Shuffer v. Board of Trustees

• Citation: 136 Cal.Rptr. 527,67 Cal.App.3d 208
• Parties: Jacob M. SHUFFER, Jr., Petitioner and Appellant, v. The BOARD of TRUSTEES OF the CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY AND COLLEGES, etc., et al., Respondents. Civ. 48959.
• Decision Date: 16 February 1977
• Court: California Court of Appeals

Page 527

136 Cal.Rptr. 527

67 Cal.App.3d 208

Jacob M. SHUFFER, Jr., Petitioner and Appellant, v. The BOARD of TRUSTEES OF the CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY AND COLLEGES, etc., et al., Respondents.

Civ. 48959.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.

Feb. 16, 1977.

Gerald Fink, Encino, Terrence N. McConville, Mission Hills and Allen P. Loewe, Los Angeles, for petitioner and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Thomas Scheerer and Martin H. Milas, Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondents.

JEFFERSON, Associate Justice.

Petitioner Jacob M. Shuffer, Jr., sought a writ of mandate (pursuant to Code Civ.Proc., § 1085) to compel the respondents, Trustees of the California State University and Colleges and other named University officials, to grant petitioner a Master of Arts Degree from California State University, Northridge, School of Education, in Psychological Foundations--Guidance. The action was filed November 22, 1974. Respondents demurred and also filed an answer to the petition. The demurrer was heard in the trial court on March 13, 1975. The trial court sustained the demurrer, ¹ and gave petitioner 60 days within which to amend his petition. Petitioner did not amend, and an order of dismissal of the petition was entered on September 29, 1975, reflecting that respondents' motion to dismiss had been granted September 16, 1975. Petitioner has appealed the judgment (order of dismissal).

The petition alleges that petitioner was a graduate student in good standing and an approved candidate for a Master of Arts Degree in Education at California State University, Northridge (hereinafter, Northridge) during 1971 and 1972. He was a 'classified' graduate student, one who had been accepted by the Department of Guidance and Counseling in the School of Education (hereinafter, Department) in a program which would lead to the degree.

Petitioner claims that he was required by the Department to enter into a 'contract' with the Department, which set forth the requirements to be met by him to obtain the degree, including but not limited to completion of certain specified courses with a 3.0 grade point average. Petitioner undertook an accelerated program, obtained a straight 'A' average or a 4.0 grade point average, and contemplated receipt of the M.A. degree in June, 1972.

The petition alleges that all went well with petitioner until December, 1971, when he 'noticed what seemed to be a subtle change of friendly attitude toward the Petitioner on the part of certain DEPARTMENT and other COLLEGE faculty members that caused Petitioner to be wary.' According to the petition, petitioner registered for his 1972 spring semester courses--two courses that were the final courses petitioner was required to complete--numbered EDP 557 and EDP 559B. Professor Donald Dorsey (hereinafter, Dorsey) was the teacher of EDP 559B (hereinafter, The Course). The Course commenced its meetings on February 26, 1972. Petitioner arrived and was handed a letter dated 26 Feb. 72, signed by Dorsey (exhibit M, attached to the petition and incorporated therein by reference), which stated: 'This letter is to clarify An understanding between myself and Jacob Shuffer Jr. regarding placement in the practicum EDP 559 A & B. This semester Jacob is to meet with Dr. Chernoffs' section of 559 A, however it is clearly understood that he is currently enrolled in 559 B And if in the judgment of of (sic) His fellow practicum members and Dr. Chernoffs he successfully completes this experience he will be given credit for 559B.' (Emphasis in original.)

Petitioner asserts that, in truth and in fact, there was no such agreement as was indicated in said letter. He further alleges that of all the persons enrolled in The Course, he alone was directed to meet with the Chernoff section of EDP 559A, and that he alone was subject to evaluation and grading by his fellow students.

Petitioner commenced meeting with the Chernoff class; he missed a meeting because he was not informed in time of the meeting. Petitioner's father contacted the University officials at Northridge. Both petitioner and his father became convinced that 'a systematic effort was being made by members of the school faculty to get Petitioner out of COLLEGE and not grant him his Master's Degree.'

