Shulman v. Hartford Public Library

• Decision Date: 05 February 1935
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: SHULMAN v. HARTFORD PUBLIC LIBRARY.

177 A. 269

119 Conn. 428

SHULMAN v. HARTFORD PUBLIC LIBRARY.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

February 5, 1935

Appeal from City Court of Hartford; Edwin M. Ryan, Judge.

Action by Max Shulman against the Hartford Public Library for the recovery of a sum claimed to be due for rent, brought to the city court of Hartford and tried to the court. Judgment for the plaintiff, from which the defendant appealed.

Frank A. Hagarty, of Hartford, for appellant.

Albert S. Bill, of Hartford, for appellee.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HAINES, BANKS, AVERY, and JENNINGS JJ.

HAINES, Judge.

The plaintiff, owner of certain premises in the city of Hartford executed a written lease to the defendant for the term of two years from November 1, 1928, with an option to the defendant for a renewal for a further term of one year. Rental for the first year was fixed at $1,080 payable $90 per month, and for the second year, $1,200, payable $100 per month, and, if the option was availed of by the defendant, the rent for the third year was to be the same as for the second.

The defendant entered into possession and paid the rent for the full two-year term of the written lease, but chose not to exercise the option to renew for a third year. Instead, before the expiration of the two-year term, it caused to be prepared and tendered to the plaintiff for his acceptance and signature another written lease for the same premises for two years beginning November 1, 1930, at a yearly rental of $1,200, payable $100 per month, with an option to the defendant for a renewal for a further term of two years at the same rental. The plaintiff told the defendant the proposed lease was satisfactory, but suggested the insertion of a clause permitting the building by the plaintiff of a stairway leading to another part of the building if the need arose, which would require taking about 4 feet of the frontage of the building and reducing the floor space 60 to 80 square feet, and, if the contingency arose, he was willing to make some provision for a reduction of the rental. He also said he was satisfied with the defendant as a tenant. To all this the defendant made no reply. The finding says: " Shulman thereupon made an offer to the said Temple [who acted for the defendant] to carry the defendant on a yearly basis at the same rental in the event they did not come to an agreement concerning the stairway. To said offer, said Temple made no reply. There was no further conversation between said Shulman and said Temple in regard to the lease, or in regard to the stairway."

The evidence justifies the request of the defendant that there be added to the finding, in substance, that the defendant did not at any time orally or in writing, agree to the reservation or to remain a tenant for another term; that on several occasions soon after the negotiations referred to, and after the expiration of the written lease, the plaintiff offered the defendant other properties in lieu of that it was occupying, and each of these was rejected after inspection, by the defendant. On May 10, 1933, the plaintiff, by his son, wrote the defendant, offering it for rent for its branch library two stores on the south side of Park street in the Rivoli Theater building, to be used instead of the store at No. 1788 Park street, and offered to " work out a satisfactory rental, and also to work out a reduction in the rental of your present location." Where a party requests the finding of certain facts which have been proved, a trial court is seldom justified in omitting them from the finding because it deems them immaterial. Senzamici v. Waterbury Castings Co., 115 Conn. 446, 450, 161 A. 860. Nothing seems to have come from these further negotiations, and the defendant remained in undisturbed possession to the end of May, 1933, paying the plaintiff $100 per month, and then vacated the premises after notice of its intention to do so. It was then informed by the plaintiff that it must pay for the months of June, July, August, September, and October of that year, at the rate of $100 per month. Upon the defendant's refusal the present action was brought. The finding also states, in substance, that there were no quarters in the vicinity which were suitable for the defendant's purposes, and that the defendant's desire to obtain a lease for a long term was because of the difficulty of obtaining new quarters at short notice.

The trial court sustained the contention of the plaintiff that, upon the disclosed facts, the defendant, in holding over, was a tenant from year to year, rather than from month to month, as the defendant claimed, and therefore liable to the plaintiff for the balance of a yearly term, five months, at $100 per month. The defendant claims that its contention is supported by the statute: " No holding over by any lessee, after the expiration of the term of his lease, shall be evidence of any agreement for a further lease; and parol leases of lands or tenements reserving a monthly rent and in which the time of their termination is not agreed upon shall be construed to be leases for one month only." General Statutes, § 5021.

Before this statute was enacted in 1866, it was the law in this state that, if a tenant held over after the expiration of a fixed tenancy of a year, he was responsible to the landlord for another year upon the same terms. Bacon v Brown, 9 Conn. 334, 338. But this was at the option of the landlord, and he could either acquiesce in the tenancy or refuse and treat the tenant as a trespasser or a tenant by sufferance. If he received the yearly rent or otherwise indicated his acquiescence, a tenancy from year to year resulted by operation of law. Coleman v. Brigham, 115 Conn. 286, 288, 161 A. 236; 1 Swift's Digest, s. p. 91; 16 R.C.L. p. 1163, § 684. The effect of the statute is to abrogate this common-law rule, and a mere holding over with consent of the landlord no longer creates a tenancy from year to year, but such a tenancy can only be established by proof of an agreement of both of the parties. Coleman v. Brigham, 115 Conn. 286, 289, 161 A. 236; Miller & Co. v. Lampson, 68 Conn. 432, 34 A....