirmed the hearing officer's decision. The hearing officer and the reviewing officer both held that Shriver's previous revocation, effective February 19, 1981, was a "revocation" "within the previous six years" of the current incident.

Shriver then filed a petition for judicial review, asserting that the department's interpretation of the revocation enhancement provision of section 321J.9 was unreasonable. He also asserted a fifth amendment vagueness challenge to the statute. The district court found no merit as to either assertion and upheld the department's ruling. It is from this ruling of the district court that Shriver appeals.

On appeal Shriver again challenges as unreasonable the department's and the district court's interpretation of the revocation enhancement provision of section 321J.9. He also challenges the language of the statute as impermissibly vague because it fails to provide a formula for calculating the six-year period.

II. Scope of Review.

When reviewing a district court decision on the validity of agency action, our task is to determine whether the district court has correctly applied the law. Iowa Fed'n of Labor v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 427 N.W.2d 443, 445 (Iowa 1988). In doing so, we apply the standards of Iowa Code section 17A.19(8) to the agency action to determine whether our conclusions are the same as the district court's. Id. If they are, we affirm; if they are not, we reverse. Id.

III. The Statutory Interpretation Issue.

The statutory interpretation issue we are to decide centers around the language "within the previous six years" found in Iowa Code section 321J.9. That section provides in relevant part:

If a person refuses to submit to the chemical testing ... the department, upon the receipt of the peace officer's certification ... that the person refused to submit to chemical testing, shall revoke the person's motor vehicle license ... for a period of two hundred forty days if the person has no previous revocation within the previous six years ... and five hundred forty days if the person has one or more previous revocations within the previous six years under this chapter....

Iowa Code § 321J.9 (emphasis added). Shriver and the department agree that this italicized language is ambiguous because the statute gives no clearly defined formula for calculating the dates necessary to trigger the enhanced revocation period. Our task is to decide how the enhancement provision should be applied. That requires a determination of two dates: the "remote date" of the previous revocation and the "proximate date" of the most recent incident.

Shriver argues that these dates should be the effective date of the previous revocation and the effective date of the subsequent revocation. In his view, these dates occur when administrative or court stays of the revocations are no longer in effect. The department, on the other hand, argues that these dates should be the effective date of the previous revocation and the date when a subsequent notice of revocation is first served.

Although we give deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute it administers, we have the final word on what the statute means. Johnson v. Charles City Community School Bd., 368 N.W.2d 74, 82 (Iowa), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1033, 106 S.Ct. 594, 88 L.Ed.2d 574 (1985).

We agree with both parties that the remote date should be the effective date of the previous revocation. We held in Pietig v. Iowa Department of Transportation that a person's driver's license is not revoked until there is an actual termination of the authority to drive. 385 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Iowa 1986). This means that as long as the person has a temporary license or permit under an administrative or judicial stay order, there is no revocation. Id. Our interpretation follows the statutory language of "one or more previous revocations" in section 321J.9. The "previous revocation" here occurred on February 19, 1981, the date Shriver's last driver's license revocation went into effect. Thus, the remote date was February 19, 1981.

Next, we need to decide what the proximate date should be. Once we have decided what the proximate date is, we need merely to count back in time to the remote date to see if it falls within six years of the proximate date. If it does, the enhancement provision is triggered.

Although we have no case law to aid us in determining the proximate date, we do have the following statutory language in section 321J.9:

The effective date of revocation [for the most recent revocation] shall be twenty days after the department has mailed notice of revocation to the person by certified mail or, on behalf of the department, a peace officer offering or directing the administration of a chemical test may serve immediate notice of intention to revoke and of revocation on a person who refuses to permit chemical testing.

We think this language evinces the legislature's intent that the proximate date should be the effective date of the most recent revocation. In the case of a person who submits to testing, this date is twenty days after the certified mailing of notice of revocation. In the case of a person who refuses to submit to chemical testing, the date is when the officer serves a notice of intention to revoke and of revocation. In this case, the effective date of the most recent revocation, the proximate date, was January 28, 1987, the date Shriver was arrested, refused to submit to testing, and was served with notice of intention to revoke and of revocation.

Because the remote date was February 19, 1981, that date was within six years of the most recent revocation. The department as well as the district court, correctly determined that Shriver's license should be revoked for a period of five hundred forty days rather than for a period of two hundred forty days.

Contrary to Shriver's contention, we believe our interpretation of the "within the previous six years" language of section 321J.9 is reasonable. In interpreting statutory language that is ambiguous we strive to ascertain legislative intent. Iowa Code § 4.6. In determining that intent, we consider the object sought to be attained by the statute and the consequences of a particular construction of it. Id. at §§ 4.6(1), 4.6(5).

Here, the district court ruled on October 19, 1987. Until then, Shriver was permitted to drive by virtue of administrative and court stays. Thus, under Shriver's interpretation, the effective or proximate date of his most recent revocation would have been October 19, 1987, six years and eight months after the remote date. Such an interpretation, of course, results in no enhancement of the revocation period under section 321J.9.

Obviously, then, under Shriver's interpretation it would behoove a person similarly situated to seek stays and continuances through the whole administrative and court review process. Such tactics would result in frustration of the primary purpose behind chapter 321J, which is to...