Service Employees International Union v. Hollywood Park, Inc.

• Decision Date: 12 December 1983
• Docket Number: AFL-CI,P
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 193,laintiffs and Appellants, v. HOLLYWOOD PARK, INC., a corporation; Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc., a corporation; Federation of California Racing Associations, Inc.; International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen and Helpers of America Local 495; et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 66261.

Page 316

197 Cal.Rptr. 316

149 Cal.App.3d 745

SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 193, AFL-CIO, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. HOLLYWOOD PARK, INC., a corporation; Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc., a corporation; Federation of California Racing Associations, Inc.; International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen and Helpers of America Local 495; et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 66261.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 7, California.

Dec. 12, 1983.

Van Bourg, Allen, Weinberg & Roger, and W. Daniel Boone, San Francisco, for plaintiffs and appellants.

O'Melveny & Myers and Stephen P. Pepe, Los Angeles, for defendants and respondents Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc. and Federation of California Racing Associations, Inc. Iverson, Yoakum, Papiano & Hatch and Arnold D. Larson, Los Angeles, for defendant and respondent Hollywood Park, Inc.

THOMPSON, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of dismissal entered upon the sustaining of demurrers without leave to amend. The central issue on appeal is whether a union whose recognition is withdrawn under the circumstances of this case can state a cause of action for damages despite the lack of compulsory bargaining in California. For reasons to follow, we hold that a union can state a cause of action for damages under the California Labor Code. ¹

Plaintiffs are 92 race track security guards (individual plaintiffs) and the Service Employees International Union Local 193, AFL-CIO (SEIU), the labor association that represents them. Defendants are Hollywood Park, the Los Angeles Turf Club (Turf Club), the Federation of California Racing Associations (Federation) and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouseman and Helpers of America, Local 495 (Teamsters). ²

For at least 25 years prior to April 1979, the terms and conditions of employment of the race track security guards were determined by successive collective bargaining agreements with SEIU, which was the recognized bargaining agent of the employees. The most recent written collective bargaining agreement expired on April 10, 1979.

After a strike was called by SEIU on April 11, 1979, the Teamsters were recognized by the other defendants as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of the race track security guards. A collective bargaining agreement with the Teamsters was subsequently executed and individual plaintiffs' employment at the race track was conditioned on joining the Teamsters, designating the Teamsters as their bargaining representative and withdrawing from SEIU.

According to the allegations of the second amended complaint, the individual plaintiffs were security guards regularly employed by defendants during annual racing meets and were members of SEIU which was their sole, authorized bargaining representative. The Federation was a private association composed of 15 racing associations, including Hollywood Park and Santa Anita Park which was operated by the Los Angeles Turf Club. For over 25 years SEIU and the Employer Defendants had maintained a collective bargaining relationship, including execution of collective bargaining agreements concerning terms and conditions of individual plaintiffs' employment. Although the last collective bargaining agreement expired on April 10, 1979, "the Agreement to recognize [SEIU] as the collective bargaining agent of said employees has never expired" and Employer Defendants continue to be obligated, as they have been for more than 25 years, to collectively bargain with SEIU.

The first cause of action further alleged that, in violation of the public policies set forth in sections 923 ³ and 1117, ⁴ Employer Defendants had (1) unilaterally refused to recognize SEIU as the bargaining representative of their employee security guards despite their continuing obligation to do so; (2) unlawfully interfered with and dominated defendant Teamsters, illegally entering into discussions with respect to the security guards' wages, hours, and conditions of employment; and (3) discharged and refused to rehire the individual plaintiffs solely "to deny, prevent and interfere" with the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in section 923. It was further alleged that the individual plaintiffs are entitled to compensatory damages because of their discharge in violation of section 923 and that plaintiffs are also entitled to punitive damages.

The second cause of action incorporated all the allegations of the first cause of action and asserted that in violation of sections 1050 ⁵ and 1054, ⁶ all of the defendants are by misrepresentation preventing employment of the individual plaintiffs, "effectively maintaining a blacklist" against said employees solely because of their activities which are protected under section 923.

