Shruhan v. City of Revere
| Decision Date | 30 June 1937 |
| Citation | 9 N.E.2d 411,298 Mass. 12 |
| Parties | SHRUHAN v. CITY OF REVERE. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Suit in equity by Paul G. Shruhan against City of Revere to remove cloud from title resulting from tax sale. Decree for petitioner, and defendant appeals.
Affirmed.Appeal from Land Court, Suffolk County; Corbett, Judge.
L. Poretsky, Asst. City Sol., of Boston, for respondent.
W. F. Porter and G. H. Millar, both of Boston, for petitioner.
Lots 17 to 24, inclusive, on a certain plan, lie in a row, each bounded by Ocean Avenue in Revere on the west and the Revere Beach Parkway on the east. They are numbered consecutively from south to north. On April 1, 1932, these lots were covered by a roller coaster built and operated as a unit by a lessee holding leases from the various owners of the lots.
Lots 19 and 21 were owned by persons who owned none of the other lots. The other six lots were owned by three trustees of a certain trust. Lot 20 was separately subject to a mortgage given by a former owner in 1901, and held on April 1, 1932, by one Chase.
The six lots numbered 17, 18, 20, 22, 23, and 24 were assessed to the trustees on April 1, 1932, as a single parcel, with a single valuation. There was no separate valuation of any lot or lots making part of the six lots assessed. On May 8, 1934, the six lots were sold as one parcel for a lump sum for nonpayment of the tax assessed April 1, 1932, and bought by the respondent City of Revere, which received a deed from the collector of taxes and now claims title.
On September 10, 1934, the petitioner bought lot 20 at a foreclosure sale under the mortgage held by Chase, and received a deed on September 26, 1934, which was duly recorded on October 2, 1934.
The petition asks that the assessment of April 1, 1932, and the tax sale thereunder be declared invalid as against the petitioner's lot numbered 20, and that the cloud resulting therefrom be removed from the petitioner's title. A decree was entered for the petitioner, and the respondent appealed.
Taxes on real estate ‘shall be assessed, in the town where it lies, to the person who is either the owner or in possession thereof on April first.’ G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 59, § 11. By sections 43-46 the mode of assessment is prescribed by reference to the ‘blank colums, with uniform headings for a valuation list’ of the assessors' valuation books. These headings call for a description and separate valuation of each lot or parcel of land owned by the person assessed. G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 60, § 37.
We need not consider how far lands owned by the same person may be assessed as one parcel at a single valuation, though treated by the owner as separate but contiguouslots (Bemis v. Caldwell, 143 Mass. 299, 9 N.E. 623), or though divided by a road which does not preclude the use of the lands as a unit (Westhampton v. Searle, 127 Mass. 502). Neither need we consider whether all eight lots could have been assessed as one parcel to the lessee in possession, for they were not so assessed. Here the six lots assessed to the trustees as one parcel were disconnected. They were in three groups separated by lots owned by and assessed to other persons.
Boston Rubber Shoe Co. v. Malden, 216 Mass. 508, 510, 104 N.E. 478, and cases cited; Lancy v. Boston, 186 Mass. 128, 133, 71 N.E. 302;Phelps v. Creed, 231 Mass. 228, 232, 120 N.E. 589. That principle is decisive of the present case, for the title of the respondent depends upon a tax lien. The right to sell land for taxes rests solely upon the existence of such a lien, which is a creature of statute and not originally a feature of the collection of taxes in this Commonwealth. Jennings v. Collins, 99 Mass. 29,...
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