Shuck v. Means

• Decision Date: 08 November 1974
• Docket Number: A,RENT-A-CA,No. 44508,A-C,44508
• Citation: 226 N.W.2d 285,302 Minn. 93
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Parties: Carole L. SHUCK, Respondent, v. David Lynn MEANS, Respondent, Hertz Rent-ar, Appellant, George A. Codling, Defendant. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff, v. HERTZ RENT-AR, Appellant, Carole L. Shuck, et al., Respondents, George A. Codling, Defendant. David Lynn MEANS, defendant and third-party plaintiff, Respondent, v. ROYAL INDEMNITY COMPANY, third-party defendant, Appellant.

Page 285

226 N.W.2d 285

302 Minn. 93

Carole L. SHUCK, Respondent, v. David Lynn MEANS, Respondent, Hertz Rent-A-Car, Appellant, George A. Codling, Defendant.

UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff, v. HERTZ RENT-A-CAR, Appellant, Carole L. Shuck, et al., Respondents, George A. Codling, Defendant.

David Lynn MEANS, defendant and third-party plaintiff, Respondent, v. ROYAL INDEMNITY COMPANY, third-party defendant, Appellant.

No. 44508.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Nov. 8, 1974.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 10, 1975.

Syllabus by the Court

Where an automobile rental agency rented an automobile under a rental agreement providing that persons under 21 years of age were not allowed to operate the vehicle, the agency nonetheless for purposes of liability under Minn.St. 170.54 of the Safety Responsibility Act is deemed to have consented to such use by a person under 21 years of age who drives the automobile with the permission of the renter.

Castor, Ditzler & Klukas and John E. Castor, Minneapolis, for appellants.

Richard Bellman, Minneapolis, for Shuck.

Katz, Taube, Lange & Frommelt, Minneapolis, for Means.

Considered and decided by the court without oral argument.

KELLY, Justice.

One of these actions was brought by Carole A. Shuck to recover for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident involving a vehicle owned by defendant Hertz Rent-A-Car and driven by defendant David Means, age 18. A second action was brought by United Services Automobile Association for declaratory judgment that an insurance policy it had issued to Means' father did not provide coverage for David Means, who in turn filed a third-party complaint for a declaratory judgment that, if no coverage existed under the United Services policy, a policy issued to Hertz by third-party defendant Royal Indemnity Company afforded Means coverage and required Royal to defend him in the Shuck action.

The parties to these suits stipulated to plaintiff Shuck's damages, to the negligence of Means, and also to the liability of Hertz conditioned on a finding that Means' use of the vehicle was with Hertz' permission and consent. The issues were then submitted to the court upon the record without oral testimony other than depositions, resulting in findings that the United Services policy did not afford coverage and that Means' use of the Hertz vehicle at the time of the accident was with the permission and consent of Hertz. Hertz and Royal Indemnity appeal from the denial of their motion for a new trial and from the judgments. We affirm.

On March 27, 1967, an automobile owned by Hertz, leased to one George A. Codling, and driven by Means, collided with an automobile in which plaintiff Shuck was a passenger. Means was uninsured at the time of the accident and the parties later stipulated that he had been negligent. The rental agreement signed by Codling was a standard form which provided that persons under 21 years of age were not allowed to operate the vehicle. The Hertz employee who had rented the car to Codling was deposed on the subject of Hertz' policy regarding minors, but she had no recollection of that particular rental transaction. In its answer to plaintiff's complaint, Hertz denied that its vehicle was being used with permission, and alleged that its possession by Means was obtained by fraud through a conspiracy between Means and Codling. And in a cross-claim against Means, Hertz alleged that Means, who could not himself obtain a vehicle from Hertz because of his age, conspired with Codling to have the latter obtain the vehicle ostensibly for his own use but in fact for the use of Means. Despite these allegations, the record is completely devoid of anything which could directly support a finding of fraud, leaving for our consideration only the following issue: Whether a car rental agency is liable under the Minnesota Safety Responsibility Act when one of its cars is leased by one person, but operated by another in violation of the rental agreement.

The applicable owner-consent statute, Minn.St.1965, § 170.54, provides as follows:

'Whenever any motor vehicle * * * shall be operated upon any public street or highway of this state, by any person other than the owner, with the consent of the owner, express or implied, the operator thereof shall in case of accident, be deemed the agent of the owner of such motor vehicle in the operation thereof.'

This provision, enacted as part of the Safety Responsibility Act, was intended to make the owners of motor vehicles liable to those injured by their operation where no such liability would otherwise exist, giving such injured persons more certainty of recovery by encouraging owners to obtain appropriate liability insurance. And to that end, the statute is to be given a liberal construction. Hutchings v. Bourdages, 291 Minn. 211, 189 N.W.2d 706 (1971).

This court, in Foster v. Bock, 229 Minn. 428, 39 N.W.2d 862 (1949), was asked to decide whether a vehicle owner was liable under the owner-consent statute...