Petitioner sought legal counsel. He was advised to insist upon attending meetings of The Course as taught by Dorsey, and did so throughout March, 1972. When petitioner appeared for The Course class on March 25, 1972, he was handed another letter (attached to the petition and incorporated therein as exhibit T), dated March 23, 1972. This letter set forth the reasons why it was felt that petitioner should participate in EDP 559A, the section taught by Chernoff. The letter set forth that petitioner's placement with Chernoff's section was 'in the best interest of yourself and the other practicum students' and that the structure of EDP 559A 'allows for a much more extensive and closer interaction between supervisor and students, and provides a much more diverse set of learning experiences . . ..' This letter reiterated that if in the judgment of Dr. Chernoff, petitioner successfully completed section EDP 559A, petitioner would receive credit for The Course. It declared that two other students were being required to meet with Dr. Chernoff's EDP 559A practicum group with a similar understanding that upon completion of that experience, they would receive credit for The Course. The letter was signed by Dorsey, Chernoff and Marion, the Department Chairman.

On March 15, 1972 Dorsey had, in writing, asked petitioner to leave his class (see exhibit W, attached to the petition and incorporated therein by reference). Petitioner, however, continued to attend and even engaged his own 'patient' for the purposes of practicing therapeutic techniques when Dorsey refused to assign a patient to him. Petitioner was given an 'Incomplete' in The Course. In spite of this fact, petitioner was allowed to participate in graduation ceremonies at Northridge. His Master's Degree, however, has never been issued by the College. Petitioner claims that he did in fact Complete The Course by his participation therein or by equivalent training elsewhere.

Petitioner asserts that he has been discriminated against in an unreasonable and capricious manner in violation of the equal-protection-of-the-laws provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He claims that respondents have failed to perform duties they were obligated to perform, and that they 'wrongfully failed and refused and continue to fail and refuse, to grant Petitioner the degree which he has rightfully earned.' Petitioner asserts that respondents specifically singled him out for requirements not made applicable to any other student, the essence of his claim that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated.

Petitioner's petition also contains the allegation that he 'exhausted all available administrative remedies required to be pursued by him' before filing the petition for mandate.

Damages asserted by petitioner are that, due to the conduct of respondents, he was unable to continue his education as planned at the University of Michigan, he was unable to work as a licensed psychotherapist during the summer of 1972, he has been unable to secure appointment as a commissioned officer in the United States Navy without his Master's Degree, and he has been denied numerous other professional opportunities.

By their demurrer to the petition, respondents raised, among other issues, the fact that the litigation between petitioner and respondents has been protracted, and that this petition constitutes the Third time that petitioner has brought this dispute into the courtroom for resolution. Respondents appear to have raised the matter both as a plea in abatement and as a Res judicata problem. To clarify the situation, we find it expedient to present pertinent procedural facts of this litigation. ²

On April 24, 1972, petitioner filed his first petition for mandate against respondents, case No. C 28088, to compel his acceptance in The Course, EDP 559B. On May 30, 1972, respondents' demurrer to this first petition was sustained on two grounds: (1) failure to exhaust administrative remedies and (2) failure to allege a cause of action for mandate because petitioner was seeking the performance of a discretionary act. Petitioner was granted leave to amend. However, amendmant was never undertaken by petitioner, nor was a dismissal entered, until, on October 29, 1974, petitioner sought dismissal of the petition, without prejudice. The superior court file reflects that, as requested by petitioner, entry of an order of dismissal was then made by the court clerk.

On August 6, 1973, petitioner filed a second action--a petition or complaint for an injunction, claiming a violation of his civil rights, and requesting damages of $10,000. The defendants or respondents were the same as those named in the first action, and in the present action. In this second action, petitioner requested that he be awarded his Master's Degree, and alleged the same general facts contained in the first petition and again in the third, the present litigation, the facts set forth, Supra. This second action was numbered NWC 34310. Respondents demurred to the petition in the second action specially and generally, I.e., informing the court of the pendency of the first action, and continuing to claim that petitioner had not stated a cause of action with respect to discretionary acts of respondents. The demurrer was sustained by the court, with leave to amend, ³ but no amendment was ever made. No judgment of dismissal was ever sought or granted; that action is still pending.

When the current matter was heard in the trial court, the court was informed by respondents' moving papers that there were other actions pending. ⁴ Respondents asserted that petitioner had brought the wrong type of...