The third cause of action incorporated all the allegations of the prior two causes of action and it further alleged that in violation of section 1122, ⁷ the Employer Defendants have financed, interfered with, dominated or controlled defendant Teamsters, conditioned individual plaintiffs' employment at their racetracks as security guards on their joining Teamsters, knowing that the Teamsters are unauthorized and unwanted by the individual employees, and refused each individual plaintiff employment in his prior position as a security guard solely because of his refusal to designate any bargaining representative other than SEIU.

The fourth cause of action incorporated all the preceding allegations and additionally asserted that in violation of section 922, ⁸ Employer Defendants have refused to reinstate individual plaintiffs to employment unless they repudiate designation of SEIU as their bargaining representative.

The fifth cause of action incorporated all prior allegations. It further alleged that all of the defendants have, "by means of restraint, coercion, or interference," forced individual plaintiffs to withdraw from membership in and association with SEIU and prevented them from freely designating SEIU as their bargaining representative; and the Employer Defendants have discontinued recognition of SEIU as the security guards' representative solely because of SEIU's activities and conduct which are protected under section 923.

Defendants demurred to the second amended complaint on the ground that (1) SEIU had failed to state a cause of action, and (2) the Federation was misjoined as a defendant since it was not alleged to be an employer of security guards. The court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend.

Issues

The issues presented by this appeal are: (1) Should the decision be affirmed under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel? (2) Was the Federation properly dismissed from the lawsuit? and (3) Was SEIU properly dismissed as a plaintiff?

The Doctrines of Res Judicata or Collateral Estoppel Are Not Applicable

Defendants contend that "the Demurrers should be sustained on the bases of res judicata and collateral estoppel." Defendants argue that SEIU is bound by the court's prior decision in November 1979 in another proceeding (case No. 285035) sustaining demurrers to SEIU as a plaintiff and Federation as a defendant because SEIU neither amended that complaint nor appealed the sustaining of the demurrers. We disagree.

In May 1979, SEIU and eight of the individual plaintiffs herein had filed a complaint alleging two causes of action in the Los Angeles Superior Court (Case No. 285035) against the Federation, Hollywood Park and the Turf Club. On November 26, 1979, the court sustained a demurrer by the Federation on the ground that the Federation was misjoined as a party because it was not an employer of security guards. The court also sustained a demurrer by all three defendants with respect to the SEIU, concluding that SEIU "does not state facts sufficient to constitute causes of action as to itself under Labor Code Section 923 or Labor Code Section 1050." The demurrers were sustained with leave to amend. No amendments were offered. Nor was any judgment of dismissal ever entered.

" 'The doctrine of res judicata gives certain conclusive effect to a former judgment in subsequent litigation involving the same controversy ....' The doctrine applies basically to all types of final judgments that are rendered on the merits of litigation. [Citation.] It may apply to a final judgment, i.e. a dismissal, even though entered after sustaining a demurrer, if the demurrer was sustained on substantive grounds." (Shuffer v. Board of Trustees (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 208, 216, 136 Cal.Rptr. 527; italics in original.) Of course, "the res judicata effect of a judgment of dismissal ... after the sustaining of a demurrer is of limited scope" since if " 'new or additional facts are alleged that cure the defects in the original pleading, it is settled that the former judgment is not a bar to the subsequent action whether or not plaintiff had an opportunity to amend his complaint.' " (Wells v. Marina City Properties, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 781, 789, 176 Cal.Rptr. 104, 632 P.2d 217.)

The second amended complaint herein is far more detailed and contains more causes of action than the original complaint in the other proceeding. We need not, however, compare the two complaints to ascertain whether the original defects have been cured. The res judicata doctrine only applies when there is a final judgment. (See 4 Witkin, Cal.Proc. (2d ed. 1971), Judgment § 147-148, pp. 3292-3294; Grable v. Citizens Nat. Trust and Sav. Bank (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 710, 714, 331 P.2d 103.)

We cannot construe the November 1979 demurrer as a final judgment on the merits. There is no showing that a judgment was ever rendered. The record does not reflect any order of dismissal or judgment by the court subsequent to his November 26, 1979 minute order. While an action may be dismissed upon the motion of either party "when, after a demurrer to the complaint has been sustained with leave to amend, the plaintiff...